

Two Global Challenges, One Solution: International Cooperation to Combat Climate Change and Tropical Deforestation

Antonio G.M. La Viña and Alaya de Leon

Abstract

This paper provides an analysis of the international political dynamics around the reduction of tropical deforestation and forest degradation as a climate mitigation strategy, emphasizing the necessity of an enabling environment and sustainable financing to support the scaling up of these efforts globally. After describing the evolution from the 1990s of international cooperation to combat tropical deforestation, the paper focuses principally on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and how it provided an impetus for a renewed effort on this issue. The paper describes the complex process through which the climate and tropical forest agenda got inserted into UNFCCC processes, from its marginal role in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) created by the Kyoto Protocol to the emergence of REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks) as the forum where decisions have been made on climate and tropical forests. The paper dissects the issues that have dominated the REDD+ negotiations, identifies and characterizes the actors and constituencies that have been influential in the process, analyzes lessons learned from the successes of this UNFCCC agenda, and suggests recommendations to move the REDD+ and overall tropical forests and climate agenda forward. The paper concludes with an anticipation of what to expect in the future, in the light especially of what could possibly be a new climate change agreement in 2015.

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**Two Global Challenges, One Solution: International Cooperation to
Combat Climate Change and Tropical Deforestation**

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Foreword

This paper is one of more than 20 analyses being produced under CGD’s Initiative on Tropical Forests for Climate and Development. The purpose of the Initiative is to help mobilize substantial additional finance from high-income countries to conserve tropical forests as a means of reducing carbon emissions, and thus slowing climate change.

The analyses will feed into a book entitled *Why Forests? Why Now? The Science, Economics, and Politics of Tropical Forests and Climate Change*. Co-authored by senior fellow Frances Seymour and research fellow Jonah Busch, the book will show that tropical forests are essential for both climate stability and sustainable development, that now is the time for action on tropical forests, and that payment-for-performance finance for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) represents a course of action with great potential for success.

Commissioned background papers also support the activities of a working group convened by CGD and co-chaired by Nancy Birdsall and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski to identify practical ways to accelerate performance-based finance for tropical forests in the lead up to UNFCCC COP21 in Paris in 2015.

This paper, “Two global challenges, one solution: international cooperation to combat climate change and tropical deforestation” by Antonio G.M. La Viña and Alaya de Leon, was commissioned by CGD to provide a scholar-practitioner’s analysis of forest politics at the international level in the context of climate change negotiations. The paper is intended to explain the reasons behind the relative success of negotiations on international cooperation to reduce tropical deforestation as a climate change mitigation strategy, and how consensus on REDD+ was achieved.

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Executive Summary

This paper describes and analyzes the evolution of international cooperation to reduce tropical deforestation. Its goal is to analyze the international political dynamics around the reduction of tropical deforestation and forest degradation as a climate mitigation strategy, and to highlight the importance of fostering an enabling environment and channeling finance to sustain these efforts at the global scale.

The paper provides a historical overview of international cooperation to address tropical deforestation, starting with the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP) in the 1980s and the criticism against it, a narrative of the failed attempts to negotiate and adopt a forest treaty in the 1990s, a description of the dynamics of intergovernmental processes on forests, and a recognition of the more recent initiatives directed at legal enforcement and sustainable management of forests. These early efforts to curb tropical deforestation through international cooperation saw agreement by governments, non-governmental organizations and other actors on the importance of this objective, but drew much disagreement on the approaches that could be undertaken to achieve it. We point out that it is in the context of this policy vacuum that the climate change convention provided, and continues to provide, an opportunity for a renewed effort for international cooperation to address tropical deforestation.

The paper then proceeds to look at the complex process through which the climate and tropical forest agenda got inserted into the processes of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), from its marginal role in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) created by Kyoto Protocol to the central role it is now playing in the UNFCCC agenda with the emergence of REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries). In describing this process, we identify the issues (scope, safeguards, MRV and other technical issues, drivers, institutional arrangements, and finance) and how they were resolved systematically through years of hard negotiation starting from Montreal in 2005 ending in Warsaw in 2013. The paper emphasizes of course the critical conferences of Copenhagen (2009), Cancun (2010), Durban (2011) and Warsaw (2013) when agreement on most issues was achieved.

