CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT

Financing Legal Labor Migration Pathways

From Pilot to Scale

HELEN DEMPSTER · ISMAEL GÁLVEZ INIESTA · REVA RESSTACK · CASSANDRA ZIMMER

Abstract

Interest among high-income countries in using bespoke legal labor migration pathways to offset the negative impacts of aging populations and skills shortages has increased in the last decade. Even when migration is beneficial in the long-run, like all investments, these pathways incur up-font costs. Yet there is little information as to the costs involved in these pathways; how they were covered by government funding, the private sector, and the migrants themselves; and how these costs could be covered in an ethical and sustainable way to enable these bespoke pathways to scale. Based on analysis of a Center for Global Development (CGD) database of 57 legal labor migration pathways, this paper seeks to answer these questions. It therefore aims to provide support to high-income countries interested in designing, implementing, and scaling legal labor migration pathways.

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Introduction

Many high-income countries use targeted legal labor migration pathways—'bespoke' schemes separate from their general immigration policies—to temporarily or permanently attract workers skilled within specific professions. The reasons for implementing such pathways vary: from offsetting the negative impacts of aging populations; to meeting skills shortages; to developing foreign policy relationships with partner countries; to attempting to curb incentives to migrate irregularly. Regardless of the reason, interest in implementing such pathways has increased in recent years, with large potential benefits (Box 1).

For example, over the last decade, the European Union (EU) has been encouraging Member States to establish legal labor migration pathways with partner or 'third' countries. In 2012, they developed their Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) which aimed to integrate all aspects of migration and mobility with third countries into overarching 'mobility partnerships.'[1] Since that time, two new migration frameworks—the 2015 European Agenda on Migration and the 2020 New Pact on Migration and Asylum—both emphasized the expansion of legal labor migration pathways. Funding was later provided under various EU instruments to Member States to support such expansion. In early 2022, the EU agreed a new 'Skills and Talent Package' which, among other things, aims to expand legal labor migration pathways.

In North America, Canada has steadily expanded their 'bespoke' schemes, such as their 2011 agreement with Mauritius, their 2010 Temporary Foreign Worker Permit, and schemes to attract workers to staff the older persons' care sector. The United States of America (US) has steadily been expanding the quotas on their H-2A and H-2B programs, with recent moves under the Biden Administration to attract Central American and Haitian workers.[2]

Similar approaches can be seen across Asia and Australasia. In June 2018, Japan abandoned its commitment to low levels of immigration, announcing a new 'Specified Skills' visa with a plan to admit 500,000 foreign workers in 14 key sectors by 2025. Australia and New Zealand have both expanded their seasonal worker schemes in the Pacific, with Australia also bringing in a Pacific Labour Scheme (PLS) to target 'mid-skill' professionals in non-agricultural professions.[3]

Interestingly, the development of these legal labor migration pathways has largely been occurring within regional silos. High-income countries in Europe are seeking to recruit from Eastern Europe,

1 Note: 'third' countries in this context refers to any countries outside of the European Union (EU), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and the European Economic Area (EEA).

2 US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2022) "DHS and DOL Announce Availability of Additional H-2B Visas for Second Half of Fiscal Year." DHS Press Release, May 16, 2022. https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/05/16/dhs-and-dol-announce-availability-additional-h-2b-visas-second-half-fiscal-year.

3 The language surrounding 'low-,' 'mid-,' and 'high-skill' labor can be misleading, and more accurately describes the level of education required for the job rather than the skill level. See Zuzana Cepla and Helen Dempster (2021) "There's No Such Thing as a "Low"-Skill Worker." Center for Global Development (CGD) Blog, June 23, 2021. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/theres-no-such-thing-low-skill-worker.

North, and sub-Saharan Africa; those in North America are seeking to recruit from Central and South America; those in East Asia are seeking to recruit from Southeast Asia; and those in Australasia are seeking to recruit from the Pacific. As a result, there is very little overlap between the spheres of influence that high-income countries seek to work within, and little opportunity to share best practices.[4] High-income countries seeking to implement or scale their legal labor migration pathways have few lessons learned on which to draw and few connections with those implementing such pathways in other high-income countries.

To enable this information sharing, in late 2020, the Center for Global Development (CGD) decided to build a database of 57 legal labor migration pathways.[5] As described below, these pathways all involve different levels of investment by different actors, and therefore provide a range of experiences that are relevant for the development of new legal labor migration pathways.

While there are many purposes for which this data could be used, this paper focuses on how these migration pathways are financed. Many of these pathways are directly supported by governments in countries of destination, often through overseas development assistance (ODA), with some receiving co-financing from governments in countries of origin, multilateral organizations, the private sector, and migrants themselves. Often these pathways, particularly those that were conceived in a pilot form, are criticized for being both small-scale and not having a plan to ethically and sustainably transfer financial responsibility away from the country of destination.[6] As a result, this paper seeks to support high-income countries in creating new and expanding existing legal labor migration pathways by answering three key questions: What costs are involved in a legal labor migration pathway? Who bears or should bear these costs? And how can pathways transition from pilot to scale in an ethical and sustainable way?

4 There are some exceptions to this. In late 2018, 164 countries adopted the *Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration* (GCM). It's fifth objective is to "enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration." The various regional review mechanisms for the GCM, as well as the 2022 International Migration Review Forum (IMRF), provide an opportunity for countries to discuss the implementation of legal labor migration pathways on a global scale. Similarly, the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) aims to bring together both national policymakers and civil society actors to discuss the issue.

5 To explore the database, please visit https://cgdev.org/bettermigration.

6 Kate Hooper (2019) *Exploring New Legal Migration Pathways: Lessons from Pilot Projects.* Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute (MPI). https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TCM_MigrationPilotProjects-FINAL%20WEB.pdf.

BOX 1. The benefits of expanded legal labor migration

This paper primarily focuses on the costs involved in establishing and expanding legal labor migration pathways. Yet it is important to acknowledge that these costs are just one side of the ledger. Expanding legal labor migration pathways can bring a wide range of economic and non-economic benefits—to the migrants themselves, their communities and countries of origin, and their countries of destination—which offset the costs involved in their migration. These benefits have been well covered in the literature, though will be briefly outlined below.[7] Due to their diffuseness, they are hard to quantify, making it difficult to perform a detailed return on investment (ROI) calculation for different actors in this space. Despite this, some pathways (such as the 'Australia Pacific Training Coalition (APTC)') have attempted to do so, as explained in this paper.

Economic

Labor migration increases expected incomes for migrants in the short-term[8] and communities at home in the long-term.[9] Of course, the net increase in income that migrants receive depends on the extent to which they can integrate into their country of destination and have their skills and qualifications recognized.[10] The economic impacts on countries of origin are less clear but typically positive. People with higher levels of education are two to three times more likely to emigrate than those with lower levels of education, leading to concerns about 'brain drain.'[11] This is mitigated by the fact that in countries with high rates of unemployment, a reduction in labor supply can contribute to job creation and wage growth for those who remain.[12] Migrants also send financial

7 OECD (2014) *Is migration good for the economy?* Migration Policy Debates. Paris: OECD. https://www.oecd.org/migration/OECD Migration Policy Debates Numero 2.pdf.

8 Michael A. Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro, and Lant Pritchett (2019) "The Place Premium: Bounding the Price Equivalent of Migration Barriers." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 101(2): 201–213. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00776.

9 Mats Hammarstedt and Mårten Palme (2012) "Human capital transmission and the earnings of second-generation immigrants in Sweden." *IZA Journal of Migration* 1(4). https://doi.org/10.1186/2193-9039-1-4.

10 Helen Dempster, Jenniffer Dew, Samuel Huckstep, Martina Castiglioni, and Cassandra Zimmer (2022) *Enhancing the Development Impact of the UK's Immigration Pathways*. Center for Global Development (CGD) Policy Paper 258. London: CGD and International Organization for Migration (IOM). https://cgdev.org/publication/enhancing-development-impact-uks-immigration-pathways; and OECD (2018) *Settling in 2018: Main Indicators of Immigrant Integration*. Paris: OECD. https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/Main-Indicators-of-Immigrant-Integration.pdf.

11 Jeffrey Grogger and Gordon H. Hanson (2011) "Income maximization and the selection and sorting of migrants." *Journal of Development Economics* 95(1): 45–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.06.003.

12 Christian Dustmann, Tommaso Frattini, and Anna Rosso (2012) "The Effect of Emigration from Poland on Polish Wages." *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 117(2): 522–564. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12102; and Prachi Mishra (2007) "Emigration and wages in source countries: Evidence from Mexico." *Journal of Development Economics* 82(1): 180–199. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.09.002.

remittances back home, sometimes having a larger impact on the gross domestic product (GDP) of those countries than either ODA or foreign direct investment (FDI).[13] Labor migration also widens and deepens networks and lowers barriers to information, increasing trade and FDI.[14]

Expanding labor migration can also positively impact countries of destination. Migrants are usually better educated, higher-skilled, and younger than their host population, reducing the negative impact of demographic decline[15]; increasing innovation and productivity[16]; and contributing new skills to the labor market.[17] For example, a recent study from the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) found that Skill Mobility Partnerships in particular increase GDP per worker by 2 percent, which amounts to an estimated gain of €2.8 billion in annual EU-27 GDP.[18] Much of this gain depends on whether the legal labor migration pathway is bringing in workers who 'complement' the skills held by hosts, rather than substituting.[19] Certainly, employers in countries of destination often rely on economic migrants to offset skills shortages. Leaving these roles unfilled can constrain the ability of firms to grow and become more productive.[20] In contrast to common narratives of migration, if roles are filled by migrants, it can enable firms to employ additional local workers.[21]

13 World Bank (2021) *Resilience: COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens.* Migration and Development Brief 34. Washington DC: World Bank. https://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/Migration and Development Brief 34_1.pdf.

14 Beata S. Javorcik, Çağlar Özden, Mariana Spatareanu, and Cristina Neagu (2011) "Migrant networks and foreign direct investment." *Journal of Development Economics* 94(2): 231–241. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.01.012.

15 Benedict Clements, Kamil Dybczak, Vitor Gaspar, Sanjeev Gupta, and Mauricio Soto (2015) *The Fiscal Consequences of Shrinking Populations.* International Monetary Fund (IMF) Staff Discussion Note 15/21. Washington DC: IMF. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdn1521.pdf.

16 Gnanaraj Chellaraj, Keith E. Maskus, and Aaditya Mattoo (2005) "The Contribution of International Graduate Students to US Innovation." *Review of International Economics* 16(3): 444–462. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2007.00714.x; Michael A. Clemens (2012) *The Effect of International Migration on Productivity: Evidence from Randomized Allocation of U.S. Visas to Software Workers at an Indian Firm.* Center for Global Development (CGD) Working Paper. Washington DC: CGD. https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2013/retrieve.php?pdfid=459; William R. Kerr and William F. Lincoln (2010) *The Supply Side of Innovation: H-1B Visa Reforms and US Ethnic Invention.* NBER Working Paper 15768. Washington DC: NBER. https://www.nber.org/papers/w15768; and Max Nathan (2015) "Same difference? Minority ethnic inventors, diversity and innovation in the UK." *Journal of Economic Geography* 15(1): 129–168. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbu006.

17 Ekrame Boubtane, Jean-Christophe Dumont, and Christophe Rault (2014) "Immigration and economic growth in the OECD Countries." *Oxford Economic Papers* 68(2): 340–360. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpw001.

18 Cecilia Navarra and Meenakshi Fernandes (2021) *Legal migration policy and law: European added value assessment.* Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU(2021)694211.

19 David Card (2009) "Immigration and Inequality." *American Economic Review* 99(2): 1–21. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.99.2.1; Cristina Cattaneo, Carlo V. Fiorio, and Giovanni Peri (2015) "What Happens to the Careers of European Workers When Immigrants "Take Their Jobs"?" *The Journal of Human Resources* 50(3): 655–693. http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/50/3/655.abstract.

20 European Investment Bank (EIB) (2018) *Investing in Europe's future: the role of education and skills.* London: EIB. https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/EIB-investing_in_europes_future_the_role_of_education_and_skills_en.pdf.

21 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) (2019) *2019 RSE Survey.* Wellington: MBIE. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/statistics/rse-2019-survey-report.pdf.

Non-economic

Countries and communities of origin can benefit from expanded legal labor migration pathways in numerous non-economic ways. An increased possibility of migrating increases demand for schooling, skill attainment, business growth, and further migration, the benefits of which magnify over time.[22] Migration partnerships can also directly channel support into training and educational institutions, improving equipment and infrastructure, and helping to align curricula (therefore increasing the migration options available to graduates).

Countries of destination can also benefit. Providing meaningful access to the labor markets of high-income countries can help the development of foreign policy relationships; provide more opportunities for increased private sector investment and trade; and encourage environmental migration in a managed and mutually beneficial way.[23] Finally, expanding legal labor migration pathways may have an impact on irregular movement. While it is difficult to understand the precise impact of opening new pathways[24] there is some evidence that doing so, coupled with robust border enforcement, can divert migration to more regular channels.[25]

Understanding legal labor migration pathways

Most countries of destination maintain a general immigration system which allows for the admission of people for work, study, family, leisure, and humanitarian reasons. Both political and economic considerations drive the numbers and types of people that a country seeks to admit and the rights

22 Paolo Abarcar and Caroline Theoharides (2020) "Medical Worker Migration and Origin-Country Human Capital: Evidence from U.S. Visa Policy." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 1–46. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01131; Michel Beine, Fréderic Docquier, and Hillel Rapoport (2008) "Brain Drain and Human Capital Formation in Developing Countries: Winners and Losers." *The Economic Journal* 118(528): 631–652. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02135.x; and Gaurav Khanna, Dean Yang, and Caroline Theoharides (2021) "Beyond Remittances: How Migrant Wages Help Communities Back Home." Center for Global Development (CGD) Blog, November 24, 2020. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/beyond-remittances-how-migrant-wages-help-communities-back-home.

23 Helen Dempster, Amelia Dal Pra, and Mariam Traore Chazalnoël (2021) *Facilitating Environmental Migration through Humanitarian and Labour Pathways: Recommendations for the UK Government*. Center for Global Development (CGD) Policy Paper 245. Washington DC: CGD. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/facilitating-environmental-migration-through-humanitarian-and-labour-pathways; and Samik Adhikari, Michael Clemens, Helen Dempster, and Nkechi Linda Ekeator (2021) *Expanding Legal Migration Pathways from Nigeria to Europe: From Brain Drain to Brain Gain*. Washington DC: Center for Global Development (CGD) and World Bank. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/expanding-legal-migration-pathways-nigeria-europe-brain-drain-brain-gain.

24 Rachel Cooper (2019) *Legal Pathways' Effects on Irregular Migration*. London: GSDRC. https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/14486/569_Regular_Pathways_Effects_on_Iregular_Migration.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; and Mathias Czaika and Hein De Haas (2013) "The Effectiveness of Immigration Policies." *Population and Development Review* 39(3): 487–508. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2013.00613.x.

25 Jessica Bither and Astrid Ziebarth (2018) *Creating Legal Pathways to Reduce Irregular Migration? What We Can Learn from Germany's "Western Balkan Regulation"*. Berlin: The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS). https://www.gmfus.org/news/creating-legal-pathways-reduce-irregular-migration-what-we-can-learn-germanys-western-balkan; and Michael Clemens and Kate Gough (2018) *Can Regular Migration Channels Reduce Irregular Migration? Lessons for Europe from the United States*. Center for Global Development (CGD) Brief. Washington DC: CGD. https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/can-regular-migration-channels-reduce-irregular-migration.pdf.

provided to them once they arrive. Generally, countries of destination seek to encourage the admission of 'high-skill' migrants, often providing generous visa provisions including a pathway to permanent residency and citizenship. Yet such countries are also experiencing aging demographics and large skills shortages, particularly in 'low-skill' and 'mid-skill' professions. This has necessitated discussions within countries of destination as to the extent of legal labor migration that is desirable to meet these economic needs.

Often, countries of destination use what we call 'legal labor migration pathways' to admit these migrants. Such pathways are often 'bespoke' schemes, 'bolt-ons' to a country's general immigration policy to facilitate the movement of a set number of workers skilled in a certain profession. The line between these 'bespoke' schemes and a country's general immigration policy can be blurry; for example, shortage occupation lists lower the admission requirements for labor migrants with specific skill-sets, but wouldn't necessarily be labeled as a specific 'pathway.'

For the analysis in this paper, we use the following definition of a legal labor migration pathway. Our definition includes pathways that are moving people for work between a lower-income country of origin to a higher-income country of destination; are skill and / or sector-targeted; and have an important government component in their design and / or implementation. This definition is deliberately narrow, and we acknowledge that it excludes many pathways which are worthy of analysis, including those that promote South-South migration and those designed and implemented by the private sector.[26] Yet we chose this definition as it allows us to compare lessons learned across a variety of pathways implemented by high-income countries and provide recommendations to their policymakers.

Using this definition, we have identified 57 relevant pathways, both temporary and permanent, current and completed (see Annex 1). Some of these pathways are what are known as pilot projects, implemented within a deliberately narrow timeframe and scope in order to test assumptions in advance of scaling. Others could be seen as regular migration pathways, larger (or even un-capped) in terms of both time and scope. Generally, they fall within three types:

1. **Apprenticeships and traineeships.** These pathways are usually explicitly circular, facilitating short-term (e.g. six- to nine-month) visas for early career professionals in a bid to ensure skilled talent returns to their country of origin.
2. **Circular, long-term temporary, and permanent general visa schemes.** These pathways vary in length, but are usually targeting 'mid-' and 'high-skill' professionals with some work experience to occupy roles within high-income countries on a long-term temporary or permanent basis.

