Amidst the debate, fears, political polarization, and regrets surrounding globalization, we cannot ignore a central reality: much of it is not reversible or even resistable. As in other periods of human history where new connections are forged between geographies and civilizations—whether driven by empire building, technological change, regime change, or climate change-driven migration—Pandora’s Box, once opened, cannot be closed. We explore the major forces that will shape globalization in the future, and the policy and institutional changes needed globally and across a broad swath of countries.
CGD Policy Blogs
You may have missed a recent dry-sounding but groundbreaking report,. It summarizes data from the Global Emerging Markets (GEMs) Risk Database for a set of 11 multilateral development banks (MDBs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) on default rates on their credits to private and sub-sovereign borrowers, which accounted for 82 percent of exposure in 2019.
How have the MDBs responded to the COVID-19 crisis? A CGD note just published assembles data published so far for four of the major MDBs on their financial commitments to governments and the private sector in 2020 compared to 2008-2009 during the Global Financial Crisis. Here we summarize the sobering results.
Few would argue that collaboration and collective efforts across the multilateral development banks (MDBs) are not urgently needed. Yet while the logic and need are obvious, the actual extent of collaboration between MDBs is limited. Our recent paper explores how this gap in the international financial architecture might usefully be filled. It addresses what a new cross-MDB governing body might do and what it might look like.
The US International Development Finance Corporation has become a Rorschach test for the policy community: when they look at it, everyone sees something different.
The Biden administration and the Congress rightly went big in the recently passed American Rescue Plan at a time of tremendous need. The package was appropriately focused on the domestic side, but it did not neglect the rest of the world. One might reasonably ask then why $1 billion or $2 billion could not have been included for fighting the poverty, food insecurity, and health crises driven by the pandemic. That would have amounted 0.05 to 0.1 percent of the total package. And it would have been multiplied many times over in additional poverty reduction dollars, because that it was the MDB model does.
Last week DFC announced that it signed a framework agreement with the government of Ecuador to refinance up to $3.5 billion of the country’s external debt to China. In exchange, according to reporting by the Financial Times, the Ecuadorian government will commit to exclude Chinese companies from its telecom networks.
There are three critical and urgent issues that should rise to the top of the agenda for the upcoming meetings of the G20 and the IMF and World Bank. IMF shareholders should seize the moment to give the Fund a mandate to develop feasible but fit-for-purpose proposals in these areas.
Now more than ever women need equal access to development finance; without it, COVID-19 & DFI response efforts could potentially widen the already-significant gender gaps. Explore our new survey on gender equity in development finance.