The paper also reflects on the actors and constituencies that influenced the REDD+ negotiations, tracing the important roles negotiation blocs (eg. Coalition for Rainforest Nations and the African Group) and individual countries (Brazil, Indonesia, and the Philippines among developing countries and Norway, EU, the US among developed countries) played and giving credit where it is due to those who played constructive roles in the REDD+ negotiations. The paper also acknowledges the special challenges that had to be addressed in the course of the negotiations, the process related issues raised by Saudi Arabia that made negotiations in Cancun challenging, and the difficulties of addressing Bolivia's advocacy for a joint mitigation-adaptation mechanism that was outside the parameters of the REDD+ discussions.

The paper then proceeds to analyze lessons learned from the successes of the process and suggest recommendations to move the REDD+ agenda forward. What could be expected in the future, in terms of the climate change process, are likewise described in the paper.

The story of international cooperation to reduce tropical deforestation is long and complex. But in the climate change process, gains have been achieved that could be critical for both climate and forests. The paper explains why these gains were achieved.

As the UNFCCC negotiations for the 2015 Paris Agreement accelerate, the REDD+ story is instructive of what is possible for climate change and tropical deforestation: international cooperation is not certain but it is certainly possible; challenges abound but solutions can be identified.

List of Acronyms

AOSIS	Association of Small Island States
AR4	Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC
AR5	Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC
AWG-KP	Ad Hoc Working Group on the Kyoto Protocol
AWG-LCA	Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action
BUR	Biennial Update Report
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CfRN	Coalition for Rainforest Nations
COP	Conference of the Parties
CPF	Collaborative Partnerships on Forests
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FLEG	Forest Law Enforcement and Governance
FLEGT	Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade
FREL/FRL	Forest reference emission level/forest reference level
G7	Group of 7
G8	Group of 8
G77	Group of 77
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GHG	Greenhouse gases

IFF	Intergovernmental Forum on Forests
IP	Indigenous peoples
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPF	Intergovernmental Panel on Forests
LULUCF	Land use, land use change and forestry
MRV	Measurement, reporting, and verification
NCB	Non-carbon benefits
NFMS	National forest monitoring system
NGO	Non-government organizations
NMBA	Non-market-based approaches
PES	Payments for ecosystem services
PNG	Papua New Guinea
RBF	Results-based finance
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice
SIS	Safeguard information system
TFAP	Tropical Forestry Action Plan
UN	United Nations
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFF	United Nations Forum on Forests
VPA	Voluntary Partnership Agreement
WGI/II/III	IPCC Working Group I/II/III
WRI	World Resources Institute
WWF	World Wildlife Fund for Nature

Introduction

On March 30, 2014, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), meeting in Yokohama, Japan, approved and released the Summary for Policymakers of the Working Group II (WGII) contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) (*Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability*).¹ In a statement widely quoted after the release of the report, IPCC chairman Rajendra Pachauri told journalists “Nobody on this planet is going to be untouched by the impacts of climate change.” Dr. Saleemul Huq, a co-author of the report, added, “Before this we thought we knew this was happening, but now we have overwhelming evidence that it is happening and it is real.”²

The report of IPCC WGII follows the release in September 2013 of the Summary for Policymakers of the Working Group I (WGI) contribution to the AR5 (*Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis*). The IPCC in its meeting in Stockholm, Sweden accepted the underlying scientific and technical assessment of the report, which, among others, concludes that: “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased.”³

The IPCC Working Group III (WGIII) contribution to the AR5 (*Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change*), approved at the working group’s 12th session in Berlin, Germany on 7-11 April 2014, for the first time considers together in a single chapter “the terrestrial land surface, comprising agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU).” The report has found that the AFOLU sector represents 20-24% of total emissions, making it the second largest emitting sector after energy.⁴ On the objective of preparing the report, WGIII Co-Chair Ottmar Edenhofer says:

Working group III would like to be a map maker... wants to provide policy relevant information without being policy prescriptive to give policymakers a way to overlook the

¹ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), *WGII AR5 Summary for Policy Makers*, March 31, 2014

² Matt McGrath, “Climate impacts ‘overwhelming’ – UN,” *BBC News*, March 31, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-26810559> (accessed March 31, 2014).