26 We also acknowledge that there will be pathways that have been unintentionally excluded, and errors in the data for the pathways that have been included. Please do get in touch to add to or edit the data.

3. **Seasonal agriculture, horticulture, or food processing.** These pathways are usually facilitating short-term (e.g. six- to nine-month) visas for 'low-skill' seasonal workers. Circularity is usually encouraged, and there are few options to extend visas or to transfer onto a different visa category.

All migration incurs costs. If a migrant wants to move to a country of destination, they will likely need to find investment to cover their visa, airfare, accommodation, subsistence, and any pre-departure training or up-skilling requirements. Despite efforts by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and other international actors to regulate the costs that migrants themselves should have to cover, in practice, they tend to cover the majority (see Box 6). This could be because they anticipate greater returns through migration which will offset the costs of migration and / or because no other sources of finance are available. Sometimes these costs are covered or subsidized by their eventual employer or the country of destination. Many of the seasonal agriculture, horticulture, and food processing legal labor migration pathways in our analysis fall under this type of model. The country of destination may provide some support to the country of origin and / or the migrants themselves, prior to migration, such as covering the costs of pre-departure training or visa processing. Beyond this, however, little investment is provided.

Other legal labor migration pathways operate differently. A country of destination may want to guarantee that migrants arriving on their shores come with a set of skills—whether soft (such as language or cultural awareness) or hard (such as a diploma or degree in a specific profession)—which will aid their economic and social integration. If a country of destination is seeking workers with skills, they may provide investment to the country of origin or the migrants themselves to fund the development of such skills. This investment could be minimal (such as funding a six-month language refresher course) or substantial (such as funding a three-year nursing qualification). In the latter case, a country of destination could provide additional support to a country of origin to 'compensate' that country for sending workers, often to meet the development priorities of the country of origin.

In order to compare costs and lessons learned across similar pathways, this paper groups the 57 legal labor migration pathways in our database into three categories of investment: those where the country of destination has committed no or little investment prior to migration; where they have committed a minimal level of investment; and those where they have committed a substantial level of investment. As described in Annex 1, the costs involved in these pathways vary widely and involve different contributions from different actors, such as governments (in the country of origin or destination); multilateral organizations; the private sector or foundations; and the migrants themselves. Our paper aims to outline these costs, the sources of funding (including their pros and cons), and explore whether such arrangements are ethical and sustainable in the long-run (Box 2).

BOX 2. Designing an ethical and sustainable legal labor migration pathway

There is no singular definition of an ethical and sustainable legal labor migration pathway, nor of the elements that it must include. The *Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration* (GCM) lays out several principles upon which legal migration should be based. Objective 5—"Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration"—calls on countries to develop "human rights-based" and "gender-responsive" pathways which uphold the rights of the migrants themselves and their families, while also meeting the needs of both countries of origin and destination.[27] These principles, and those contained in the documents the Compact builds upon such as the various ILO conventions, must be paramount.

There are also other considerations that apply to specific sectors. For example, the World Health Organization's (WHO) *Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel* states that health worker migration can deplete countries of origin of needed resources.[28] As a result, international recruitment from countries with a "critical shortage" of health workers can only be ethical and sustainable if it is conducted under a government-to-government agreement that prioritizes the development and sustainability of health systems in their countries of origin.[29]

This paper focuses on what an ethical and sustainable legal labor migration pathway would look like from a financial standpoint. As a result, an 'ethical' pathway would prioritize the needs of the migrants, their families, and their communities, while upholding ILO and other principles pertaining to the financing of migration. A 'sustainable' pathway would be one which was able to be piloted and scaled (if appropriate) to the benefit of all parties involved. This likely means that the pathway would need to be financed using funding sources which were available long-term and largely insulated from changing political or public demands.

What costs are involved?

The creation and expansion of legal labor migration pathways brings large economic and non-economic benefits for both countries of origin and destination (Box 1). However, these activities also come at a cost; the most obvious being financial. Designing an ethical and sustainable migration pathway, where all actors are satisfied with their part of the bill, is a key component of

27 United Nations (UN) (2018) *Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration*. New York: UN. https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/180713_agreed_outcome_global_compact_for_migration.pdf.

28 World Health Organization (WHO) (2010) *User's Guide: The WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel*. Geneva: WHO. file:///C:/Users/hdempster/Downloads/WHO_HSS_HRH_HMR_2010.2_eng%20(2).pdf.

29 Michael Clemens and Helen Dempster (2021) *Ethical Recruitment of Health Workers: Using Bilateral Cooperation to Fulfill the World Health Organization's Global Code of Practice*. Center for Global Development (CGD) Policy Paper 212. Washington DC: CGD. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/ethical-recruitment-health-workers-using-bilateral-cooperation-fulfill-world-health.

its success. This, therefore, requires a thoughtful understanding of the costs involved. Yet design, implementation, and operational costs are very complex, can be substantial, and can vary greatly depending on the nature of the pathway. The challenge faced by policymakers is not only keeping these costs manageable, but also equally distributing these costs among all actors involved in the pathway (described in more detail in the sections below). This should be achieved while guaranteeing that the goals are reached.

In what follows, we outline the average costs across the 57 legal labor migration pathways that fall under our definition above (full costs are included in Annex 1). We collected information about the costs involved in our pathways in three ways: through a comprehensive literature review of background documents and other publicly available information; through interviews with designers and implementers of the legal labor migration pathways; and through budgets specifically provided to the research team by five of the pathways in our database.[30] In particular, we aim to identify those costs which must be borne by actors aiming to recruit migrants (rather than local workers), though acknowledging that this separation can be difficult (e.g., salary costs will be borne regardless).

Any analysis of these costs comes with a range of caveats. Firstly, itemized costs for legal labor migration pathways are extremely difficult to procure. With few exceptions, a very small number of projects share unit costs or display a detailed list of the items that make up the total cost of the program. For the purposes of this paper, we sourced costs from a range of different documents, as shown in Annex 1. As such, it is likely that some costs are missing or have been double-counted. Secondly, costs are not comparable. Below, we have included an average per participant cost within each element. Yet these costs vary depending on the nature and design of the pathway. Bringing a migrant by plane from the Philippines to the United Kingdom (UK) will incur a larger travel cost than bringing one by bus from Mexico to the US. A draft budget is contained in Annex 2 and individual pathways should input their costs into this budget to obtain a more realistic estimate. This paper should therefore be seen as a conversation starter as to the various costs involved in migration and who does and should cover these, rather than a definitive answer as to future budgets.

Essential costs

As described above, all legal labor migration pathways have fixed costs that must be incurred regardless of the type of pathway. These elements are outlined below, including the average cost per participant identified in our pathways and the share of the budget that is taken up with these elements.

30 The authors are grateful to the designers and implementers of these pathways for sharing their full budgets. All costs have been averaged to avoid detailed information of specific pathways being obtained by the reader.

Pre-selection of candidates

This could involve providing funding to recruitment agents, employer associations, border agencies, or international organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to cover the identification, screening, and processing of migrants who will eventually take up work in the country of destination. One voluntary component of this element is the implementation of workshops and examinations designed to test the skills of applicants. These costs would largely likely be incurred even if an employer was to recruit a local worker, minus specific visa and placement fees.

In our pathways, the pre-selection of candidates costs roughly US$5,130 or €4,366 per participant. The share of the budget that is taken up by this element varies depending on the type of the pathway. For example, pathways that have substantial training components may dedicate relatively little to the pre-selection of candidates (e.g., 20–25 percent of the total budget), given that the candidates have already participated in training. For pathways with minimal or no investment in training, the resources destined for the selection of migrants become the most important item in the budget. This is the case for temporary programs aiming to fulfill seasonal needs in the agricultural, horticultural, and food processing sectors (e.g., 'Collective Management of Hiring in the Country of Origin').

Project implementation

This could include providing salaries to staff and external consultants (for project management, financial reporting, and communications purposes) and operational costs (such as equipment and supplies e.g., rent and telecommunications). Depending on the nature of the pathway, it may also bear accommodation costs (such as housing rental) and / or food and other allowances or subsidies for participants (such as medical insurance). We have largely excluded salaries (including social insurance contributions) as these are normally borne by the employer directly.

In our pathways, project implementation costs came to US$6,935 or €5,903 per participant. As above, for larger programs, this accounted for roughly 30–35 percent of the budget.

Travel

All pathways included some allowance for travel costs, including visas and airfares. Obviously, these costs would not be borne if an employer was hiring a local worker, and these costs are often some of the first to be passed on to the migrant themselves.

In our pathways, travel costs came to US$705 or €600 per participant. These were a modest part of the budget in larger programs; less than five percent. However, as above, the share of the budget dedicated to travel would be larger in programs that invest less in training.

Voluntary costs

Training

Some legal labor migration pathways choose to incorporate a training or skill-building element. The extent of this training runs the gamut from short-term pre- and post-departure training (e.g., modules on rights, language, and cultural awareness); to medium-term informal courses delivered by skills hubs and technical colleges (e.g., in programming languages or food preparation); through to long-term formal degree programs delivered by universities (e.g., a Bachelor of Nursing degree). All aim to provide migrants with the skills they will need within the country of destination and, if the pathway is aiming to be circular, the skills migrants will need when they return home. Training could be delivered within the country of origin, destination, or a combination of the two.

For example, in the 'Pilot Project Addressing Labour Shortages Through Innovative Labour Migration Models (PALIM)' program between Morocco and Belgium, migrants are trained in information, communications, and technology (ICT) skills within Morocco, with half of trainees then moving to the region of Flanders, Belgium. Another example is the program 'Global Skills Partnership Nursing in the Philippines' between the Philippines and Germany where participants receive two years of general nursing training prior to migration. In addition to skill development, these pathways also include short courses in language and cultural awareness.

Unfortunately, information is not robust enough to compare the cost of training between different providers. This will depend on the nature of the provider, the characteristics of the training being provided, and the country in which the training is being provided. Certainly, available evidence seems to suggest that the cost of delivering a comparable course is lower in the country of origin, suggesting a higher rate of return to a legal labor migration pathway if they deliver training before a migrant departs.[31]

In our pathways, the cost of training was extremely variable. On average, per participant, it came to US$8,004 or €6,812. This represented the largest fraction of most budgets, coming to around 30–40 percent, with the most significant item being the payment to the institution delivering the training.

Monitoring and evaluation

Finally, some legal labor migration pathways include a budget for monitoring and evaluation. Pathways could conduct the evaluation internally (in which case the cost is staff time) or externally, signing cooperation agreements with universities or international organizations to run surveys on

31 Satish Chand, Michael Clemens, and Helen Dempster (2021) *A Pacific Skills Visa: Improving Opportunities for Skilled Migration Throughout the Pacific Region.* Center for Global Development (CGD) Policy Paper 231. Washington DC: CGD. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/pacific-skills-visa-improving-opportunities-skilled-migration-throughout-pacific-region.

their behalf (e.g., Belgium's 'Pilot Project Addressing Labour Shortages Through Innovative Labour Migration Models (PALIM)' contracted UCLouvain[32]). These evaluations may include soliciting information and feedback from migrants and employers (e.g., New Zealand's 'Recognised Seasonal Employer' scheme conducts employer tracer surveys). Finally, some pathways also finance events, conferences, and workshops to share lessons learnt.

In our pathways, the average cost per participant for monitoring and evaluation was US$2,726 or €2,320. For some, especially those with larger training components for which they may want a better sense of outcomes, this came to approximately 10 percent of the total budget.

Comparing across pathways

The cost of implementing a legal labor migration pathway is therefore determined by several choices made by those designing and implementing the pathway; in particular, regarding the type and length of training provided.

For example, pathways which are attracting workers for seasonal agriculture, horticulture, and food processing roles are usually aiming to improve the efficiency in the matching process between foreign workers and employers with vacant jobs. Consequently, programs under this category focus on building institutions and the legal framework for employers to efficiently supplement their workforce with migrants. If training is provided, it is likely to be standard pre- and post-departure training (rather than skills training), meaning that it is often short-term and cheap. Our data validates this idea, showing that the average cost per participant in such a type of pathway is around US$1,058, or €1,000. This includes the fees to recruitment agencies involved in the pre-selection of candidates and pre- and post-departure training.

Other pathways include some form of more extensive training, often delivered in the country of origin. For example, projects such as 'Mediterranean Network for Training Orientation to Regular Migration (MENTOR)' and 'Enhancing Tunisian youth employability through vocational apprenticeships and professional internships in Belgian companies' include pre-departure training in soft skills such as language and cultural awareness. As a result, the cost per participant radically increases to between US$9,000 and $19,000 per participant.

Yet the pathways with the largest total budgets are those that finance medium- or long-term soft and hard skills development within the country of origin. On average, the cost per participant in these programs is around US$23,500 or €20,000. This amount, of course, varies with the duration of the program (which usually lasts from six months to one year) and the length of the training period.

32 For more information, please see UCLouvain, "PALIM: CEDIE." https://uclouvain.be/en/research-institutes/juri/cedie/palim.html.

How are these costs covered?

The 57 legal labor migration pathways in our database are all financed by different combinations of actors, notably governments (particularly in the country of destination), the private sector, and migrants themselves. In the following section, we outline how these actors have financed or are currently financing legal labor migration pathways, the varying degrees of success pathways have had when relying on these actors as a funding source, and other potential models for financing pathways.

Government

The vast majority of our 57 legal labor migration pathways have some form of government financial contribution, usually from the country of destination. For example, the Australian government has spent AU$463 million (approximately US$328 million) on their flagship 'Australia Pacific Training Coalition (APTC),' part of which is aiming to encourage the migration of graduates to Australia. The German government spent €1.7 million (approximately US$1.8 million) on the 'Promoting legal mobility among highly qualified Tunisian experts' project, and many millions more on their other legal labor migration pathways. And the Dutch government spent €3.8 million (approximately US$4 million) on their 'Blue Birds' project, despite ultimately only receiving eight migrants.[33] Yet while the costs spent on these pathways may seem large, they pale in comparison to the amounts spent on irregular migration by the same governments (Box 3).

BOX 3. Spending on regular vs irregular migration

Most high-income country of destination governments would frame their migration policy and partnerships as aiming to both encourage regular migration (especially of 'high-skilled' workers) and discourage irregular migration. For example, the US' White House *Collaborative Migration Management Strategy* aims to "strengthen legal pathways for those who choose to or are forced to migrate, and reduce irregular migration" in order to promote "safe, orderly, and humane migration."[34]

Yet despite this dual aim, the amount of financial resources committed (not to mention political and public attention) is wildly imbalanced. Here, the EU provides an excellent example. In 2015, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) was agreed. It had five stated aims, including

33 Melissa Siegel and Vivianne van der Vorst (2012) *Evaluation of the 'Blue Birds' Circular Migration Pilot in The Netherlands*. Maastricht: Boekenplan. https://migration.unu.edu/publications/reports/evaluation-of-the-blue-birds-circular-migration-pilot-in-the-netherlands.html.

34 US White House (2021) *Collaborative Migration Management Strategy*. Washington DC: White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Collaborative-Migration-Management-Strategy.pdf.

addressing irregular migration and enhancing cooperation on legal migration and mobility. Between November 2015 and May 2019, the EUTF approved projects worth almost €4 billion (approximately US$4.2 billion); by 2021 its budget had risen to €5 billion.[35] Of this, just €56 million (approximately US$60 million) was allocated to regular migration schemes, less than 1.5 percent of the total budget. In fact, Oxfam concluded that the success of many EUTF projects rests on their contribution to reduced irregular migration flows.[36] And this is just money spent to reduce irregular migration *in countries of origin.* It has been estimated that billions more have been spent *in countries of destination* on border controls and management.[37]

Given the relationship between legal and irregular immigration espoused above, it is reasonable to assume that countries of destination seeking to 're-route' potential migrants would spend money on both expanding legal pathways and border controls to reduce irregular migration. Yet the discussion in this paper shows that, while costs regarding the former are large, they pale in comparison to that spent on the latter.

Given that countries of destination had a wide variety of objectives when establishing these 'bespoke' schemes (including some that were unwritten), it is difficult to state whether these schemes have been successful. For example, they may have encouraged better cooperation on migration with a country of origin; improved the capacity of their migration management agencies; or proved to employers the skills of migrants from a country of origin, even if costs remained high, numbers remained low, and the pathway remained in pilot form.

Yet certainly countries of destination have found it difficult to scale these 'bespoke' schemes and / or integrate them into their broader migration schemes. One of the primary reasons for this difficulty is the cost involved in such pathways and a lack of political will to sustain these costs. Often these high per-capita costs occur because the pathway includes a substantial training component. Ironically, these costs are often imposed on the pathway due to strict immigration requirements in the country of destination. For example, migrants may need to speak the local language to a certain level, which requires investment in language training (often covered by the country of destination). In other cases, migrants may need to earn or re-certify professional credentials such as licenses to work independently and / or perform specific duties or tasks. Often this can require long-term and expensive training; for example, sponsoring a Bachelor of Nursing degree. Investing in training helps program participants succeed at their roles in countries of destination and ensures that migrants

35 Mehari Taddele Maru (2021) *Migration Policy-making in Africa: Determinants and Implications for Cooperation with Europe.* European University Institute (EUI) Working Paper 2021/54. Fiesole: Robert Schumann Centre for Advanced Studies, EUI. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/71355.

36 Tuuli Raty and Raphael Shilhav (2020) *The EU Trust Fund for Africa: Trapped between aid policy and migration politics.* Oxford: Oxfam International. https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/the-eu-trust-fund-for-africa-trapped-between-aid-policy-and-migration-politics-620936/.

