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Reality is not yet matching rhetoric in moving from “billions to trillions” to finance the SDGs—how can we accelerate sustainable development finance?
To meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the world must ramp up development financing from billions to trillions of dollars. The COVID-19 pandemic has increased the financing needs and made them more complex. We must think beyond aid, to private finance, and unlocking developing countries’ own resources. The roles of financiers and developing country partners in mobilizing and allocating aid needs to change so that the international community can focus not only on country-by-country development, but also on pressing shared problems, such as climate change, global health and international migration. Financing must encourage a resilient and sustainable future.
At the same time that the world is looking to scale up development financing, the development financing system is becoming more complex. There are new donors, like China and India, with different development paradigms. And the emergence of new multilateral development agencies and national development banks add resources to the mix but raise the question of whether new models of international cooperation are needed to maximize the leverage of scarce financing.
Our research focuses on five questions: How can the international financial system produce sufficient funding for recovery and sustainable development? How should it be allocated to help countries rebuild their economies, meet the SDGs and confront global challenges? How can financing most effectively mobilize private capital, safeguard public monies, and keep debt levels sustainable? How can domestic resources be mobilized within developing countries? And how should existing institutions be changed to best cooperate?
The paper addresses three key issues raised by the G-7 in its proposals to reform the multilateral banks, in 2001. One, the restructuring of IDA with a part of its lending in the form of grants rather than loans. Two, the harmonization of procedures, policies and overlapping mandates among MDBs. And three, the volume of support by MDBs for Global Public Goods (GPGs) and the rankings and priorities among them.
We assess the dynamic behind the high net resource transfers of donors and creditors, IDA, bilaterals, IBRD, IMF and other multilateral creditors to the countries of sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s and 1990s. Analyzing a panel of 37 recipient countries over the years 1978-98, we find that net transfers were greater in poorer and smaller countries. The quality of countries' policy framework mattered little, however, in determining overall net transfers.
Public policy on financial crises in emerging markets has implicitly been grounded in economic theory calling for lender-of-last-resort intervention when the country is solvent, and on theory recognizing that reputational damage is the quasi-collateral enabling lending to sovereigns with no physical collateral. The call for Private Sector Involvement — PSI — in the financing of crisis resolution has appropriately arisen from the desire for fairness as well as for successful outcomes. This paper identifies an array of PSI modalities and argues that in each crisis case the most voluntary type consistent with the circumstances should be chosen, to speed return to market access.
Global private capital flows have barely touched the poorest nations; the rich invest mostly with the rich. It is possible that failures in the global capital market prevent capital from exploiting high returns in poor countries; it is also possible that fundamental returns to investment are lower in poor countries. In this paper, a novel empirical framework uses standard data to conclude that 85% of wealth bias, whether caused by market failure or not, is domestic in origin. That is, poor country lenders are deterred from investing in poor countries to nearly the same degree that rich-country lenders are.
What should the World Bank optimally do with the US$10 to $20 billion it can loan each year? Has it, in fact, done what is optimal? This study suggests a simple framework within which to measure the World Bank against an optimal international public financier for development. It goes on to argue that a careful treatment of the empirical evidence on Bank lending strongly contradicts optimal behavior under different assumptions. The evidence, in fact, rejects any notion that the Bank has substituted for private capital or that it has successfully catalyzed private development finance.
I suggest in this paper the logic of going beyond the standard, poverty-targeted, elements of good social policy to a modern social contract adapted to the demands and the constraints of an open economy. Such a contract would be explicitly based on broad job-based growth. Second, it would be politically and economically directed not only at the currently poor but at the near-poor and economically insecure middle-income strata.
In this paper I set out the economic logic for why good global economic governance matters for reducing poverty and inequality and argue that a step towards better global governance would be better representation of developing countries in global and regional financial institutions.
The US government's proposed $5 billion Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) could provide upwards of $250-$300m or more per year per country in new development assistance to a small number of poor countries judged to have relatively "good" policies and institutions. Could this assistance be too much of a good thing and strain the absorptive capacity of recipient countries to use the funds effectively? Empirical evidence from the past 40 years of development assistance suggests that in most potential MCA countries, the sheer quantity of MCA money is unlikely to overwhelm the ability of recipients to use it well, if the funds are delivered effectively.