³ IPCC, *WGI AR5 Summary for Policy Makers*, September 27, 2013.

⁴ Francesco Tubiello, “Climate change mitigation in the land-use sector: policies and measures,” presentation at SBSTA-IPCC special event: WGIII Contribution to AR5 – Mitigation of Climate Change. Bonn, Germany, 6 June 2014.

whole landscape and provide information about their past performance and also to give them information what [*sic*] they could do in the future.⁵

In the context of this new scientific evidence on the drivers and impacts of, and solutions to, global climate change, and as parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) move closer to a legally-binding agreement on addressing these drivers and impacts, a critical look at international politics around specific aspects of the climate debate could inform decision-making by key actors in the next few years.

In this paper, we tackle the negotiations regarding the role that tropical forests play in helping stabilize carbon dioxide (CO₂) levels in the atmosphere. This role is now well-established and has been re-emphasized over the years, finding its own space within the broader climate negotiations. The need for international cooperation in forest conservation and enhancement has never been more relevant, particularly with the positive developments on these issues in the UNFCCC discussions on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries (REDD+), and in light of new discussions begun in November 2013 on forests and other land uses relevant to climate, as the negotiations on a 2015 Agreement accelerate towards its final stages.

Objective of paper for policy makers

The objective of this paper is to provide an analysis of the international political dynamics around the reduction of tropical deforestation and forest degradation as a climate mitigation strategy, and to elucidate the importance of fostering an enabling environment and channeling finance to sustain these efforts at the global scale. This analysis is not being done in a vacuum, but in the context of ongoing processes in the United Nations, in particular the discussions on the formulation and adoption of sustainable development goals and the negotiations towards a new agreement on climate change under the UNFCCC.

Many studies have been conducted and reports written and released on this topic, especially those focusing on REDD+. These range from scientific to social to technical assessments, and from comprehensive studies covering international and regional discourse to site- and

⁵ IPCC, Video on the IPCC WGIII Contribution to AR5, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gDcGz1iVm6U#t=378> (accessed 3 July 2014).

issue-specific studies, briefers and reports. With the sheer volume of material⁶ on the subject, sources for this paper have been limited to broader reports and studies at the global or regional scale reflecting overall trends, or positions of key actors that have greatly influenced or shaped the discourse. In addition, this paper is informed by the active participation of both authors in the UNFCCC negotiations as members of the Philippine delegation.⁷

Brief history of international cooperation to address tropical deforestation

To understand the dynamics and politics of climate change and forest discussions, it is important to be aware of the evolution of international cooperation to reduce tropical deforestation, from the controversial Tropical Forestry Action Plan in the 1980s, the failure to agree on a forest treaty in the 1990s, to various forest initiatives in enforcement and sustainable management implemented in the last 10 years or so.

One of the main proposals that arose out of these various fora and discussions was the provision of compensation for avoiding tropical deforestation, raised by environmental scientists as early as the 1980s. At the international level, it gained traction later in the 1990s, with discussion around the issue in relation to the Earth Summit in 1992 and its potential inclusion under the UNFCCC through the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.^{8,9}

Tropical Forestry Action Plan

The Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP) was launched in 1985 as a major response to the “crisis” in the rate of tropical deforestation¹⁰ and the decrease in international funding for tropical forestry programs, amid the recognition as early as 1983 that tropical “forests are

⁶ In March 2012, a search for publications on REDD+ on Google Scholar yielded almost 18,000 results. As of this writing, a Google Scholar search on “reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation” yields about 36,600 results, while “reducing emissions from deforestation” yields about 59,700. Accessed 28 June 2014.