37 John Cosgrave, Karen Hargrave, Marta Foresti, and Isabella Massa with Justin Beresford, Helen Dempster, and Joanna Rea (2016) *Europe's refugees and migrants: Hidden flows, tightened borders and spiralling costs.* London: ODI. https://odi.org/en/publications/europes-refugees-and-migrants-hidden-flows-tightened-borders-and-spiralling-costs/.

do not end up underemployed. Even pathways without a substantial training component can involve high operational costs in the establishment and running of the pathway.

These costs are often covered by ODA and / or other parts of the government's central budget (Box 4). A lack of political will to use these public funds, coupled with changing views as to the amount of aid that should be spent (and on what), can threaten the sustainability of a project. A change in political support for a program can therefore quickly end it all together. This was the case for 'Blue Birds,' a program that sought to bring 160 migrants from South Africa and Indonesia to the Netherlands to work in agribusiness, the food industry, logistics, manufacturing, and shipping.[38] 'Blue Birds' was ended early, in 2011, after the newly elected Dutch government felt that supporting a labor migration program while at the same time vowing to lower domestic unemployment would result in "poor optics."[39]

BOX 4. Should Official Development Assistance (ODA) be spent on developing legal labor migration pathways?

ODA is defined by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as "government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries."[40] It is the main source of financing for development aid.

There is an ongoing debate as to whether aid can be spent on projects that also have some benefit for the country distributing the aid (a 'win-win,' or 'aid in the national interest').[41] Certainly, many of the legal labor migration pathways outlined in this note are explicitly couched in this language, and some are (at least in part) financed through ODA.

Knoll and Sheriff (2017) explored the spending of ODA on migration and refugee activities.[42] Their interviewees noted that they are facing pressure to spend ODA on migration activities, especially activities that those in power believe would reduce irregular migration, though conditionality had not yet been imposed. The authors called on clear guidelines and agreed practices for migration-specific ODA activities.

38 Melissa Siegel and Vivianne van der Vorst (2012) *Evaluation of the 'Blue Birds' Circular Migration Pilot in The Netherlands*. Maastricht: Boekenplan. https://migration.unu.edu/publications/reports/evaluation-of-the-blue-birds-circular-migration-pilot-in-the-netherlands.html.

39 Kate Hooper (2019) *Exploring New Legal Migration Pathways: Lessons from Pilot Projects*. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute (MPI). https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TCM_MigrationPilotProjects-FINAL%20WEB.pdf.

40 OECD (2020) "Official Development Assistance (ODA)." https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm.

41 Owen Barder (2018) "Aid in the National Interest: When is Development Cooperation Win-Win?" Center for Global Development (CGD) Blog, June 5, 2018. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/aid-national-interest-when-development-cooperation-win-win.

42 Anna Knoll and Andrew Sheriff (2017) *Making Waves: Implications of the Irregular Migration and Refugee Situation on Official Development Assistance Spending and Practices in Europe*. Stockholm: ECDPM. https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/ECDPM-EBA-Making-Waves-Migration-Refugee-ODA-Europe-2017.pdf.

Throughout 2017 and 2018, the OECD debated a new purpose code to capture ODA-eligible migration activities. Under this code, ODA could be used to assist low- and middle-income countries to facilitate safe, orderly, regular, and responsible migration. It was not to be used to address the root causes of forced displacement and irregular migration, nor for "activities that pursue first and foremost providers' interests."[43] Co-operation on aspects of migration for mutual benefit was not, per se, a sufficient criterion for qualifying as ODA.

In 2020, the DAC created a Temporary Working Group (TAG) on the issue. By September 2022, they hope to produce a set of concrete criteria that can be used to help assess whether a migration-related activity can be reported as ODA.[44] Establishing new legal labor migration pathways is not one of the five specific areas of exploration, though parts of this activity will undoubtedly be touched upon. For example, the purpose code debate above explicitly excluded using ODA to pay for migrants' travel.

In the absence of this guidance, it is reasonable to fall back on the original ODA definition. Activities that primarily target the economic development and welfare of low- and middle-income countries (such as education and skill building, the development of migration management capacity, and sustainable reintegration) can be declared as ODA. Other activities inherent within migration pathways (such as implementation and set up costs, physical migration, and the development of migration policies) cannot. Therefore, it is likely that many of the legal labor migration pathways discussed here will need to rely on a combination of both ODA and non-ODA support.[45]

As a result of this difficulty, governments in countries of destination have tried four ways to reduce the per-capita cost of such 'bespoke' schemes. Firstly, they have attempted to move the large training components (or at least part of these components) into the country of origin, based on the view that such training will be cheaper.[46] In the case of Filipino nurses recruited to work in Japan, migrants completed part of their language training in the Philippines, which helped cut down on costs and took

43 OECD (2018) *Proposed New Purpose Cost for "Facilitation of Orderly, Safe, Regular and Responsible Migration and Mobility."* Paris: OECD. https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC/STAT(2018)23/REV3&docLanguage=En.

44 OECD (2020) *Brief on the DAC Temporary Working Group on Clarifying the ODA-eligibility of Migration-related Activities (TWG).* Paris: OECD. https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/collapsecontents/brief-dac-twg-migration.pdf.

45 Other funding restrictions may require that a mix of ODA and non-ODA are used to fund legal labor migration pathways in the future. For example, the EU Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), which currently supports many of the European legal migration pathways in our database, cannot be used to cover capacity-building activities within countries of origin (while ODA can). See European Commission (2021) "Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (2021–2027)." https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/funding/asylum-migration-and-integration-funds/asylum-migration-and-integration-fund-2021-2027_en.

46 Michael Clemens (2014) *Global Skill Partnerships: A Proposal for Technical Training in a Mobile World*. Center for Global Development (CGD) Policy Paper 040. Washington DC: CGD. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/global-skill-partnerships-proposal-technical-training-mobile-world.

advantage of the Philippines' Technical Education Skills Development Authority.[47] Another example is the 'Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative (KANI),' in which young people in Kiribati were trained as nurses with the explicit aim of employment at home and in Australia. This is the logic on which the Global Skill Partnership model was built.[48] However, even with training in the country of origin, costs can still be high, especially when the training is specialized and divergent from the country of origin's typical method, or instructors need to be brought in from the country of destination. For example, KANI cost the Australian government AU$18.8 million (approximately US$13.3 million) for just 90 students.[49]

Secondly, governments in countries of destination have attempted to share responsibility for financially covering recruitment, travel, and other migrant benefits with the country or countries of origin. For example, the government of Tunisia contributed towards the 'Transformation Partnership in the Healthcare Sector (TAPIG)' project with Germany; the Bangladeshi government subsidized the cost of private intermediaries and offered loan schemes under the 'Malaysia-Bangladesh G2G program;' and the Mexican government offers workers small travel grants under the Canadian 'Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP).' There is a good public rationale as to why countries of origin may want to invest their own funds in building this migration management capacity. The development of legal labor migration pathways seems to exemplify a form of path dependence; countries of origin with the ability to manage migration (often because they have already cooperated on legal labor migration pathways) are prioritized for future pathways. It is more difficult for a 'new' country of origin to become involved in a legal labor migration pathway if this underlying capacity is not in place. Many of these countries of origin have a foundation upon which to build—with elements such as Labor Sending Units and Migrant Welfare Funds—but may need to invest in other aspects such as the capacity of government departments and employer associations. Building this capacity can also have other benefits, such as securing the rights of migrants abroad.

For example, the Jamaican government handles the recruitment and vetting (background and health screenings) for temporary agriculture and hospitality work programs in the US and Canada, and sends lists of available workers to employers in the respective country of destination.[50] Additionally, it provides migrants and / or their families with health and death benefits in the event of illness, injury, or death through a fee subtracted from an employee's wage each pay period. This system has worked well and is efficient for all actors involved. Jamaican migrant workers are less likely to be scammed by fraudulent labor recruiters and receive benefits for a small wage deduction.

47 Kate Hooper (2019) *Exploring New Legal Migration Pathways: Lessons from Pilot Projects.* Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute (MPI). https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TCM_MigrationPilotProjects-FINAL%20WEB.pdf.

48 Center for Global Development (CGD) (n.d.) "Migration that works for everyone." https://cgdev.org/bettermigration.

49 Jesse Doyle (2014) "A sinking atoll nation and quarter million dollar nurses: where to next for the Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative (KANI)?" DevPolicy Blog, April 9, 2014. https://devpolicy.org/a-sinking-atoll-nation-and-quarter-million-dollar-nurses-where-to-next-for-the-kiribati-australia-nursing-initiative-kani-20140409/.

50 Jamaican Ministry of Labour and Social Security (n.d.) "Overseas Employment." https://www.mlss.gov.jm/departments/overseas-employment/.

Employers in the US and Canada can count on workers having been properly vetted and trained, and the Jamaican government can ensure their citizens are both safe abroad and will be likely to return without legal issues.

Thirdly, they have attempted to share some of these costs with the migrants themselves. Despite the ILO guidance in this regard (see Box 6), there are several examples of pathways in our database where this has occurred. Finally, some pathways have attempted to share costs with, or pass costs onto, participating employers. These ways will be explored in full below.

Moving towards a cost-sharing model can ensure pathways withstand reductions in government funding (e.g., if political priorities shift). Unfortunately, figuring out what the appropriate distribution of costs should be is often a case of trial and error. Policymakers should look to realize economies of scale as they consider the feasibility of turning pilot projects into permanent and / or scaled-up programs (see ideas in the next section). A possible solution would be to create standardized processes for placement and training, such as a database to manage placements more broadly. A system like this may be more feasibly implemented in the European context; the European Commission has already begun to coordinate pilot projects that involve groups of interested Member States to cover some of the costs of brokering partnerships between European countries and countries of origin.[51]

Private sector

The majority of international recruitment is conducted by the private sector, with large, medium, and small enterprises attracting workers from abroad (and, in some cases, financially supporting their movement).[52] Governments may seek to regulate this recruitment through visa conditions and other bureaucratic processes, but the immigration itself is largely employer-led. For example, in the US, the 'H visas' (H-1B, H-2A, and H-2B) are a form of employer-financed temporary visas.[53] H-1B employers

51 For example, the European Commission recently released their 'Skills and Talent' package which aims, among other things, to establish a Talent Pool (which would serve such a function) and Talent Partnerships. For more information, see European Commission (n.d.) "Skills and Talent." https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/new-pact-migration-and-asylum/skills-and-talent_en; and "Migration Partnerships Facility (MPF)." https://www.migrationpartnershipfacility.eu.

52 Note, as per the definition employed in the design of our legal pathways database, we explicitly excluded those pathways that are fully designed, implemented, and financed by the private sector. This section includes legal labor migration pathways that are primarily government-run, though have some form of contribution from the private sector.

53 The US' 'H visas' have been included within our legal labor migration pathways database, despite having a larger private sector component than other pathways. We have included them because the US government does play a central role, especially in setting the occupations within which employers can hire workers under the 'H visas,' and setting quotas on the maximum number of migrants allowed under the specific pathways. They can also impose other conditions. For example, they recently set a quota on the number of people from Central America and Haiti who were to be recruited under the H-2B visa. See US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2022) "DHS and DOL Announce Availability of Additional H-2B Visas for Second Half of Fiscal Year." DHS Press Release, May 16, 2022. https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/05/16/dhs-and-dol-announce-availability-additional-h-2b-visas-second-half-fiscal-year.

seek to hire workers in specialty occupations that require at least a bachelor's degree or equivalent.[54] H-2A and H-2B visas are for seasonal or temporary agricultural labor and non-agricultural labor, respectively.[55] All H visas require employers to demand and apply for foreign workers. For the H-2A and H-2B visas, employers are responsible for the cost of the application (approximately US$750 per worker), inbound and outbound transportation (approximately US$400–$650 depending on country of origin), meals and lodging (approximately US$9,000–$13,000), and salary (varies based on location).

With this in mind, it is useful to interrogate why the private sector may want to be involved in a government-run legal labor migration pathway. In March 2022, the 'Digital Explorers' project conducted an evaluation of their project which included surveying participating employers.[56] They found that for the majority of companies, hiring specialists from abroad was a business decision first, "meaning that all benefits and costs of the decision, as well as all alternatives, have to be weighed and compared." Employers may wish to hire from abroad—due to large and persistent skills shortages, an interest in expanding cultural diversity, and / or a desire to lay the building blocks for new operations overseas—but economic considerations will predominate. Even in the 'Digital Explorers' project, where most operational costs were covered elsewhere, employers still faced additional costs and risks compared with hiring local workers, which larger companies found easier to absorb. This is despite the fact that small and medium enterprises are more likely to benefit from managed legal labor migration pathways given their own lack of internal resources to recruit internationally.

For governments seeking to use legal labor migration pathways to meet skills shortages, therefore, it will be necessary to identify why the private sector is likely to be involved. This could be because it is impossible for the private sector to recruit internationally (due to the size of the organization or other bureaucratic hurdles); because they are unable to recruit locally (due to the unattractive nature of the work or absolute shortage in workers); because they require government intervention to attract migrant workers (for example, to promote the scheme, see Box 5); and / or because it is cheaper for them to hire a migrant worker through the government-run scheme than through their own channels. In the case of the German 'Triple Win' project, for example, employers are required to pay €5,500 (approximately US$5,888) to partially cover the costs of the scheme incurred by the German Development Agency (GIZ)—including coordination, professional training, and language training—in addition to the costs of transport and skills accreditation.[57] The total cost of training a skilled worker to the level required for the 'Triple Win' project is estimated to range from €8,000–€10,000. As a

54 U.S. Department of Labor (n.d.) "H-1B Program." https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/immigration/h1b.

55 U.S. Department of Labor (n.d.) "H-2A: Temporary Agricultural Employment of Foreign Workers." https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/agriculture/h2a; and U.S. Department of Labor (n.d.) "H-2B Program." https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/immigration/h2b.

56 Nicolas Friederici (2022) *Digital Explorers: Breaking new ground for talent exchange between Lithuania, Nigeria, and the world.* Vilnius: Digital Explorers.

57 Gap Institute (2020) *The emigration of Kosovo's labor force to Germany: A brief assessment of positive and negative returns.* Berlin: Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration. https://www.institutigap.org/documents/38227_emigration-.pdf.

result, employers are securing workers 'cheaper' than they could locally. From 2013–20, the project placed 3,577 qualified nurses from four partner countries into German care facilities.[58] It is this last reason that has led many of the legal labor migration pathways in our database to 'subsidize' the costs employers incur to bring them on board and prove the benefits of the pathway, in the hope that they will want to financially invest when scaling.

BOX 5. The 'Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWPS)'

The 'Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWPS),' running from 2008–2011, was originally intended to be an employer-driven and -financed migration program. Despite this, significant government intervention was necessary to guarantee the pilot's success, and even then, take-up of the scheme was low; a total of 1,623 individuals migrated through the scheme during the pilot phase. This can mainly be attributed to the lack of information about the scheme—one survey found that half of all growers did not know it existed—and for those that were aware, there was a perception that the risks and costs were too great to participate.[59]

Moreover, there was a lack of coordination in the Australian horticulture industry which required the government to intervene. At the grassroots level, the pilot project spread by word of mouth, but government marketing was required in order for it to expand into new areas. In 2012, the pilot was rebranded as the 'Seasonal Worker Program (SWP),' and has since increased significantly in scope. In 2019–20, 12,000 people arrived, with 37,500 expected by 2030. A 2017 report found that 65 percent of workers were not employed in their countries of origin before the scheme, and that they have sent back significant amounts of remittances since moving.[60]

Eventually, the aim is that the SWP will become industry-driven almost completely through word of mouth. However, until then, stakeholders agree that the program can't be managed or sustained by the horticulture industry alone. To grow while encouraging decreasing government support, stakeholders agree there is a need for capacity-building in the agriculture industry in Australia as well as the establishment of a performance monitoring system.

Even receiving 'subsidized' workers, it may still not be in the private sector's interests to engage with a government-run migration pathway. One potential reason is the length of time that migrants are allowed to operate in the country of destination. Many migration pathways only provide skilled

58 Bertelsmann Stiftung (2020) *Fostering transnational skills partnerships in Germany.* Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/Projekte/Migration_fair_gestalten/IB_Policy_Brief_2020_Transnational_Skills_Partnerships.pdf.

59 Danielle Joy Hay and Stephen Howes (2012) *Australia's Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme: Why Has Take-Up Been So Low?* Development Policy Centre Discussion Paper 17. Canberra: Australian National University (ANU). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2041833.

60 See Richard Curtain and Stephen Howes (2020) *Governance of the Seasonal Worker Programme in Australia and sending countries.* Canberra: Australian National University (ANU). https://devpolicy.org/publications/reports/Governance_SWP_2020_WEB.pdf; and Jesse Doyle and Manohar Sharma (2017) *Maximizing the Development Impacts from Temporary Migration: Recommendations for Australia's Seasonal Worker Programme.* Washington DC: World Bank. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/572391522153097172/pdf/122270-repl-PUBLIC.pdf.

workers for a limited period of time. There are many reasons for this, including an aversion to encouraging 'low-skill' permanent migration among countries of destination, and a desire to encourage circularity to reduce 'brain drain' among countries of origin.[61] Yet. it may be difficult for such time-limited pathways to secure private sector investment. For example, the 'Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA)' requires employers to cover the costs of six months of language and skills training for Filipino nurses, which amounts to about 600,000 yen (approximately US$5,600) per migrant.[62] However, their initial contract only lasts three years; while migrants can stay if they pass a licensing exam, pass rates are low.[63] Many employers, especially small and medium enterprises, are unable or unwilling to spend large sums of money on training for employees that can only work for them temporarily. There are currently few evaluations of pilot projects, but those that exist do reveal demand from migrants and employers for opportunities to extend the employment of migrants in countries of destination.[64] The Philippines has even encouraged its 'mid-skilled' workers (such as nurses) to migrate to address the high rates of under- and unemployment and the increase remittances.[65] To bring the private sector on board, the length of contract must be a primary consideration.

Migrants themselves

Of all methods to fund migration pathways, migrants paying for their own migration is perhaps the most debated. In 2016, the ILO outlined principles and guidelines for the fair recruitment of migrant workers (Box 6).[66] The ILO holds as a principle that "workers shall not be charged directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, any fees or related costs for their recruitment." Despite the ILO's guidelines, migrants continue to finance their own labor migration to varying degrees. In the Asian and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) migration corridors especially, migrants bear the majority of the costs

61 Frédéric Docquier, Olivier Lohest, and Abdeslam Marfouk (2007) "Brain Drain in Developing Countries." *World Bank Economic Review* 21(2): 193–218. https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhm008.

62 Ohno Shun (2012) "Southeast Asian Nurses and Caregiving Workers Transcending the National Boundaries: An Overview of Indonesian and Filipino Workers in Japan and Abroad." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 49(4). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265000235_Southeast_Asian_Nurses_and_Caregiving_Workers_Transcending_the_National_Boundaries_An_Overview_of_Indonesian_and_Filipino_Workers_in_Japan_and_Abroad.

63 Claire Kumar, Helen Dempster, Megan O'Donnell, and Cassandra Zimmer (2022) *Migration and the future of care: supporting older people and care workers*. London: ODI and Center for Global Development (CGD). https://odi.org/en/publications/migration-and-the-future-of-care-supporting-older-people-and-care-workers/.

64 Anna Goos (2016) *Manual on Circular Migration Scheme*. Berlin: Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM). https://migration.commission.ge/files/pcms_en_final.pdf.

65 Fely Marilyn E Lorenzo, Jaime Galvez-Tan, Kriselle Icamina, and Lara Javier (2007) "Nurse Migration from a Source Country Perspective: Philippine Country Case Study." *Health Services Research* 42(3 Pt 2): 1406–1418. https://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1475-6773.2007.00716.x; and Roland M Dimaya, Mary K McEwen, Leslie A Curry, and Elizabeth H Bradley (2012) "Managing health worker migration: a qualitative study of the Philippine response to nurse brain drain." *Human Resources for Health* 10(47). https://doi.org/10.1186/1478-4491-10-47.

66 International Labour Organization (ILO) (2019) *General principles and operational guidelines for fair recruitment and definition of recruitment fees and related costs*. Geneva: ILO. https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/publications/WCMS_536755/lang--en/index.htm.

of recruitment and related fees such as recruitment fees, emigration documents, and travel.[67] The literature is extensive and shows that, for example, as far back as 1976, Pakistani migrant workers were paying an average of Rs 10,488 (approximately US$135) more than what the government allowed recruitment agencies to charge workers. Similarly, a 2016 IOM survey found Nepalese migrant workers in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) paid between US$1,400 and $1,600 to obtain their jobs and migrate.[68]

BOX 6. ILO regulation on migrants paying for their migration

In their guidance on the fair recruitment of migrant workers, the ILO outlines 13 general principles.[69] Number seven states that "No recruitment fees or related costs should be charged to, or otherwise borne by, workers or jobseekers." While recruitment fees refer to payments made in order for workers to secure employment or placement, related costs are considered much more general. They could include costs related to obtaining passports, visas, background checks, security and exist clearances, banking services, and work and residence permits; along with those related to medical assessments, insurance, skills and qualification tests, training and orientation, equipment, travel, accommodation, administrative purposes, and application and service fees. This list is "generalized and not exhaustive."

Yet the ILO also recognizes that pathways need flexibility to determine exceptions. They note that any exceptions to this rule must uphold international labor standards and be developed in consultation with relevant actors. As a result, costs must only be passed on to the migrant if they are in the interest of the worker concerned, limited in their scope, and are disclosed before the job is accepted.

Many migrants utilize bank loans to pay for the cost of migration. These loans often charge expensive fees and high interest rates, such that paying them back can be a burden for migrants. Moreover—as is the case with many small farmers in Guatemala and around the world—migrants may be required to put their land or home up as collateral, which can have devastating consequences for entire families if migration is unsuccessful or pays less than expected.[70] Even microloans, touted by international institutions as a way out of poverty and a key ingredient in development, have caused

67 Manolo I. Abella (2017) "The High Cost of Migrating for Work to the Gulf." In Philippe Fargues and Nasra M. Shah (eds.) *Migration to the Gulf: Policies in Sending and Receiving Countries*. Cambridge: Gulf Research Center. https://gulfmigration.grc.net/media/pubs/book/grm2017book_chapter/Volume%20-%20Migration%20to%20Gulf%20-%20Chapter%2011.pdf.

68 International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2016) *Research on Labour Recruitment Industry between United Arab Emirates, Kerala (India) and Nepal*. Kuwait: IOM. https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/documents/Research-on-Labour-Recruitment-Industry-between-UAE-Kerala-and-Nepal-Final-Report.pdf.

69 International Labour Organization (ILO) (2019) *General principles and operational guidelines for fair recruitment and definition of recruitment fees and related costs*. Geneva: ILO. https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/publications/WCMS_536755/lang--en/index.htm.

70 Kevin Sieff (2019) "The migrant debt cycle." Washington Post, November 4, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/11/04/migrant-debt-cycle/.

issues for migrants unable to afford to repay them. In South Asia, Africa, and Central America there has been a surge in delinquent microloans due, in part, to individuals using them to fund labor migration. For example, some 66 percent (as of 2013) of Bangladeshi migrants in the GCC were struggling to pay back loans averaging US$2,154.[71]

Beyond bank loans, migrants utilize pawn shops or borrow money from relatives or money lenders to fund migration. A KNOMAD study on the migration costs incurred by 'low-skilled' labor migrants working in Korea, Kuwait, and Spain found that three-fourths of survey respondents working in Kuwait borrowed money from friends and relatives to migrate. The rates varied: 87 percent of Egyptians borrowed an average of US$3,146, compared with 65 percent, 52 percent, and 74 percent of Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, and Indians respectively.[72] While relatives, friends, and community and religious leaders are informal lenders, they often charge interest on loans in a sort of shadow financial industry, and this can leave labor migrants in an unsurmountable amount of debt.[73]

There have been a few legal labor migration pathways in which migrants have financed their recruitment, training, and / or related costs to varying degrees of success. One example is the 'Malaysia-Bangladesh G2G Program' which encouraged Bangladeshi migration into the Malaysian palm-oil sector (Box 7).[74] The experience of the G2G Program suggests that active government involvement is crucial if migrants are to finance their own migration in all or in part. Government negotiation and subsidies were critical in lowering the amount migrants borrowed, and in providing a network for migrants without family or social connections in the country of destination. In doing so, it is imperative that government actors consider whether potential migrants can meet even these reduced costs, to avoid debt burdens.

71 Md Mizanur Rahman (2013) "Migrant Indebtedness: Bangladeshis in the GCC Countries." *International Migration* 53(6): 205–216. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12084.

72 Manolo Abella and Philip Martin (2014) *Migration Costs of Low-skilled labor migrants: Key Findings from Pilot Surveys in Korea, Kuwait and Spain.* Washington DC: KNOMAD, World Bank. https://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2017-05/KNOMAD_TWG3_Report%20on%20Migration%20Cost%20Pilot%20Surveys%20May%2011_final%20%28002%29_1.pdf.

73 Kevin Sieff (2019) "The migrant debt cycle." Washington Post, November 4, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/11/04/migrant-debt-cycle/.

74 Maheshwor Shrestha, Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, and Iffath Anwar Sharif (2019) *Migration and Remittances: The Impacts of a Government Intermediated International Migration Program*. Washington DC: World Bank. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/993971564038966977/pdf/Migration-and-Remittances-The-Impacts-of-a-Government-Intermediated-International-Migration-Program.pdf.

BOX 7. The 'Malaysia-Bangladesh G2G Program'

The 'Malaysia-Bangladesh G2G Program' was a state-managed and -run pilot program that aimed to recruit 30,000 Bangladeshi workers into the palm-oil sector in Malaysia beginning in 2013. Although initial interest in the pilot was high in Bangladesh, with some 36,000 workers applying for the program, only about 10,000 actually migrated. One potential reason may have been the undeveloped migration management systems within Bangladesh. While investing in such systems would have increased the cost of the program, it may have also increased its success. In addition, the program was heavily criticized for not involving the private sector. For these reasons, it was eventually stopped. Despite its issues, one thing that the G2G Program was quite successful at was lowering the debt burden among migrants.

In Bangladesh, migrants typically borrow to migrate internationally, with about a third borrowing from moneylenders at high interest rates. In a study on Bangladeshi migrant workers, some 69 percent could not repay their loans due to irregularity of jobs, unexpected work conditions, payment of loans from other sources, sickness, delay in job, and / or change in desired salary.[75] Migrants utilizing private channels to migrate paid on average BDT 390,000 to migrate (approximately US$4,508) while G2G migrants paid on average BDT 45,000. The G2G program was able to reduce borrowing by 19 percent and lowered the average interest rates by 40 percent. Moreover, due to the reduced cost and debt burden, the G2G Program was able to increase net earnings from a three-year migration period compared to migrants going through private channels by 87 percent. The program was able to do this by subsidizing loan fees and medical check fees for migrants, negotiating the cost of administrative fees with the government of Malaysia, and negotiating with airlines to lower the cost of travel to and from the job site. As a result, migrants in the G2G Program were able to borrow less and under better terms when financing their migration.

Despite their admirable success in lowering the costs and indebtedness of migrants, migration remained expensive for workers and the program did not ultimately make a persuasive case for migration as a tool to reduce poverty in Bangladesh.[76] The BDT 45,000 average cost (approximately US$512) amounted to around half of the annual GDP per capita in 2013. The steep price limited the ability of poor households to finance the opportunity, with many not having the credit to borrow even this reduced amount. Only three percent of applicants to the program had incomes under the poverty line, suggesting that the price of migration is too high for poor households in Bangladesh—those that would arguably benefit the most from labor migration—to even consider international migration as a means to escape poverty.

75 Bangladesh Bank (2019) *A Survey Report on Loans for Expatriates—Its Uses and Impact.* Dhaka: Bangladesh Bank. https://www.bb.org.bd/pub/research/sp_research_work/srw1902.pdf.

76 Maheshwor Shrestha, Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, and Iffath Anwar Sharif (2019) *Migration and Remittances: The Impacts of a Government Intermediated International Migration Program*. Washington DC: World Bank. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/993971564038966977/pdf/Migration-and-Remittances-The-Impacts-of-a-Government-Intermediated-International-Migration-Program.pdf.

Even if migrants can meet these reduced costs, the benefits from migration must also make such investment worth it. For example, the 'Transformation Partnership in the Healthcare Sector (TAPIG)' was a pilot project that aimed to offer 150 Tunisians jobs as nurses in Germany after six months of pre-departure training in German language and culture.[77] They were given a three-year apprenticeship and then a five-year work contract with a gross salary of €2,000 per month (approximately US$2,114). The costs of pre-departure training were divided amongst the employer (75 percent), public funds (10 percent), and the migrants themselves (five percent). Due to the high contribution from migrants, student loans were originally planned to cover the cost of training and the apprenticeship; however, attempts to secure these loans failed, causing major issues with the pilot and forcing employers to incur additional costs. This example demonstrates that gaining and retaining migrant support for government-run and -financed projects is crucial to a pilot program's success. For migrants, the cost-benefit analysis goes beyond just paying for their own training: it also includes decent working conditions, higher wages, reasonable cost of living, and the chance to develop new skills.[78]

To support migrants with these costs, some governments have attempted to create state-backed Overseas Workers' Welfare Funds, with mixed results. For example, Sri Lanka launched a program in 2002 primarily aimed at protecting migrants from loan sharks, offering subsidized loans rates between 7 and 16 percent.[79] However, take-up has been low, with loans used to cover pre-departure expenses rather than housing and the costs of self-employment upon return as originally intended. The Philippines also attempted a similar fund, but suspended it in 2008 due to limited take up and a repayment rate of just 29 percent. In addition, several NGOs have set up similar products.[80] In Bangladesh, the NGO BRAC maintains a migrant loan program in Bangladesh; to date, they have funded 194,000 loans at an average of US$2,300. Under the program, BRAC offers a customizable loan to two co-borrowers, one who will migrate and one who will remain in Bangladesh.[81] Similarly, in

77 European Training Foundation (ETF) (2015). *Migrant Support Measures from an Employment and Skills Perspective (MISMES): Tunisia*. Brussels: ETF. https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/36845/MISMES_Tunisia.pdf?sequence=1.

78 Helen Dempster, Jenniffer Dew, Samuel Huckstep, Martina Castiglioni, and Cassandra Zimmer (2022) *Enhancing the Development Impact of the UK's Immigration Pathways.* Center for Global Development (CGD) Policy Paper 258. Washington DC: CGD and International Organization for Migration (IOM). https://www.cgdev.org/publication/enhancing-development-impact-uks-immigration-pathways.

79 Katy Long and Kasumi Takahashi (2017) *Credit Where It's Due: Ensuring Migration Pathways for Refugees Are Financially Accessible.* New York: Talent Beyond Boundaries. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5dc0262432cd095744bf1bf2/t/5f4f4ffa6d5d88276e3413c9/1599035018193/Credit+where+It%27s+due.pdf.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

Canada, Windmill Microlending provides loans to immigrants to enable them to obtain recognition for their skills and apply them in Canada.[82] Since 2005, Windmill Microlending has approved CAD$17 million of loans to 2,700 immigrants and received funding from the Canadian federal government, the provincial government of Alberta, and private donations.[83]

How can pathways move from pilot to scale?

All of the 57 legal labor migration pathways in our database address skill needs within five main sectors: agriculture, horticulture, and food processing; engineering, construction, and manufacturing; health care (including nursing and aged-care nursing); ICT; and tourism and hospitality. These sectors are experiencing large skills shortages within many countries, a situation that will likely continue in the future.[84]

There are many policy responses that high-income countries could, and do, implement to try and mitigate these skills shortages, such as raising labor force participation by women and older workers; increasing automation; and facilitating outsourcing and offshoring. Yet most commentators acknowledge the limitations of these responses and recognize that facilitating more migration will be required. The good news is that there are many pathways that are operating at scale. Our analysis classified the 57 legal labor migration pathways into three buckets: <100 people (small); 100–1,000 people (medium); and >1,000 people (large). We found that only 18 percent of the existing pathways can be classified as small. In fact, the median number of people participating in a legal labor migration pathway was 3,000 (Figure 1).[85]

82 See "Windmill Microlending." https://windmillmicrolending.org/; and Center for Global Development (CGD) (2020) *Using Innovative Finance to Increase Refugee Resettlement.* Washington DC: CGD. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/using-innovative-finance-increase-refugee-resettlement.

83 J. C. Herbert Emery and Ana Ferrer (2015) "The Social Rate of Return to Investing in Character: An Economic Evaluation of Alberta's Immigrant Access Fund Microloan Program." *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 16(2): 205–224. www.infona.pl/resource/bwmeta1.element.springer-b864746e-ca14-3ad8-b118-db4ee5fa1898.

84 For example, for Europe, see CEDEFOP (2015) *Skill shortages and gaps in European enterprises.* Brussels: CEDEFOP. https://www.cedefop.europa.eu/files/3071_en.pdf.

85 Helen Dempster, Ismael Galvez Iniesta, Reva Resstack, and Cassandra Zimmer (2021) "We Analyzed 57 Legal Migration Pathways. Here's What We Found." Center for Global Development (CGD) Blog, July 16, 2021. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/we-analyzed-57-legal-migration-pathways-heres-what-we-found.

FIGURE 1. Only 18 percent of the 57 legal labor migration pathways are classified as 'small'



Source: Helen Dempster, Ismael Galvez Iniesta, Reva Resstack, and Cassandra Zimmer (2021) "We Analyzed 57 Legal Migration Pathways. Here's What We Found." Center for Global Development (CGD) Blog, July 16, 2021. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/we-analyzed-57-legal-migration-pathways-heres-what-we-found.

Yet there is some truth to the prevailing narrative that the existing legal labor migration pathways are too small to make a real impact on either high-income country skills shortages or economic development in low- and middle-income countries, and that they have been unable to adapt and scale to the extent necessary. Notably, it is those pathways that are incurring substantial costs (usually due to large training components) that tend to facilitate the migration of the smallest numbers of people. Belgium's 'Pilot Project Addressing Labour Shortages Through Innovative Labour Migration Models (PALIM)' trained 120 Moroccans, with only 40 planning to move to Belgium; Germany's 'Youth, Employment, and Skills in Kosovo (YES)' trained 33 Kosovarians; and the 'Temporary Labour Migration of Georgian Workers to Poland and Estonia' supported just 19 people. This brings into question the efficacy of using government-run legal labor migration pathways to meet substantial skill needs throughout high-income countries.

Barriers to scaling

Despite this concern, few pieces of research have attempted to ascertain *why* legal labor migration pathways are often so small, and the barriers to these projects adapting and scaling. One reason for this lack of research could be the fact that very few legal labor migration pathways conduct formal and public evaluations. Of the evaluations that do exist, even fewer meaningfully consider the political, financial, and social elements that either supported a pathway in morphing or scaling into a second iteration or hindered a pathway from doing so. The few notable exceptions to this will be explained in full below. The lack of evaluations could be because the majority of pathways considered as part of our database were conceived of and implemented by governments in high-income countries. Admitting that a pathway failed, or did not live up to expectations, could create political and public backlash against future pathways. If we are to learn from the experiences of these pathways to construct better ones, it will be necessary to confront this 'fear of failure,' attempting to explain to political and public actors why failure in this space should not be used as a blocker to future progress.