⁷ La Viña chaired the REDD+ contact group in 2009, including during the Copenhagen Conference of Parties, and again in Durban, South Africa, in 2011. De Leon has been on the Philippine delegation since the Durban Conference of Parties and is now among the lead negotiators of the Philippines on REDD+. The views expressed in this study however are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Philippine government.

⁸ Vivienne Holloway and Esteban Giandomenico, “Carbon Planet White Paper: The History of REDD Policy,” *Carbon Planet Limited*, December 4, 2009. http://unfccc.int/files/methods/redd/submissions/application/pdf/redd_20091216_carbon_planet_the_history_of_redd_carbon_planet.pdf (accessed March 31, 2014).

⁹ Rhett Butler, “REDD,” <http://rainforests.mongabay.com/redd/> (accessed March 31, 2014).

¹⁰ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and World Resources Institute (WRI), in Robert Winterbottom. “The Tropical Forestry Action Plan: Is It Working?” NAPA Bulletin 15 (1995): 60–70.

being cleared or degraded at a rapid rate, mainly to satisfy the basic subsistence needs of poor rural communities.”¹¹

With recommendations from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Resources Institute (WRI), the World Bank led in the design of the TFAP to provide an international framework for the development of national forestry action plans, make funding available, and coordinate the spending of such funding – around a total of US\$8 billion – for projects to combat deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries.¹² The plan identified five priority areas for action: (i) forestry in land use; (ii) forest based industrial development; (iii) fuelwood and energy; (iv) conservation of tropical forest ecosystems; and (v) institutions.^{13 14}

Not long after its launch, several studies reviewing the plan criticized its effectiveness and progress in achieving its goals. The World Rainforest Movement, in a 1990 report, found that the TFAP would accelerate deforestation rather than curb it, due to “a narrow focus on forestry and forest-based industries” and that national plans based on the TFAP framework promoted increased logging in primary forests. The report recommended the cessation of funding under the Plan and its “radical” overhaul.¹⁵

WRI¹⁶ and FAO¹⁷ also conducted their own reviews after the receipt of various criticisms, and acknowledged major problems with the implementation of the plan. WRI found that the plan was not achieving its original objectives, and went so far as to conclude that “without major revisions ... the plan may contribute to cultural destruction.”¹⁸ Many tropical countries stated that TFAP did not bring about an increase in forestry investments, as anticipated, and required the implementation of top-down national plans. Disagreements also arose among the plan’s co-founders. Without having achieved many of its targets, TFAP became obsolete

¹¹ FAO, Committee on Forest Development in the Tropics. *Tropical Forestry Action Plan*. Rome: 1985.

¹² Marcus Colchester and Larry Lohmann, synopsis to *The Tropical Forestry Action Plan: What Progress?* (Malaysia: World Rainforest Movement, 1990), back cover.

¹³ FAO, *The Tropical Forestry Action Plan*.

¹⁴ Winterbottom, “The Tropical Forestry Action Plan: Is It Working?”

¹⁵ Colchester and Lohmann, *The Tropical Forestry Action Plan*.

¹⁶ Robert Winterbottom, *Taking Stock: The Tropical Forestry Action Plan After Five Years*. Washington, D.C.: WRI, 1990.

¹⁷ O. Ullsten, S.M. Nor & M. Yudelman, *The Tropical Forestry Action Plan: report of the independent review*. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: FAO, 1990.