In analyzing the 57 legal labor migration pathways in our database, the most notable finding was that the majority of pathways actually *do* scale or, at least, morph into a new form. Of the 57 pathways, 26 were completed as of July 2021. Of these 26, 18 have scaled or morphed into a new pathway. Several helped inform the design of larger projects which enhanced the benefits to the countries of origin. For example, the learnings from Australia's 'Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWPS)' and the 'Northern Australia Worker Pilot Program (NAWPP)' helped inform the design of the 'Seasonal Worker Programme (SWP),' with the original countries of origin now benefitting from a much expanded and improved system.[86] And several projects aimed at attracting nurses to Germany, including the 'Transformation Partnership in the Healthcare Sector (TAPIG)'; the 'Pilot project aimed at attracting personnel from Vietnam to train as nurses in Germany'; and the 'Training nurses from Vietnam to become geriatric nurses in Germany' projects, all fed into the design of 'Triple Win,' their flagship nursing recruitment program.[87]

Others learned lessons within their original design and morphed into different entities. For example, Canada's 'Live-in Caregiver Program (LCP)' was criticized for high levels of labor and personnel abuse, with many reformers criticizing the 'live-in' aspect of the program. This requirement was dropped as part of a new project: the 'Canada Home Child Care Pilot and Home Support Worker Pilot.' Lithuania's 'Digital Explorers' struggled to attract Nigerian women to its ICT traineeships.[88] As a result, phase two of the project will specifically focus on female graduates. Spain's 'Cartaya Program' morphed into the Foundation for Foreign Workers in Huelva (FUTEH), which negotiated a much broader agreement regarding circular migration between Morocco and Huelva;[89] in 2019, 20,000 Moroccan women benefited from this agreement.[90] Other pathways were handed off to the private sector. The 'Malaysia-Bangladesh G2G Program' was criticized for low job placement rates

86 Jesse Doyle and Stephen Howes (2015) *Australia's Seasonal Worker Program: Demand-side Constraints and Suggested Reforms*. Washington DC: World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21491.

87 Insight gained through interviews with GIZ staff. See also Steffen Angenendt, Jessica Bither, and Astrid Ziebarth (2015) *Creating a Triple-Win Through Labor Migration Policy? Lessons from Germany.* Berlin: Robert Bosch Stiftung. https://www.bosch-stiftung.de/sites/default/files/publications/pdf_import/MSG_Report_labor_migration_Germany-Angenendt_Bither_Ziebarth_Jan2015.pdf.

88 Nicolas Friederici (2021) *Lessons Learned from Digital Explorers (Track 1).* Vilinus: Digital Explorers. https://www.dropbox.com/s/ocntj94q5wb3uu5/Digital%20Explorers_1st%20Track%20Evaluation%20Report_final.pdf?dl=0.

89 FIDH (2012) *Importing Workers, Exporting Strawberries.* Madrid: FIDH. https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/report_strawberries_eng.pdf.

90 Nikolaj Houmann Mortensen and Stefania Prandi (2021) "In Spain's strawberry fields, migrant women face sexual abuse." Al Jazeera, July 10, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/10/in-spains-strawberry-fields-migrant-women-face-sexual-abuse.

(just 10,000 people) due to the lack of coordination between the government of Malaysia and its private sector. In 2015, it morphed into the G2G-Plus program, in which recruitment was handled entirely by the private sector; more than 30,000 workers were then recruited.

This discussion serves to illustrate a broader point. From the outside, it may look like the lifecycle of a legal labor migration pathway has come to an end and that it has therefore 'failed.' Yet many pathways merely serve to inform the design of bigger or different pathways. This is just as much a worthy goal for a pathway as a direct scaling up of its current form, as long as lessons learned are truly reflected on and fed into ongoing policymaking.

The reasons why pathways do not scale or morph are myriad and, as described above, difficult to ascertain in detail. Analysis of those in our database suggests four main reasons: changing employer demand; political backlash; conflicting priorities; and high costs.

Changing employer demand

Many pathways ended because the needs of the private sector shifted, often for reasons outside the pathways' control. The 2008 financial crisis depressed the needs of agricultural employers in Spain, ending the Spain-Colombia 'Temporary and Circular Labour Migration (TCLM) model.' When countries such as Romania and Bulgaria entered the EU in 2007, agricultural employers in the UK were able to freely source labor from these countries, reducing the need for the 'Sectors Based Scheme.' Other reasons were more nuanced, often due to a lack of coordination between the government, implementing partners, and the participating employers. There may have not been adequate demand for the migrants trained or moved through the project, as was seen in the 'Temporary Labour Migration of Georgian Workers to Poland and Estonia' and the 'Malaysia-Bangladesh G2G Program.'

Political backlash

Placing responsibility for the design and implementation of a legal labor migration pathway in the hands of government actors means the pathway itself is vulnerable to changes in leadership and political priorities. This is especially the case when politicians may be seeking to reduce immigration *overall* as part of an attempt to respond to what they feel are public concerns about the economic, cultural, and security impact of new migration flows.[91] For example, the excellent external evaluation of the Dutch 'Blue Birds' circular migration pilot notes that a cabinet change in 2010 led to a focus within the Dutch government on filling vacancies with unemployed Dutch people or

91 For more information about what people in high-income countries think of migration, and how politicians can respond to this reality, see Amy Leach, Helen Dempster, and Karen Hargrave (2020) *Public attitudes towards immigration and immigrants: what people think, why, and how to influence them*. London: ODI. https://odi.org/en/publications/public-attitudes-towards-immigration-and-immigrants-what-people-think-why-and-how-to-influence-them/.

Europeans, which came into conflict with the goals of the pilot project.[92] Similarly, while the Trump Administration in the US ostensibly ended the 'Seasonal Migration from Haiti (USAIM)' project due to high rates of refusal, fraud, abuse, and overstaying, this was largely due to a lack of government oversight. Devia (2019) cites various instances of discrimination but concludes that "the involvement of several organizations and identifiable points of contact in both countries can diminish the abuses inherent in agricultural migrant employment."[93]

Conflicting priorities

This category encompasses a wide variety of reasons that pathways end (such as mismatched expectations, regulatory issues, a lack of flexibility and transparency, and concern about 'brain drain') which can be summarized as a lack of alignment in priorities between different parties. This lack of alignment could occur within a government; the remit for developing migration partnerships usually sits awkwardly across a variety of ministries, and the capacity of these actors can be limited. Regulatory and bureaucratic issues can therefore get in the way. For example, the 'Temporary and Circular Migration Project between Portugal and Ukraine' struggled to obtain the number of certificates needed for the visa, making the project unviable.[94]

It could also occur between governments. Some projects never get off the ground, or weren't scaled, because the country of origin was concerned about the 'brain drain' of their skilled professionals, a particular concern when working within the health sector.[95] Others bowed to pressure from government in ways that undermined implementation. For example, within Germany's 'Transformation Partnership in the Healthcare Sector (TAPIG),' the Tunisian authorities insisted on selecting and placing already trained nurses instead of school leavers, leading to participants believing they were overqualified for the work and underpaid.

Finally, issues can arise between governments and the private sector. Ultimately, the 'Transformation Partnership in the Healthcare Sector (TAPIG)' project ended before the expected date due to the withdrawal of the employer. The way that the 'Malaysia-Bangladesh G2G Program' tackled this problem is described above: handing off primary responsibility for recruitment to the private sector itself. In addition, the private sector may be unsatisfied with the candidates being provided to them through the program. Selecting unemployed young Moroccans for the 'Pilot Project Addressing Labour Shortages Through Innovative Labour Migration Models (PALIM)' was a way to

92 Melissa Siegel and Vivianne van der Vorst (2012) *Evaluation of the 'Blue Birds' Circular Migration Pilot in The Netherlands*. Maastricht: Boekenplan. https://migration.unu.edu/publications/reports/evaluation-of-the-blue-birds-circular-migration-pilot-in-the-netherlands.html.

93 Tatiana Devia (2019) "Haiti—U.S. Migration through a Labor Lens: The H-2 Visa Program, the Temporary Protected Status (TPS), and Its Policy Implications." *University of Miami Inter-American Law Review* 51(1). https://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol51/iss1/5/.

94 Anna Charpin and Luca Aiolfi (2011) *Evaluation of the concrete results obtained through projects financed under AENEAS and Thematic Programme for Migration and Asylum*. Brussels: European Union (EU). http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.599.331&rep=rep1&type=pdf.

95 Insight gained through interviews.

ensure government buy-in on both sides, but led to a perception among the private sector that these migrants were somehow less skilled than other potential candidates.[96]

High costs

There are two elements to this: large fixed costs, and a high per-capita cost. Developing the necessary up-front institutional capacity, networks, and knowledge is costly, both in time and money. This is especially the case when developing legal labor migration pathways with 'new' countries of origin which may require additional support to both design and implement a pathway. Often the number of participants in such schemes is limited, meaning these fixed costs are offset by few beneficiaries, leading to a high per capita cost. The experience of the 'Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative (KANI)' is outlined in Box 8, though this is far from the only example in our database. For example, the 'German-Tunisian Mobility Pact' had an incredibly high per-capita cost. Despite the success in terms of placement rates (71 percent), the cost for each of the work contracts obtained exceeded €20,000 (approximately US$23,177), and the average cost for each beneficiary was €15,000 (approximately US$17,380).[97] Reducing this per-capita cost is crucial if governments are to maintain support for a pathway and if the private sector is to assume (even partial) financial responsibility. As a result, the success of legal labor migration pathways is integrally linked to their scale, as high fixed costs would diminish on a per capita basis as the number of participants increase.

BOX 8. The 'Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative (KANI)'

The best example regarding high per-capita costs is the 'Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative (KANI).' The total cost of the scheme was AU$18.8 million (approximately US$13.3 million), for which 64 nurses were trained, equating to a cost of approximately AU$290,000 per registered nurse. For comparison, the average cost of training a nurse *in Australia* is AU$230,000.[98] While the benefits to the trainees were large, their small number therefore limited the potential benefits to the country of origin, which would have been the only way to justify the high per-capita costs. This led the independent review of KANI to include that the "cost of KANI relative to its limited potential impact in addressing the overall economic and social challenges confronting Kiribati remains a critical issue."[99] The project ended in 2014.

96 Insight gained through interviews.

97 European Training Foundation (ETF) (2015). *Migrant Support Measures from an Employment and Skills Perspective (MISMES): Tunisia*. Brussels: ETF. https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/36845/MISMES_Tunisia.pdf?sequence=1.

98 Jesse Doyle (2014) "A sinking atoll nation and quarter million dollar nurses: where to next for the Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative (KANI)?" DevPolicy Blog, April 9, 2014. https://devpolicy.org/a-sinking-atoll-nation-and-quarter-million-dollar-nurses-where-to-next-for-the-kiribati-australia-nursing-initiative-kani-20140409/.

99 Lea Shaw, Murray Edwards, and Akka Rimon (2013) *KANI Independent Review*. AidWorks Initiative Number ING466. Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/kiribati-australia-nursing-initiative-independent-report.pdf.

Learning from scaled pathways

As the factors described above show, there are many reasons as to why a pathway may fail to scale or morph. Some are difficult to address and mitigate within the design of the pathway, such as changing political support. But there are others that can be addressed if the pathway is designed carefully. Bringing in a wide range of critical actors, such as private sector, government, and civil society, at the early stages can help clarify both the profile of migrant needed and smooth conflicting priorities. The design must be flexible enough to respond to changing private sector and political demands, with all actors in constant contact throughout. A fuller discussion of these factors is beyond the scope of this paper. The rest of this section is going to focus on how actors can design a sustainable funding model that contributes to a low per-capita cost.

To construct this model, it is worth considering the legal labor migration pathways in our database that have both managed to scale and have substantial information as to the financial structures they have employed in doing so. Here we focus on two—the 'Australia Pacific Training Coalition (APTC)' and Germany's 'Accessing Overseas Employment Opportunities for Moroccan Youth Project'—which exhibit multiple similarities. Both involve substantial training components, resulting in a complex network of costs which other pathways do not accrue. They both also currently rely on 'unsustainable' financing sources: government aid and international organization funding respectively. And both have attempted to move to a more sustainable financing model, by leaning on the contributions of trainees (the former) and employers (the latter). Hence their experiences have much to teach other pathways in thinking about such transitions.

Australia Pacific Training Coalition (APTC)

The 'Australia Pacific Training Coalition (APTC)' was established in 2007 to train Pacific Islanders for employment in high-demand sectors both at home and abroad. There have been three phases of the project since then, all funded by the Australian Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) through overseas development assistance (ODA) at a cost of AU$134 million (Stage 1; approximately US$155 million); AU$137 million (Stage 2); and AU$192 million (Stage 3). This funding supports the implementation of the APTC (including salaries for the APTC's 188 staff and in-Australia support); design and delivery of the training courses (33 across five countries); and scholarships for eligible students. Howes and Sherrell (2017) note how exceptional this is, observing that "few countries use their aid program to induce migration from developing countries. The opposite is much more common."[100]

To understand the financial impact of APTC, it is necessary to interrogate both the costs involved (and how they are covered) as well as the benefits of the program. On the first, it was noted from

100 Stephen Howes and Henry Sherrell (2017) "Aid for migration: second time lucky with the Australia-Pacific Technical College?" DevPolicy Blog, May 8, 2017. https://devpolicy.org/aid-migration-second-time-lucky-australia-pacific-technical-college-20170508/.

the start that relying solely on Australian aid was unsustainable, and that "APTC's future rests on new forms of funding."[101] Throughout the years, they attempted to get students to pay for their own training, or for their employers to cover the costs of the training. Yet by stage 2, only 21 percent of students were fee-paying. To increase this percentage in stage 3, the APTC is offering incentives, such as guarantee of immediate entry and decreasing the number of Australian government-funded scholarship places. They hope that the reputation for quality training that APTC has developed will ensure people still pay for their training, rather than seeking courses elsewhere. The Design Document for Phase 3 of the APTC notes that the quality, relevance, and flexibility of training is key to ensuring that enterprises are willing to pay for the training.[102] That being said, APTC are also seeking to "embed" their programs in existing training facilities, to slowly increase the reputation and quality of local providers and ensure the long-term sustainability of APTC.

On the second, originally it was assumed that 50 percent of APTC graduates would be able to move and undertake employment in Australia, New Zealand, and other high-income countries. By stage 2, this had been reduced to 25 percent.[103] Yet by 2014, a CGD review noted that only 3 percent had been able to migrate, and by 2019, this had only increased to 3.5 percent.[104] As a result, the cost per full-time equivalent between 2007 and 2015 was AU$38,000 (approximately US$27,000), almost three times that of the Australian average (AU$9,700). It would have been cheaper to send people to Australia to train, rather than training them within the Pacific Islands.[105] This severely impacts the value for money (VfM) calculations that APTC has conducted (see Box 9). Today, APTC is oversupplying the local labor markets with qualified graduates, meaning their job placement rates are slowing.[106] This speaks to the low fee-paying rates above. Why would youth (and their parents) take out loans to fund training investments if they are not certain of reaping a return on their investment? To improve placement rates, the APTC is placing a heavier emphasis on labor mobility

101 Michael Clemens, Colum Graham, and Stephen Howes (2014) *Skill Development and Regional Mobility: Lessons from the Australia-Pacific Technical College*. Center for Global Development (CGD) Working Paper 370. Washington DC: CGD. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/skill-development-and-regional-mobility-lessons-australia-pacific-technical-college.

102 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) (2017) *Australia-Pacific Training Coalition Stage 3 (APTC3): Investment Design Document.* Canberra: DFAT. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/aptc3-design-document.pdf.

103 Stephen Howes and Henry Sherrell (2017) "Aid for migration: second time lucky with the Australia-Pacific Technical College?" DevPolicy Blog, May 8, 2017. https://devpolicy.org/aid-migration-second-time-lucky-australia-pacific-technical-college-20170508/.

104 Michael Clemens, Colum Graham, and Stephen Howes (2014) *Skill Development and Regional Mobility: Lessons from the Australia-Pacific Technical College.* Center for Global Development (CGD) Working Paper 370. Washington DC: CGD. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/skill-development-and-regional-mobility-lessons-australia-pacific-technical-college; and Richard Curtain and Stephen Howes (2021) *Helping APTC trades graduates to migrate to Australia under the TSS*. Development Policy Centre Policy Brief 20. Canberra: Australian National University (ANU). https://devpolicy.org/publications/policy_briefs/PB20-Helping-APTC-trades-graduates-to-migrate-to-Australia-under-the-TSS-Feb-2021.pdf.

105 Richard Johanson, Richard Curtain, Peter Moock, and Virginia Simmons (2014) *Independent review of the Australia–Pacific Technical College Full report.* Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/aptc-independent-review.pdf.