¹⁸ WRI in International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), General Assembly 1990 Recommendation No. 31 (GA 1990 REC 031), *Tropical forestry action plan*. Perth, 1990.

and attention shifted to national forest programs developed by countries themselves.¹⁹ Both reviews recommended the establishment of a global instrument on forests.²⁰

Failure to achieve a forest treaty at the 1992 Earth Summit

In the context of this global concern over the rapid rate of tropical deforestation and forest degradation – including in relation to rising attention to climate change²¹ – international negotiations on a legally-binding instrument on forests were initiated in 1990. A group of developed countries led by the United States²² steered this process with the goal of concluding a forest convention at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED).²³ Among other proposals for a global forest instrument, the Group of 7²⁴ (G7) and the European Commission (EC) put forward their readiness to negotiate, “in the appropriate fora, as expeditiously as possible on a global forest convention or agreement, which is needed to curb deforestation, protect biodiversity, stimulate positive forestry actions, and address threats to the world's forests.” They proposed that such convention or agreement be completed no later than 1992.²⁵

However, forests proved to be “among the most controversial issues” in the lead-up to the Earth Summit²⁶ and a treaty was not achieved. In fact, there was disagreement among countries on whether a forest convention should even be negotiated in the first place.²⁷ Attempts to produce a draft agreement during preparatory committee meetings – which resulted only in a report prepared mainly by the UNCED secretariat on the “roles, functions and values of forests,” and a compilation of options for instruments – reflected the lack of consensus and wide disparity of views among Parties.²⁸ Brazil cautioned against negotiating an instrument “by proxy by passing responsibility to the secretariat,” but nothing more

¹⁹ Douglas Kneeland, “FAO Forestry at 60,” *Unasylva* 223, Vol. 57 2006/1.

²⁰ David Humphreys, *Forest Politics: The Evolution of International Cooperation*. NY: Routledge, 2013.

²¹ Susan Fletcher, *International Forest Agreements: Current Status*, CRS Report 95-511 ENR (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 1995).

²² Deborah S. Davenport, “An Alternative Explanation for the Failure of the UNCED Forest Negotiations,” in *Global Environmental Politics* 5 (2005): 105-130.

²³ Barbara M.G.S. Ruis, “No forest convention but ten tree treaties,” *Unasylva* 206 (2001), http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/y1237e/y1237e03.htm#P0_0 (accessed March 31, 2014).

²⁴ The Group of 7 was composed of the Heads of State and Government of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States.

²⁵ See paragraphs 66-68, *Houston Economic Declaration*, G7 Economic Summit, Houston, Texas, USA, 1990.

²⁶ “A Brief to Global Forest Policy,” International Institute for Sustainable Development, http://www.iisd.ca/process/forest_desertification_land-forestintro.htm (accessed March 31, 2014).

²⁷ Ruis, “No forest convention.”

²⁸ Humphreys, *Forest Politics*.

substantive in terms of concrete proposals and recommendations for an agreement could be reached.²⁹

A number of theories have been put forward as to the reason for the failure to reach a legally-binding agreement, foremost among them the issue of national interest and sovereignty over natural resources, a prevailing concern among developing countries.^{30 31} This argument was strongly taken up by Brazil in its refusal to discuss “mitigation measures related to emissions from tropical deforestation and degradation.”³²

With the support of the Group of 77 (G77), Malaysia and India during the pre-UNCED meetings “demanded that tropical forest countries must be compensated for all direct costs and lost-opportunity costs of compliance with any convention that would commit these states to halting or substantially slowing deforestation.”³³ Developing countries also called for commitment on the part of developed countries to “reduce their energy consumption and to provide funding and technology transfer for developing countries to control their emissions,”³⁴ which highlighted the issue of how the “burden” for reducing deforestation should be shared by both developing and developed countries, rather than imposing requirements on the former with no direct (financial) incentive.

Also considered a factor in the failure was the “political infeasibility” of creating a treaty focused only on tropical areas, thus the need to expand the debate on a potential agreement to include all forests³⁵ and complicating discussions further. Other explanations are related to the absence of a direct link between forests and international commerce, distinguishing it from other areas capable of being “addressed through instruments that regulate trade,” and “a lack of information on possible transboundary consequences of forest degradation.”³⁶

Non-government organizations (NGOs) and indigenous peoples’ (IP) groups, on the other hand, maintained that forests should be treated as “local commons,” such that the best

²⁹ Id.

³⁰ Fletcher, *International Forest Agreements*.