106 Richard Curtain and Stephen Howes (2021) "APTC graduates finding it increasingly difficult to find employment." DevPolicy Blog, February 17, 2021. https://devpolicy.org/aptc-graduates-finding-it-increasingly-difficult-to-find-employment-20210217/.

through engaging with the 'Pacific Labour Facility (PLF)' and there are discussions about shifting some of the training components to local universities rather than continuing to operate as a stand-alone entity.[107]

BOX 9. The 'Australia Pacific Training Coalition's (APTC)' value for money model

In our review of 57 legal labor migration pathways, APTC was one of the only ones with a clear value for money (VfM) model. This model starts with the question of whether the money "could be spent differently so as to deliver greater 'value' to the Australian taxpayer."[108] The VfM assessment is based on an economic rate of return (ERR) analysis with the following parameters:

- Direct benefits in the Pacific (average pre- and post-training earnings differential of graduates who do not migrate)
- Direct benefits for those who migrate
    - Percent of graduates who do migrate
    - Average time between graduation and migration
    - Average earnings differential while living abroad (over and above earnings of those at home without APTC training, and net of the differential in living costs while overseas)
    - Average duration (between migration and return home)
    - Average earnings differential after return home
- Opportunity costs (average weekly foregone earnings of students while enrolled at APTC)

An independent review conducted in 2014 was able to employ this model using a questionnaire administered to employees and employers. After applying a discount rate, they find that the APTC is not meeting the ERR of 11 percent needed to "break even." They note that the model is highly sensitive to the migration rate of graduates, and advise that to "maximise economic returns, APTC's strategy for the future should emphasise labour mobility and measures to reduce the reliance on foreign workers in middle-skill occupations." That being said, they also note that the model does not take into consideration externalities (e.g., the impact of graduates on workplace productivity) and other foreign policy and development gains.

Accessing Overseas Employment Opportunities for Moroccan Youth Project

The 'Accessing Overseas Employment Opportunities for Moroccan Youth Project' is a US$3.05 million investment on the part of the World Bank to "strengthen institutional capacity to pilot the reform of

107 Satish Chand, Michael Clemens, and Helen Dempster (2021) *A Pacific Skills Visa: Improving Opportunities for Skilled Migration Throughout the Pacific Region*. Center for Global Development (CGD) Policy Paper 231. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/pacific-skills-visa-improving-opportunities-skilled-migration-throughout-pacific-region.

108 APTC is also one of the only pathways with regular, external, evaluations, and employer and employee tracer surveys. They should be commended for this attention to monitoring and learning; there is evidence that this information is regularly used to improve operations.

international labor intermediation services in Morocco and better prepare the Moroccan workforce for greater integration with international labor markets." It offers Moroccan high-school graduates three-year apprenticeships in Germany in both hospitality and construction. After completing the apprenticeship, trainees can either be hired by a German compact or use their training in Germany as a springboard for a career in Morocco. It is designed and implemented by the German Development Agency (GIZ) and the Moroccan Employment Agency (ANAPEC). The project is now in its second phase, with 110 Moroccans targeted in the first phase and 104 Moroccans targeted in the second.

The project was developed in 2015 and started in 2016. At that time, there was little cooperation on legal labor migration between Europe and Morocco, and therefore little interest among European stakeholders and German employers in funding such a project. This was despite huge demand for skilled labor within the private sector and the capacity of the employment agency and related stakeholders in Morocco. As a result, the World Bank interceded. They currently pay for everything in Morocco: six months of language and cultural training, as well as the running costs of ANAPEC to shortlist, interview, and coordinate candidate selection. In the migrants' first year in Germany, the project pays for a small part of their stipend and the employers pay the rest. From the second year, the financial burden is fully on employers. Currently, the per capita cost to the World Bank is in the region of US$11,000–$12,000.

An ambition of the project is to turn it into a more traditional Global Skill Partnership approach, whereby skills training is provided in Morocco in advance of migration.[109] While this transition was disrupted due to COVID-19, there has been some movement with employers, training institutions, and accreditation bodies in recent months. In this, the project has aimed to shift the financial burden of training onto the eventual employers, with some success. Program coordinators indicated in interviews that they didn't think this would be possible without the initial investment of the World Bank. Employers didn't trust the quality of graduates, nor the coordination capacity of the Moroccan authorities. Seed funding was required to build "confidence in the corridor," with interviews noting that "paying for the cost of opening the pathway is not the per person cost forever."[110]

Transferring financial responsibility

The analysis in this paper has focused on government-run legal migration pathways, rather than those organized solely by the private sector. Certainly those organized by governments tend to have higher fixed and per-capita costs. What, then, is the benefit of piloting and scaling legal migration pathways with a substantial government component, rather than leaving such pathways solely to the private sector? We posit that there are five main reasons:

109 For more information about the Global Skill Partnership approach, please see Center for Global Development (CGD) (n.d.) "Making migration work for everyone." https://www.cgdev.org/bettermigration.

110 Interviews with program coordinators, November 2020.

- **To prioritize the development impact of migration pathways.** Many of the government-run pathways are aiming to maximize the development impact their migration pathways have on migrants' communities and countries of origin. This could be through the design of the pathway (e.g., encouraging circularity, allowing for family accompaniment, or prioritizing ongoing skill-building) or through additional investments incorporated within the pathway (e.g., financially supporting infrastructure and equipment, or experimenting with ways to increase remittances). Private sector actors may have little incentive to ensure their legal labor migration pathways have a similar benefit.
- **To promote capacity-building within countries of origin.** As described above, some countries of origin have little experience in legal labor managing migration pathways, despite the benefits that they could receive from expanded emigration. The private sector may therefore not be able to work with these countries to source workers, as the underlying structures needed do not exist. Government-run pathways are able to prioritize capacity-building, channeling investment into building these underlying structures to enable future migration pathways to thrive.
- **To meet other trade, foreign policy, and investment goals.** Governments may have reasons as to why they want to deepen a relationship with a potential partner country, including expanding trade and investment into that country. Cooperating on expanding legal labor migration pathways can be one way to develop a deeper foreign policy relationship which can have wider flow-on benefits beyond the impact of migration. Private sector actors may, similarly, want to expand their operations into a particular country and use a migration partnership as a way to do so, though governments are likely to have larger ambitions.
- **To respond to market failures or market inability.** Some areas of commerce, especially those relating to the green transition, are not yet sufficiently profitable, or in sufficiently high demand, for private sector actors to be likely to seek to create migration pathways. For countries taking a longer-term perspective, however, the creation of such pathways may be beneficial in order to accelerate sector transition. Without government involvement, migration pathways (especially those involving training) might not be created until significantly later, to the detriment of national green objectives and the development of strategically important sectors.
- **To satisfy international regulations.** There are some international regulations which require the active involvement of government actors in designing and leading migration pathways. For example, under the WHO's *Global Code of Practice*, active recruitment of health workers is banned from countries which are exhibiting a "critical shortage" of health workers.[111] Therefore, the private sector cannot unilaterally source health workers from these countries and would need to work through a government-to-government agreement.

111 Michael Clemens and Helen Dempster (2021) *Ethical Recruitment of Health Workers: Using Bilateral Cooperation to Fulfill the World Health Organization's Global Code of Practice*. Center for Global Development (CGD) Policy Paper 212. Washington DC: CGD. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/ethical-recruitment-health-workers-using-bilateral-cooperation-fulfill-world-health.

Yet to ensure that such pathways remain viable in the future, it will be necessary for government actors to transfer some form of financial responsibility to the private sector and / or the migrants themselves. This requires engaging with the incentives of the relevant parties, and structuring the pathway in such a way that enough benefit accrues to the various actors to offset the cost required in its implementation. As the Design Document for Phase 3 of the APTC highlights:

> *"Employers and other industry parties are more likely to invest if they can be assured of work-ready graduates with high-level technical and soft skills who add value to their enterprises. Individuals are more likely to pay for or contribute to the cost of their tuition if they can be confident of a good job/career outcome or of acquiring the skills to become successfully self-employed. National governments are more likely to invest where there is commitment to TVET and evidence of its potential to contribute to economic prosperity."*[112]

Private sector

The 'Accessing Overseas Employment Opportunities for Moroccan Youth Project' provides a good example as to how pathways could consider handing off financial responsibility for a legal labor migration pathway to the private sector. Initially, it is unlikely that employers, particularly small and medium enterprises, will be willing or able to invest in such a pathway. As the Migration Partnership Facility (MPF) outlines:

> *"financial contributions towards training or mobility management costs from the private sector remain the goal in all contexts where Pilot Projects have operated, but such contributions only appear realistic on a basis of established trust, and demonstrated results that will take time to obtain."*[113]

This statement appears to indicate that trust must be developed, and the value add of the trainees proven to employers, before they would be likely to invest. This suggests a role for governments and / or multilateral organizations to finance the pilot stage, covering the cost for employers and proving the importance of the pathway. In phase two of the project, some costs could be handed over to the private sector (say, the cost of training the workers they ultimately receive) with additional running costs handled by governments and / or multilateral organizations. A stylized version of such a model for pathways with a substantial training component is shown in Figure 2. The government in the country of destination would pay for the training of workers in both the 'home' and 'away' track, with

112 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) (2017) *Australia-Pacific Training Coalition Stage 3 (APTC3): Investment Design Document*. Canberra: DFAT. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/aptc3-design-document.pdf.

113 Migration Partnership Facility (MPF) (2019) *New MPF publication: Partnerships for Mobility at the Crossroads—Lessons Learnt from 18 Months of Implementation of EU Pilot Projects on Legal Migration*. Vienna: International Center for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). https://www.migrationpartnershipfacility.eu/news/new-mpf-publication-partnerships-for-mobility-at-the-crossroads-lessons-learnt-from-18-months-of-implementation-of-eu-pilot-projects-on-legal-migration.

employers in the country of destination repaying the government for the cost of training the workers they receive through the 'away' track. Other costs could be covered through ODA (see Box 4).

FIGURE 2. A cost-sharing model for legal labor migration pathways



The cost-sharing in phase two is likely only to happen under the condition that employers *need* those people emerging from the pathway. If employers are able to source labor elsewhere, or are able to source labor more cheaply, it is unlikely they would be willing to invest in the pathway. As was discovered in the implementation of the 'German-Tunisian Mobility Pact,' it was cheaper for employers to hire from Eastern Europe and therefore difficult to get them interested in hiring from Tunisia.[114] It is necessary to reduce the per-capita cost of the migration pathway to a level acceptable to the private sector, and to approach employers with persistent skills shortages and an interest in sourcing labor through such pathways. Such employers may have other incentives for engaging in the pathway, such as a desire to cultivate economic development in a particular country of origin, which should be ascertained. Attention here should be paid to the size of the entity. Large multinational organizations may have a history of hiring foreign workers and therefore more trust in sourcing talent through a migration pathway. They also, usually, have the internal capacity to engage with such schemes. Yet it is in small and medium enterprises where much demand lies. The pathway could engage larger organizations in phase one and two, transferring financial responsibility to them *first*, before thinking about engaging smaller organizations.

Length is crucial here. As discussed above, feedback from existing pathways is that it is more difficult to generate financial sustainability for shorter-duration and circular schemes than long-term mobility due to the potential for the private sector to reap a sustained investment. If pathways are interested in handing off financial responsibility to the private sector, they may need to transition from short-term to long-term visas, and / or transition from a circular to a permanent

114 European Training Foundation (ETF) (2015) *Migrant Support Measures from an Employment and Skills Perspective (MISMES): Tunisia*. Brussels: ETF. https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/36845/MISMES_Tunisia.pdf?sequence=1.

pathway. Throughout, pathways must ensure that they engage the private sector from the early days of the project, recruiting interested employers to help design the skill profile of migrants expected through the pathway to ensure it matches with demand. Finally, the pathway must conduct robust cost-benefit analyses to ensure the project is delivering value for money. Returning to the 'German-Tunisian Mobility Pact,' 64 percent of participating employers felt one of their motivations for engaging in the pathway was the financial subsidies they were receiving. ETF rightly questions the cost-benefit rationale of such a program, asking whether labor could be sourced in a cheaper and easier way.[115]

Migrants themselves

As described in the section above, some pathways have experimented with passing some costs on to the migrant themselves. These usually include passport, visa, and travel costs, along with some application and recruitment fees. For the pathway to meet the requirements set out by the ILO, such fees must be in the genuine interest of the migrant, limited in scope, and explicitly expressed to the migrant before they move (Box 6).[116]

To meet these costs, legal labor migration pathways could construct some form of loan scheme (whether from the employer, though salary deductions, or from an external agency). The original design for the Global Skill Partnership model outlines a financial mechanism whereby the migrant would be able to take out a loan that was contingent on their earning differential from moving abroad.[117] This scheme is elaborated in a new paper, outlining a Pacific Skills Visa (PSV) that would enable more labor migration throughout the Pacific region.[118] In that paper, an income-sharing model is proposed whereby donor and student funds would be recycled back into the scheme based on the outcome of migration (Figure 3).

115 European Training Foundation (ETF) (2015) *Migrant Support Measures from an Employment and Skills Perspective (MISMES): Tunisia*. Brussels: ETF. https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/36845/MISMES_Tunisia.pdf?sequence=1.

116 International Labour Organization (ILO) (2019) *General principles and operational guidelines for fair recruitment and definition of recruitment fees and related costs*. Geneva: ILO. https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/publications/WCMS_536755/lang--en/index.htm.

117 Michael A. Clemens (2015) "Global Skill Partnerships: a proposal for technical training in a mobile world." *IZA Journal of Labor Policy* 4(2). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40173-014-0028-z.

118 Satish Chand, Michael Clemens, and Helen Dempster (2021) *A Pacific Skills Visa: Improving Opportunities for Skilled Migration Throughout the Pacific Region*. Center for Global Development (CGD) Policy Paper 231. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/pacific-skills-visa-improving-opportunities-skilled-migration-throughout-pacific-region.

FIGURE 3. The Pacific Skills Visa (PSV) income-sharing model



Source: Satish Chand, Michael Clemens, and Helen Dempster (2021) *A Pacific Skills Visa: Improving Opportunities for Skilled Migration Throughout the Pacific Region.* Center for Global Development (CGD) Policy Paper 231. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/pacific-skills-visa-improving-opportunities-skilled-migration-throughout-pacific-region.

There are, of course, many ethical concerns with passing such costs on to the migrant themselves. In particular, the experience of the 'Malaysia-Bangladesh G2G Program' outlined above shows that even when a pathway does lead to profitable migration opportunities, paying for the pathway can still be out of reach for the majority of the populace. Subsidies may be required, at least in the initial stages, to ensure the cost of the pathway is kept affordable for migrants. New models may need to be considered, leveraging this income differential while mitigating ethical concerns, as the example of the Outcomes-Based Migrant Welfare Fund (Box 10) suggests. And finally, robust evaluations must be conducted throughout to measure the impact of the pathway on those concerned, with design tweaks made to the pathway as necessary.

BOX 10. The outcomes-based migrant welfare fund

As described by Rebekah Smith and Richard Johnson, "current migration systems encourage migrants to take on debt and service providers to behave poorly, undermining the development impact of labor mobility." They propose a 'Migrant Welfare Fund' be developed, covering the cost of job finding, migrant preparation / training, job / workplace audits and worker protection, settling in, and in-work support, as well as the necessary government institutions for protections and oversight.

The initial investment would be made by social investors, with the services to migrants provided by service providers under outcomes-based contracts. Migrants who successfully find and sustain quality employment through these service providers would contribute a percentage of their salary while abroad back into the fund. They propose starting with a pilot program, assisting 3,000 workers to find jobs overseas over the span of 18 months, at a cost of around US$6 million (to be funded by government or donors).

Similar funds have been implemented in the Philippines[119], Pakistan[120], and Sri Lanka[121], though in smaller scope and impact. It remains to be seen whether this model would be attractive to governments, and how it would mitigate many of the welfare concerns seen in other pathways.

Source: Rebekah Smith and Richard Johnson (2020) "Introducing an Outcomes-Based Migrant Welfare Fund." Center for Global Development (CGD) Blog, January 16, 2020. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/introducing-outcomes-based-migrant-welfare-fund.

Policy recommendations

This paper has attempted to support high-income countries that are interested in developing new and scaling existing legal labor migration pathways by providing comprehensive information on the costs inherent within such pathways and the ways in which these costs could be covered in an ethical and sustainable way. Based on this analysis, this paper concludes with seven key policy recommendations and lessons learned for such actors:

1. **There is not one way to finance legal labor migration pathways.** The design and implementation of such pathways is complex and political, with different incentive structures inherent within different actors giving rise to a vast array of different configurations. While this paper has attempted to outline some lessons learned from these structures, governments should experiment and flexibly adapt as the pathway progresses.
2. **Governments in countries of destination will likely be a key source of funding for a pilot phase, and should explore options for doing so.** It is unlikely that the private sector or migrants themselves will have enough trust in a new pathway to be willing to incur the costs of engaging in it. Governments in countries of origin will have limited financial capacity to substantially invest. As a result, it is likely that a government in a country of destination will need to cover the costs of the pilot phase. Box 4 highlights that much of these costs could be covered through ODA. In addition, some external funds (such as the MPF) could be used.
3. **Transferring financial responsibility to the private sector or migrants themselves must be done carefully and slowly.** Many of the pathways surveyed here attempted to bring these actors on board (in a financial sense) early in a project, leading to complications. The section on scale suggests that such responsibility could be transferred in phase two of a project, once trust has been developed and benefits proven, but this transfer and its impact must be carefully monitored.

119 Department of Labor and Employment (n.d.) "Overseas Workers Welfare Administration." https://owwa.gov.ph/.
120 Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development, Government of Pakistan (n.d.) "Overseas Pakistanis Foundation." https://www.opf.org.pk/.
121 International Labour Organization (ILO) "Sri Lanka Overseas Workers Welfare Fund." https://www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/migmain.showPractice?p_lang=en&p_practice_id=151#.

4. **Think long-term.** Transferring financial responsibility will likely only work if both the private sector and the migrants themselves believe that the pathway will confer long-term benefits. As such, pilots should be designed on a multi-year time horizon, with a sustainable financing plan embedded within the design from day one.
5. **Support migration to lower the per capita cost.** Our analysis shows that the per capita cost can be very large—up to €20,000 (approximately US$21,141)—especially if training is factored in. To ensure this funding is put to good use, trainees must have the ability to access gainful employment, whether at home or abroad. In particular, the experience of the 'Australia Pacific Training Coalition (APTC)' clearly shows that pathways with a substantial training component can lead to a problematic cost-benefit ratio if the migration of participants is not supported (with its ensuant income differential). If a pathway is intending to link training with labor mobility, this labor mobility must be a priority.
6. **Conduct value-for-money (VfM) analyses.** The experience of the 'Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative (KANI)' shows the importance of conducting VfM analyses. Even if the pathway is successful—in that people are trained, able to move, access higher earnings, and plug skills gaps in employers—it may still not represent value for money (vis-à-vis other potential investments). For actors interested in conducting such analyses, a good place to start is the design documents for the 'Australia Pacific Training Coalition (APTC)' as outlined above.
7. **Evaluate and build lessons into future pathway iterations.** There is a severe lack of evaluations of legal labor migration pathways, making it difficult for other policymakers to draw lessons learned. Part of the issue lies in funding monitoring and evaluations themselves, but another issue is that oftentimes goals and objectives are not clearly defined and measuring progress is convoluted at best.[122] This can lead to an endless cycle of pilots, with few learning lessons and scaling. Evaluations such as that conducted by McKenzie and Gibson (2010) for New Zealand's 'Recognized Seasonal Employer (RSE)' scheme should be replicated, measuring the causal impact of the pathway on participants, their communities, and their eventual employers to support future projects.[123]

122 Kate Hooper (2019) *Exploring New Legal Migration Pathways: Lessons from Pilot Projects.* Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute (MPI). https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/exploring-new-legal-migration-pathways-lessons-pilot-projects.

123 David J. McKenzie and John Gibson (2016) *The Development Impact of a Best Practice Seasonal Worker Policy.* Policy Research Working Paper 5488. Washington DC: World Bank. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1718246.

Annex 1. Analyzed legal labor migration pathways

This paper analyzed 57 legal labor migration pathways contained within a CGD database. To learn more about the pathways contained within the database, please visit https://cgdev.org/bettermigration. In Annex 1, they are roughly ordered by the level of training provided; high (substantial soft- and hard-skills training); medium (some soft-skills training); and low (some pre-departure training, or no training).

Pathway Details					Funding Source			
Name	Country of Destination	Country of Origin	Sector	Level of Training Provided	Government	INGOs / Multilateral Organizations	Private Sector / Foundations[124]	Migrants Themselves
Pilot Project Addressing Labour Shortages Through Innovative Labour Migration Models (PALIM)	Belgium	Morocco	ICT	High	Belgian government (Enabel): €75,000	European Commission (DG Home, Migration Partnership Facility (MPF)): €1.5 million[125]		
Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration Governance and Labour Mobility in North Africa (THAMM)	Germany, Belgium	Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia	ICT	High	German government (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)): €5 million[126]	European Union Trust Fund (EUTF): €20 million, of which €5 million will be dedicated to labor mobility		
Temporary Labour Migration of Georgian Workers to Poland and Estonia	Poland, Estonia	Georgia	Engineering, construction, and manufacturing	High		International Organization for Migration (IOM) Development Fund: US$150,000		

124 For all of the pathways listed here, the employer paid the salary of the migrant. We have only indicated where the private sector and / or foundations incurred a financial cost *beyond* salaries.
125 Migration Partnership Facility (MPF) (2021) "Completed Action: Pilot Project Addressing Labour Shortages through Innovative Labour Migration Models (PALIM)." https://www.migrationpartnershipfacility.eu/mpf-projects/17-completed-action-pilot-project-addressing-labour-shortages-through-innovative-labour-migration-models-palim.
126 European Union (EU) Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (2018) "Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration Governance and Labour Mobility in North Africa." https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/regional/towards-holistic-approach-labour-migration-governance-and-labour_en.

Pathway Details					Funding Source			
Name	Country of Destination	Country of Origin	Sector	Level of Training Provided	Government	INGOs / Multilateral Organizations	Private Sector / Foundations[124]	Migrants Themselves
Global Skills Partnership Nursing in the Philippines	Germany	The Philippines	Health care	High	German government (German Development Agency (GIZ)) [amount unknown]		Bertelsmann Foundation [amount unknown]	
Youth, Employment, and Skills (YES)	Germany	Kosovo	Engineering, construction, and manufacturing	High	German government (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and German Development Agency (GIZ)) and Bavarian Ministry of Economy: €12 million[127]			
Australia Pacific Training Coalition (APTC)	Australia, New Zealand	Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu	Engineering, construction, and manufacturing; health care; tourism and hospitality	High	Australian government (Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT): AU$134 million (Stage 1), AU$137 million (Stage 2), and AU$192 million (Stage 3)			Skills assessment, travel expenses, technical overview, visa costs

127 GIZ (2018) *Youth, Employment and Skills in Kosovo (YES)*. Berlin: GIZ. https://www.giz.de/fachexpertise/downloads/giz2018-DE-Factsheet-YES%20Kosovo.pdf.

Pathway Details					Funding Source			
Name	Country of Destination	Country of Origin	Sector	Level of Training Provided	Government	INGOs / Multilateral Organizations	Private Sector / Foundations[124]	Migrants Themselves
Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA)	Japan	The Republic of the Philippines[128]	Health care	Medium	Japanese government: six months of pre-departure language training		Employer: Six months of language and skills training, management fee[129]	
Technical Intern Training Programme (TITP)	Japan	Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Myanmar, Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uzbekistan, Vietnam	Engineering, construction, and manufacturing	Medium	Japan International Training Cooperation Organisation (JITCO)		Employer: Broker fees to recruitment agents	Registration, training, and placement fees[130]
Recruiting Trainees from Viet Nam (Triple Win Nurses)	Germany	Vietnam	Health care	Medium	German government (Ministry of Economics and Energy (BMWi)): language training and attendance costs[131]			Accommodation
Training nurses from Vietnam to become geriatric nurses in Germany	Germany	Vietnam	Health care	Medium				

128 This pathway has been used as an illustrated example of the three EPA partnership agreements, which all operated similarly (the other two being with Vietnam and Indonesia).

129 Kate Hooper (2019) *Exploring New Legal Migration Pathways: Lessons from Pilot Projects.* Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute (MPI). https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TCM_MigrationPilotProjects-FINAL%20WEB.pdf.

130 Sona Yukti (n.d.) "Indo-Japan Technical Intern Training Program (TITP)—Japanese Language + Domain Training." https://www.sonayukti.com/trainings/indo-japan-technical-intern-training-program-titp.php.

131 Michael Clemens, Helen Dempster, and Kate Gough (2019) *Maximizing the Shared Benefits of Legal Migration Pathways: Lessons from Germany's Skills Partnerships.* Center for Global Development (CGD) Policy Paper 150. Washington DC: CGD. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/maximizing-shared-benefits-legal-migration-pathways.

Pathway Details					Funding Source			
Name	**Country of Destination**	**Country of Origin**	**Sector**	**Level of Training Provided**	**Government**	**INGOs / Multilateral Organizations**	**Private Sector / Foundations[124]**	**Migrants Themselves**
Pilot project aimed at attracting personnel from Vietnam to train as nurses in Germany	Germany	Vietnam	Health care	Medium				
Sustainable Recruitment of Nurses (Triple Win)	Germany	Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Philippines, Tunisia	Health care	Medium			Employer: Placement fee to German Federal Employment Agency (BA); Service fee to German Development Agency (GIZ); Foreign Employer Guarantee Fund payment to Philippines Overseas Employment Agency (POEA); Travel costs, housing and qualification recognition to the trainee.[132]	Processing fee to Philippines Overseas Employment Agency (POEA); Contribution to Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA); PhilHealth and Home Development Mutual Fund Contribution; Medical examination[133]

132 The Summit Express (2020) "Germany hiring 550 Filipino nurses, estimated salary P135,000 per month." January 17, 2020. https://www.thesummitexpress.com/2020/01/poea-hiring-550-nurses-germany-triple-win-project.html.

133 The Philippines is used as the primary example here, as the majority of nurses under 'Triple Win' come from the Philippines and they have the best data available. It should not be assumed that the payments are similar for other countries. See Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2020) "Triple Win—Pilipinas." https://www.arbeitsagentur.de/vor-ort/zav/triple-win/philippinen.

Pathway Details					Funding Source			
Name	Country of Destination	Country of Origin	Sector	Level of Training Provided	Government	INGOs / Multilateral Organizations	Private Sector / Foundations[124]	Migrants Themselves
German–China Geriatric Nursing Pilot Program	Germany	China	Health care	Medium	German government (Federal Employment Agency's International Placement Service (ZAV)), Federal Association of German Employers' Associations (BDA), the German Care Employers Association (Arbeitgeberverband Pflege), and the Chinese International Contractors Association (CHINCA)			
Make It In Germany	Germany	India, Indonesia, Vietnam	Engineering, construction, and manufacturing	Medium	German government (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi))			
Accessing Overseas Employment Opportunities for Moroccan Youth Project	Germany	Morocco	Tourism and hospitality	Medium	German government (German Development Agency (GIZ)): language training[134]	World Bank: US$3.05 million[135]	Employer: Accommodation, food, vocational training in Germany	

134 Cinzia Alcidi, Nadzeya Laurentsyeva, and Ahmad Wali Ahmad Yar (2019) *Legal Migration Pathways across the Mediterranean: achievements, obstacles and the way forward.* EMNES Policy Paper 009. Brussels: EMNES. https://euromed-economists.org/download/legal-migration-pathways-across-the-mediterranean-achievements-obstacles-and-the-way-forward/?wpdmdl=2240&refresh=611d1a7232fb11629297266.

135 World Bank (n.d.) "Accessing Overseas Employment Opportunities for Moroccan Youth." https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P150064.

Pathway Details					Funding Source			
Name	Country of Destination	Country of Origin	Sector	Level of Training Provided	Government	INGOs / Multilateral Organizations	Private Sector / Foundations[124]	Migrants Themselves
Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative (KANI)	Australia	Kiribati	Health care	Medium	Australian government (Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT): AU$18.8 million[136]			
Transformation Partnership in the Healthcare Sector (TAPIG)	Germany	Tunisia	Health care	Medium	Governments of Germany and Tunisia: 10 percent[137]		Private Hospital Group Asklepios: €2.5 million+ Employer: pre-departure training, vocational training in Germany	Student loan to cover costs
Digital Explorers	Lithuania	Nigeria	ICT	Low		European Commission (DG Home, Migration Partnership Facility (MPF)): €1.35 million to cover implementation costs and one-time payment to trainees[138]	Enterprise Lithuania: €4,657 AfriKo: €38,622 Ventures Platform: €16,854 Code Academy: €5,707 Diversity Development Group: €1,546	

136 Lea Shaw, Murray Edwards, and Akka Rimon (2013) *KANI Independent Review.* AidWorks Initiative Number: ING466. Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/kiribati-australia-nursing-initiative-independent-report.pdf.

137 European Training Foundation (ETF) (2015) *Migrant Support Measures from an Employment and Skills Perspective (MISMES): Tunisia*. Brussels: ETF. https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/36845/MISMES_Tunisia.pdf?sequence=1.

138 Migration Partnership Facility (MPF) (2021) "Digital Explorers." https://www.migrationpartnershipfacility.eu/mpf-projects/4-digital-explorers; and Nicolas Friederici (2021) *Lessons Learned from Digital Explorers (Track 1).* Vilinus: Digital Explorers. https://www.dropbox.com/s/ocntj94q5wb3uu5/Digital%20Explorers_1st%20Track%20Evaluation%20Report_final.pdf?dl=0.

Pathway Details					Funding Source			
Name	Country of Destination	Country of Origin	Sector	Level of Training Provided	Government	INGOs / Multilateral Organizations	Private Sector / Foundations[124]	Migrants Themselves
High Opportunity for Mediterranean Executives Recruitment (HOMERe)	France	Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, France, Greece, Italy, Lebanon, Spain	ICT: tourism and hospitality		HOMERe France: €6,000 Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur: €20,000	European Commission (DG Home, Migration Partnership Facility (MPF)): €2.6 million[139]	Employers: €1.5 million Réseau Méditerranéen des Ecoles d'Ingénieurs (RMEI): €4,000 University of Brest "Offshoring des Technologies de l'Information" (OTI): €15,000 Hard Workers: €8,000 ME France: €30,000	
Enhancing Tunisian Youth Employability through Professional Internships in Belgian Companies	Belgium	Tunisia	*Not specified*		Belgian government: €350,000			
Mediterranean Network for Training Orientation to Regular Migration (MENTOR)	Italy	Morocco, Tunisia	*Not specified*			European Commission (DG Home, Migration Partnership Facility (MPF)): €543,231.54[140]		
Promoting legal mobility among highly qualified Tunisian experts	Germany	Tunisia	Engineering, construction, and manufacturing	Low	German government (Federal Foreign Office): €1.7 million			

139 Migration Partnership Facility (MPF) (2020) "Completed Project: High Opportunity for Mediterranean Executive Recruitment (HOMERe)." https://www.migrationpartnershipfacility.eu/mpf-projects/33-completed-project-high-opportunity-for-mediterranean-executive-recruitment-homere.

140 Migration Partnership Facility (MPF) (2018) "Completed Action: MENTOR MEditerranean Network for Training Orientation to Regular migration." https://www.migrationpartnershipfacility.eu/mpf-projects/11-completed-action-mentor-mediterranean-network-for-training-orientation-to-regular-migration.

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Name	Country of Destination	Country of Origin	Sector	Level of Training Provided	Government	INGOs / Multilateral Organizations	Private Sector / Foundations[124]	Migrants Themselves
Western Balkan Regulation	Germany	Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia	Engineering, construction, and manufacturing; tourism and hospitality	Low				Work permit
Strengthening the development potential of the EU Mobility Partnership in Georgia through targeted circular migration and diaspora mobilization	Germany	Georgia	Health care; tourism and hospitality	Low	German government (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ))	European Union (EU) Thematic Programme on Migration and Asylum (TPMA)		
Sectors Based Scheme	United Kingdom	Bulgaria, Romania	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing	Low			Employer: visas and work permits to the UK Border Agency	
Blue Birds	The Netherlands	South Africa, Indonesia	Engineering, construction, and manufacturing	Low	Dutch government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)): €3.8 million[141]			
Temporary and Circular Migration Project between Portugal and Ukraine	Portugal	Ukraine	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing; tourism and hospitality		Portuguese government	European Commission[142]		

141 The project was implemented by the HIT foundation. While the Foundation had their budget covered by the MFA grant, it is one of the few examples of a private foundation implementing a legal migration project. See Melissa Siegel and Vivianne van der Vorst (2012) *Evaluation of the 'Blue Birds' Circular Migration Pilot in The Netherlands*. Maastricht: Boekenplan. https://migration.unu.edu/publications/reports/evaluation-of-the-blue-birds-circular-migration-pilot-in-the-netherlands.html.

142 Implemented by IOM and the World Bank. IOM notes the total project budget is €625,000. It's unclear whether that is only IOM's portion of a larger budget, and how that has been funded (e.g., the split between the Government of Portugal and the European Commission). See International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2010) *IOM Migrant Training Programmes Overview 2010–2011*. Geneva: IOM. https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/facilitating/IOM_Migrant_Training_Programmes_Overview_2010_2011.pdf.

Pathway Details					Funding Source			
Name	**Country of Destination**	**Country of Origin**	**Sector**	**Level of Training Provided**	**Government**	**INGOs / Multilateral Organizations**	**Private Sector / Foundations[124]**	**Migrants Themselves**
Migration of African Talents Through Capacity Building and Hiring (MATCH)	Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Italy	Senegal, Nigeria	ICT	Low		European Union's Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)[143]		
Construction Worker Pilot	Israel	China, Romania, Turkey	Engineering, construction, and manufacturing	Low			Employer: licensing fee, application fee, additional fees to Population, Immigration, and Borders Authority (PIBA); social security, medical insurance, and accommodation to migrant[144]	
Temporary Care Workers	Israel	The Philippines, Nepal, Sri Lanka	Health care	Low			Employer: visa fee to Population, Immigration, and Borders Authority (PIBA)	
Northern Australia Worker Pilot Program (NAWPP)	Australia	Kiribati, Nauru, Tuvalu	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing	Low	Australian government (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT))		Employer: some airfare cost-sharing	"Microstates Visa"[145]

143 Implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

144 Rebeca Raijman and Nonna Kushnirovich (2012) *Labor Migrant Recruitment Practices in Israel.* Tel Aviv: Ruppin Academic Center. https://www.ruppin.ac.il/%D7%9E%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99-%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%A7%D7%A8/%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%9C%D7%94%D7%92%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%94-%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%91-%D7%97%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%AA%D7%99/Documents/Labor%20Migrant%20Recruitment%20Practices%20in%20Israel.pdf.

145 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) (2017) "Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Australia and the Government of Nauru: In support of the granting of visas to citizens of Nauru for the Pacific Microstates—Northern Australia Worker Pilot Program." Canberra: DFAT. https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Pages/mou-australia-nauru-northern-australia-worker-pilot-program; and Department of Home Affairs (2019) "Temporary Work (International Relations) visa." https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/getting-a-visa/visa-listing/temporary-work-403.