³¹ Davenport, “An Alternative Explanation.”

³² Fernanda Viana de Carvalho. *The Brazilian position on forests and climate change from 1997 to 2012: from veto to proposition*. Rev. bras. polít. int., Brasília, v. 55, n. spe, 2012, http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292012000300009&lng=en&nrm=iso (accessed June 29, 2014).

³³ Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, *Global Environmental Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 103.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Fletcher, *International Forest Agreements*.

³⁶ Davenport, “An Alternative Explanation.”

strategy for reducing deforestation was “to grant secure land-tenure rights to local communities whose livelihoods depend directly on the conservation of forest resources.”³⁷

While the Earth Summit concluded conventions on climate change, biodiversity and desertification – important global agreements which have relations to forest protection and conservation – the agreement specific to forests was limited to a set of “forest principles” set out in the “Non-legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests,” and inclusion of Chapter 11 of Agenda 21 on “Combating Deforestation.”

Intergovernmental processes on forests

Without a legally-binding instrument to address deforestation and forest degradation, after the Earth Summit, alternative institutional arrangements were established to facilitate international cooperation on forest issues: the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) which had a two-year mandate from 1995 to 1997; the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) which replaced the IPF and worked from 1997 to 2000; and the UN Forum on Forests (UNFF), established in 2000 and continues to this day. The UNFF and the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) form the present international regime for forests.³⁸

It was the mandate of the IPF to pick up from where the UNCED left off on the forest principles and Chapter 11 of Agenda 21, producing over 100 negotiated proposals for action on forests, while the IFF produced about 120 in its three-year term. The proposals produced during these five years are called the “IPF/IFF Proposals for Action.”³⁹ Despite this proliferation of proposals, countries have come no closer to reaching a binding forest agreement. As such, UNFF’s mandate was limited to “strengthening ... long-term political commitment to sustainable forest management” and considering synergies among existing legally binding instruments relevant to forests.⁴⁰ The forum adopted the *Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests* in 2007.⁴¹

³⁷ Pamela S. Chasek, David L. Downie and Janet Welsh Brown, *Global Environmental Politics*. USA: Westview Press, 2010.

³⁸ Ruis, “No forest convention.”

³⁹ Lisa Holmgren, “International forest policy: an overview,” *Secretariat for International Forestry Issues*, June 2010, <http://www.focali.se/filer/International%20Forest%20Policy.pdf> (accessed March 31, 2014).

⁴⁰ Ruis, “No forest convention.”

⁴¹ UNFF Secretariat, “The Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests,” 2007, http://www.un.org/esa/forests/pdf/notes/bali_081207_pc.pdf (accessed September 14, 2014).

G8 Action Programme on Forests and Forest Law Enforcement and Governance

Among developed nations, part of the discussions on deforestation and forest degradation and associated issues focused on illegal logging and trade in illegally logged timber. The Group of 8⁴² (G8) launched an Action Programme on Forests in 1998, which “focuses on domestic action in the G8 member countries and areas where these countries can make unique contributions through their bilateral assistance programmes and support for intergovernmental processes.”⁴³ In place until 2002, the Programme was “intended to accelerate implementation of the actions” proposed by IPF in 1997,^{44 45} and covered the five themes or areas of monitoring and assessment, national forest programs, protected areas, private sector, and illegal logging.^{46 47}

The title “Action Programme” has been called into question because G8 member countries did not undertake any projects in the four years it was in effect.⁴⁸ Still, the Programme brought to light the fact that some of the G8 members were serious about illegal logging⁴⁹ at the global scale, and the US in particular pursued further actions to address the issue beyond the program, including initiatives on FLEG, discussed below.

Three Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) Ministerial Conferences since 2001 have yielded ministerial declarations containing “commitments to identify and implement actions to combat illegal logging, and have fed into other regional forest governance schemes.”⁵⁰ The engagement of multiple stakeholders, including civil society and the private sector, is an important attribute⁵¹ in the credibility and success of these processes.