Pathway Details					Funding Source			
Name	Country of Destination	Country of Origin	Sector	Level of Training Provided	Government	INGOs / Multilateral Organizations	Private Sector / Foundations[124]	Migrants Themselves
Pacific Labour Scheme (PLS)	Australia	Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing; engineering, construction, and manufacturing; health care; tourism and hospitality	Low	Australian government (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)): AU$77 million to fund the "Pacific Labour Facility (PLF)" which supports workers and employers[146]			Visa (subclass 403)
Singapore Foreign Worker Permit	Singapore	China, Hong Kong, Macau, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan	Engineering, construction, and manufacturing	Low	Singaporean government (Ministry of Manpower)		Employer: Monthly foreign worker levy; medical and work injury compensation insurance; and work permit[147]	
Singapore S Pass	Singapore	Not specified	Engineering, construction, and manufacturing	Low	Singaporean government (Ministry of Manpower): company grant scheme, housing scheme		Employer: Monthly foreign worker levy; medical and work injury compensation insurance; and work permit[148]	

146 Implemented by Palladium International. See Lisa Martin (2018) "Coalition's $16m Pacific labour scheme recruits just 83 workers in five months." The Guardian, December 28, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/dec/28/coalitions-16m-pacific-labour-scheme-recruits-just-83-workers-in-five-months.

147 Ministry of Manpower (MOM) (n.d.) "What is the foreign worker levy." https://www.mom.gov.sg/passes-and-permits/work-permit-for-foreign-worker/foreign-worker-levy/what-is-the-foreign-worker-levy.

148 VisaGuide (2021) "Singapore Visa Fees." https://visaguide.world/asia/singapore-visa/fees/.

Pathway Details					Funding Source			
Name	Country of Destination	Country of Origin	Sector	Level of Training Provided	Government	INGOs / Multilateral Organizations	Private Sector / Foundations[124]	Migrants Themselves
Employment Permit System (EPS)	Republic of Korea	Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, The Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam, Uzbekistan	Engineering, construction, and manufacturing; tourism and hospitality	Low	Korean government (Ministry of Employment and Labor): Happy Return Programme[149]			Language test, medical check-up, application, passport, visa, preliminary training, travel, insurance, and workers welfare fund contribution[150]
Malaysia-Bangladesh G2G Program	Malaysia	Bangladesh	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing	Low	Bangladesh government (Bureau of Manpower, Employment, and Training (BMET)): subsidized cost of private intermediaries and offered loan schemes through the Expatriates' Welfare Bank			Airfare, medical test, welfare fee, non-judicial stamp, visa fee, orientation training, tax, service charge, intermediation[151]

149 Piyasiri Wickramasekara (2019) *Effective return and reintegration of migrant workers.* Geneva: International Labour Organization (ILO). https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---sro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_733917.pdf.

150 Government of Canada (2021) "Fee list." https://www.cic.gc.ca/english/information/fees/fees.asp.

151 Maheshwor Shrestha, Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, and Iffath Anwar Sharif (2019) *Migration and Remittances:* The Impacts of a Government Intermediated International Migration Program. Washington DC: World Bank. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/993971564038966977/pdf/Migration-and-Remittances-The-Impacts-of-a-Government-Intermediated-International-Migration-Program.pdf.

Pathway Details					Funding Source			
Name	Country of Destination	Country of Origin	Sector	Level of Training Provided	Government	INGOs / Multilateral Organizations	Private Sector / Foundations[124]	Migrants Themselves
Canada Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP)	Canada	Mexico, India, Guatemala, Jamaica, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, United States of America, China France, United Kingdom	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing; engineering, construction, and manufacturing; health care; ICT	Low	Canadian government (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC))		Employer: Labor Market Impact Assessment (LMIA)	Visa and medical exam[152]
Canada Home Child Care Provider Pilot and Home Support Worker Pilot	Canada	Not specified	Health care	Low				Temporary Resident Visa, work permit, and biometrics
Canada Live-in Caregiver Program (LCP)	Canada	Not specified	Health care	Low				Temporary Resident Visa and biometrics
Canada International Mobility Program (also known as Open Work Permit)	Canada	United States of America, France, China, United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Germany, Ireland	*Not specified*	Low			Employer: compliance fee	Temporary Resident Visa, medical exam, and biometrics
Bilateral Agreement on Circular Migration between Canada and Mauritius	Canada	Mauritius	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing; engineering, construction, and manufacturing	Low	Mauritius government (Ministry of Labor, Industrial Relations, Employment, and Training (MLIRET))	International Organization for Migration (IOM): pre-departure training, orientation, visa and medical exam facilitation		Temporary Resident Visa and biometrics

152 Government of Canada (n.d.) "Fee list." https://www.cic.gc.ca/english/information/fees/fees.asp.

<table>
<tr><th colspan="5">Pathway Details</th><th colspan="4">Funding Source</th></tr>
<tr><th>Name</th><th>Country of Destination</th><th>Country of Origin</th><th>Sector</th><th>Level of Training Provided</th><th>Government</th><th>INGOs / Multilateral Organizations</th><th>Private Sector / Foundations[124]</th><th>Migrants Themselves</th></tr>
<tr><td>Canada Rural and Northern Immigration Pilot</td><td>Canada</td><td>Not specified</td><td>Not specified</td><td>Low</td><td>Canadian government (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC))</td><td></td><td></td><td>Resident Application Fee, biometrics, and, if applicable, medical exam, police certificate, language assessment, and education credential assessment[153]</td></tr>
<tr><td>H-2B Program</td><td>United States of America</td><td>Mexico, Jamaica</td><td>Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing</td><td>Low</td><td rowspan="2">United States of America government (Department of Labor (DOL))</td><td></td><td>Employer: Processing Fee[154]</td><td rowspan="2">Visa fees e.g. education credential assessment</td></tr>
<tr><td>H-1B Program</td><td>United States of America</td><td>Not specified

(majority from India, China)</td><td>Not specified

(majority within Engineering, construction, and manufacturing)</td><td>Low</td><td></td><td>Employer: Fees for basic filing, registration, public law, anti-fraud, and ACWIA education and training[155]

Optional Premium Processing Fee borne by employer or migrant</td></tr>
</table>

153 Government of Canada (n.d.) "Guide 0118—Rural and Northern Immigration Pilot." https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/application/application-forms-guides/guide-0118-rural-northern-immigration.html.

154 U.S. Department of State (n.d.) "Fees for Visa Services." https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/fees/fees-visa-services.html.

155 VisaNation (2022) "H-1B Visa Fees 2022–23: Extension, Amendment & Transfer Cost [Updated 3/28/22]." https://www.immi-usa.com/h1b-visa-processing-fees-2016/.

Pathway Details					Funding Source			
Name	**Country of Destination**	**Country of Origin**	**Sector**	**Level of Training Provided**	**Government**	**INGOs / Multilateral Organizations**	**Private Sector / Foundations[124]**	**Migrants Themselves**
H-1B1 Program	United States of America	Chile, Singapore	*Not specified*	Low			Employer: Fees for processing and ACWIA education and training	
Tarjeta Migratoria de Trabajador Fronterizo (TVTF)	Mexico	Guatemala, Belize	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing; engineering, construction, and manufacturing	Low			Employer: Transportation, accommodation, and food[156]	Visa fee. Some pay for paperwork, assistance with job placement, recruitment costs, transportation, and lodgings[157]
Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration (OFII) and Office des Migrations Internationales (OMI) contracts	France	Tunisia, Morocco	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing	Low	French government (Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration (OFII)): international travel		Employer: accommodation, fee to OFII[158]	
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Scheme (SAWS)	United Kingdom	Bulgaria, Romania	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing	Low	United Kingdom government (UK Border Agency)		Employer: visa and work permit costs to UK Border Agency; salaries and return incentives to employees[159]	

156 International Labour Organization (ILO) (2020) *Central American migrant women in Mexico: Informality in recruitment and employment.* Geneva: ILO. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms_764779.pdf.

157 Gobierno de Mexico (n.d.) "Tarjeta Migratoria de Trabajador Fronterizo (TVTF)." https://www.gob.mx/inm/acciones-y-programas/tarjeta-de-visitante-trabajador-fronterizo-tvtf.

158 République Française (2022) "Recruiting a foreign employee: cost for the employer." https://www.welcometofrance.com/en/fiche/recruiting-foreign-employee-cost-for-employer.

159 Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) (2013) *Migrant Seasonal Workers.* London: MAC. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/257242/migrant-seasonal-workers.pdf.

Pathway Details					Funding Source			
Name	Country of Destination	Country of Origin	Sector	Level of Training Provided	Government	INGOs / Multilateral Organizations	Private Sector / Foundations[124]	Migrants Themselves
Seasonal Workers Directive, Employment Regulation (Beschäftigungsverordung)	Germany	Georgia	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing	Low	German government (Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (BMAS))		Employer: accommodation and health insurance[160]	
Agriculture Worker Scheme	Israel	Thailand	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing	Low	Israeli government (Population, Immigration, and Borders Authority (PIBA)): travel		Employer: fees for foreign worker application, license, and recruitment agents	
Temporary and Circular Labour Migration (TCLM) model	Spain	Colombia	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing	Low	Spanish government (Valle del Cauca) and Colombian government[161]	European Commission (AENEAS 2005): €500,037.48[162]	Trade Unión de Pagesos (UP) and its Fundación Agricultores Solidaris (FAS): logistical assistance (selection of migrants, travel arrangements, visa); support for trainees; and training courses	

160 Claudia Lechner (2020) *Attracting and Protecting Seasonal Workers from Third Countries*. European Migration Network (EMN) Working Paper 89. Berlin: EMN. https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/EMN/Studien/wp89-saisonarbeitskraefte.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=11.

161 The total budget of TCLM is €625,046.85. It is unclear whether the Spanish and Colombian governments covered the difference between this amount and that provided by the European Commission and if so, in what shares. See European Commission (2006) *Aeneas programme: Programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the area of migration and asylum*. Brussels: European Commission. https://download.taz.de/migcontrol/eu/EU_AENAS_%20projects%20funded%20to%20third%20countries%202004%20-%202006_eng.pdf. .

162 Implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Pathway Details					Funding Source			
Name	Country of Destination	Country of Origin	Sector	Level of Training Provided	Government	INGOs / Multilateral Organizations	Private Sector / Foundations[124]	Migrants Themselves
Cartaya Project	Spain	Morocco	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing	Low	Spanish government (Cartaya)	European Commission (AENEAS 2005): €1.196 million European Commission (M@res I and II): €1.045 million[163]	Foundation for Foreign Workers in Huelva (FUTEH): administrative costs including opening employment and training agency in Casablanca, and design of web portal with job offers and information on potential candidates Employer: travel and accommodation	
Collective Management of Hiring in the Country of Origin	Spain	Morocco, Colombia	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing	Low	Spanish government (National Public Employment Service): training courses (costs shared with employers)		Employer: half of the travel costs, accommodation, training courses[164]	Half of travel costs

163 Implemented by Andalucia Acoge (NGO), CC.OO (trade union), and Foundation for Foreign Workers in Huelva (FUTEH). See European Commission (2006) *Aeneas programme: Programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the area of migration and asylum*. Brussels: European Commission. https://download.taz.de/migcontrol/eu/EU_AENAS_%20projects%20funded%20to%20third%20countries%202004%20-%202006_eng.pdf; and Zyab Ibáñez, Miriam Acebillo, and Margarita León (2015) *Voluntary, involuntary and programmed circular migration in Spain: the case of Moroccan workers in the berry-producing region of Huelva (Spain)*. Bellaterra: Institut de Govern i Polítiques Públiques. https://docplayer.net/136940886-Voluntary-involuntary-and-programmed-circular-migration-in-spain-the-case-of-moroccan-workers-in-the-berry-producing-region-of-huelva-spain.html.

164 Kate Hooper (2019) *Spain's Labour Migration Policies in the Aftermath of Economic Crisis*. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute (MPI). https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/MPIE-SpainMigrationPathways-Final.pdf.

Pathway Details					Funding Source			
Name	Country of Destination	Country of Origin	Sector	Level of Training Provided	Government	INGOs / Multilateral Organizations	Private Sector / Foundations[124]	Migrants Themselves
Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWPS)	Australia	Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Vanuatu	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing	Low	Australian government (Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) and the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC))		Employer: pastoral care, accommodation, half of international travel costs, domestic travel, recruitment fees, private health insurance, visa fees, and monitoring and other administration[165]	Half of international travel costs
Seasonal Worker Programme (SWP)	Australia	Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing	Low	Australian government (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT))		Employer: accommodation, pastoral care, first AU$500 of travel costs, and recruitment fees to agents (if using)[166]	Visa, Australian health insurance, medical test, police check, travel costs over AU$500, recruitment fees (officially barred, but can be imposed ad-hoc by agents)[167]

165 Accommodation, health insurance, and visa fees could be recovered through wage deductions. See Danielle Joy Hay and Stephen Howes (2012) *Australia's Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme: Why Has Take-Up Been So Low?* Development Policy Centre Discussion Paper No. 17. Canberra: Australian National University (ANU). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2041833.

166 Richard Curtain and Stephen Howes (2020) *Governance of the Seasonal Worker Programme in Australia and sending countries.* Canberra: Development Policy Centre, Australian National University (ANU). https://apo.org.au/node/309985.

167 Some costs, like travel and visa fees, could be covered by the employer and recouped through pay deductions.

Pathway Details					Funding Source			
Name	Country of Destination	Country of Origin	Sector	Level of Training Provided	Government	INGOs / Multilateral Organizations	Private Sector / Foundations[124]	Migrants Themselves
Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE)	New Zealand	Fiji, Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing	Low	New Zealand government (Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment (MBIE))		Employer: half of international travel costs, local transport, pastoral care, and health care[168]	Accommodation and health insurance
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP)	Canada	Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Mexico, Montserrat, St Kitts and St Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing	Low	Mexican government: small grants to workers to cover domestic travel		Employer: international and local transport, accommodation, and workplace safety insurance[169]	Temporary Resident Visa and health insurance

168 John Gibson and David McKenzie (2014) *Development through Seasonal Worker Programs: The Case of New Zealand's RSE Program*. Policy Research Working Paper 6762. Washington DC: World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/18356/WPS6762.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

169 Some transport costs could be recovered through wage deductions. Employers have to obtain an LMIA, but there is no fee.

					Funding Source			
Pathway Details								
Name	Country of Destination	Country of Origin	Sector	Level of Training Provided	Government	INGOs / Multilateral Organizations	Private Sector / Foundations[124]	Migrants Themselves
Canada/Guatemala Temporary Guest Worker Program	Canada	Guatemala	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing	Low	Guatemalan government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Labor)[170]		Employer: international and local transport, and accommodation	Temporary Resident Visa, medical exam, health insurance, accommodation, and recruitment fee
Seasonal Migration from Haiti (USAIM)	United States of America	Haiti	Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing	Low	Haitian government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)[171]	International Organization for Migration (IOM): pre- and post-departure training and workshops	Open Philanthropy Project to IOM: US$1,490,505[172] Good Ventures to Protect the People (PTP): US$550,000[173]	
H-2A Program	United States of America	*Not specified* (majority from Mexico)	*Not specified* (majority within Agriculture, horticulture, and food processing)	Low			Employer Labor Certification, Non-Immigrant Worker Petition, Consulate Fee, Border Stamp Fee, recruitment agent fees, transport, association fees, and accommodation	Transport expenses, daily subsistence, and food through wage deductions[174]

170 Recruitment conducted by FERME (Fondation des Entreprises en Recrutement de Main-d'œuvre agricole Étrangère) in Quebec and Amigo Laboral in Guatemala. See Dalia Gesualdi-Fecteau, Andréanne Thibault, Nan Schivone,Caroline Dufour, Sarah Gouin, Nina Monjean, and Éloïse Moses (2014) *Who, How and How Much? Recruitment of Guatemalan Migrant Workers to Quebec.* Montreal: On the Move Partnership. https://www.onthemovepartnership.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/who-how-howmuch-Report-sm.pdf.

171 Implemented by NGO Protect the People (PTP) and two agricultural workers' cooperatives.

172 GiveWell (2010) *Project Proposal: Facilitation of Circular Labour Migration of Haitian Seasonal Workers to the US under the H2 visa program.* Washington DC: US Association for International Migration (USAIM) and International Organization for Migration (IOM). https://files.givewell.org/files/shallow/international-migration/grants/USAIM.IOM%20Haiti_H2A%20Visa%20Project%20_Narrative.pdf.

173 Good Ventures (2016) "Protect the People—Seasonal Migration from Haiti." https://www.goodventures.org/our-portfolio/grants/protect-the-people-seasonal-migration-from-haiti.

174 U.S. Department of Agriculture (2017) "H-2A Visa Program." https://www.farmers.gov/working-with-us/h2a-visa-program.

Annex 2. Draft legal labor migration pathway budget

		Average per participant	
		€	US$
1	**Pre-selection of candidates**	**4,366**	**5,130**
1.1	Services to recruiters (e.g., screening and selection of candidates; interviews)		
1.2	Job placement (e.g., matching candidates with employers)		
1.3	Pre-departure training for participants within the country of origin (e.g., cultural awareness and other soft skills)		
2	**Training**	**6,812**	**8,004**
2.1	Training during the pathway itself (e.g., payments to companies providing the soft skills / hard skills training; technical assistance; allowances for participants)		
2.2	Language and intercultural courses during the program within the country of destination		
2.3	Post-departure training in country of destination (e.g., payments to companies providing the training; allowances for participants)		
3	**Project implementation**	**5,903**	**6,935**
3.1	Salaries		
3.2	Fees for external consultants		
3.3	Operational costs (e.g., including equipment; supplies)		
3.4	Accommodation costs (e.g., rent; food; allowances)		
4	**Travel**	**600**	**705**
4.1	Visa		
4.2	Flights		
5	**Monitoring and evaluation**	**2,320**	**2,726**
5.1	Cooperation agreements with external evaluators		
5.2	Knowledge sharing after the program finished (e.g., tests for participants; lesson-sharing workshops)		
Total		**20,000**	**23,500**