Reactions from civil society and IPs were mixed. While some NGOs were encouraged by the outcome of the ministerial conferences, IP groups found problematic the lack of

⁴² The G8 is composed of the G7, listed above and Russia. {NOTE: Russia was host of G8 in 2014 – though a 2015 meeting of G8 (as opposed to G7) is in doubt}.

⁴³ FAO, “Editorial: Accommodating multiple interests in forestry,” *Unasyha: An international journal of forestry and forest industries* 194 (1998), [http://www.fao.org/docrep/w8827e/w8827e02.htm#editorial:accommodating multiple interests in forestry](http://www.fao.org/docrep/w8827e/w8827e02.htm#editorial:accommodatingmultipleinterestsinforestry) (accessed March 31, 2014).

⁴⁴ Duncan Brack, “Excluding illegal timber and improving forest governance: The European Union’s Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade initiative,” in *High-Value Natural Resources and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, eds. Päivi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad. (London: Routledge, 2011), 211-220.

⁴⁵ David Humphreys. *Logjam: Deforestation and the Crisis of Global Governance* (USA: Earthscan, 2006).

⁴⁶ FAO, “Editorial: Accommodating multiple interests in forestry.”

⁴⁷ Brack, “Excluding illegal timber.”

⁴⁸ Humphreys, *Logjam*.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ “Illegal Logging and Trade Initiatives.”

⁵¹ Ibid.

consideration of forest peoples in FLEG, focused as it was on law enforcement without a purview of customary and other rights that are not legally recognized. In the absence of legally enforceable status and rights of certain forest peoples and communities, implementation of FLEG posed the risk of “[perpetuating] social exclusion.” Law reform was thus seen as a preliminary step to law enforcement.⁵²

Related to this, in 2003, a process referred to as the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade initiative (FLEGT) was launched in 2003 as the European Union’s (EU) response to the problem of illegal logging and related trade. The EU FLEGT Action Plan sets out measures to “to prevent illegally harvested timber from reaching EU’s single market.”⁵³ A key measure under the Action Plan is the forging of Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) with timber-producing countries, to develop licensing systems in those countries that identify legal products for import into the EU.⁵⁴

Implications for cooperation on forests and climate

It would be easy to characterize these early efforts of forging international cooperation on forests as resulting in failures. After all, no treaty was agreed upon in Rio de Janeiro at the 1992 Earth Summit, and the UNFF and FLEGT initiatives, while important forums for sharing information and ideas, have not progressed in terms of articulating and adopting international legal norms that could guide that cooperation. Indeed, these early efforts to curb tropical deforestation through international cooperation saw agreement by governments, non-governmental organizations and other actors on its importance, but drew much disagreement on the approaches that could be undertaken to achieve it.

In all of these earlier processes, the divide between developing and developed countries was also highlighted, particularly in light of the burden agreements would impose on developing countries without clarity as to the economic and other benefits they would bring. At this early stage, compensation for the opportunity cost of avoiding deforestation and degradation, as opposed to carrying on with economic growth that involved clearing large areas of forests, was not clear to countries in which those tropical forests were located.

It is in the context of this policy vacuum that the climate change convention provided an opportunity for a renewed effort for international cooperation to address tropical

⁵² Humphreys, “The Politics of ‘Avoided Deforestation.’”

⁵³ Holmgren, “International forest policy.”

⁵⁴ Brack, “Excluding illegal timber.”

deforestation. Ironically, this opportunity was preceded first by a failure to include a good mechanism for avoided tropical deforestation activities in the Kyoto Protocol, reasons for which are explored below.

Key milestones in negotiating REDD+

According to Arild Angelsen and Desmond McNeill, the popularity of REDD+ derived from its breadth, enabling it to “accommodate different interests.”⁵⁵ It was also possible to expand the scope of REDD+ benefits not only in terms of emissions reduction, but also to so-called “co-benefits” such as poverty reduction and biodiversity conservation.⁵⁶ While targeting deforestation – “the single most important source” of emissions⁵⁷ in the forest sector and “the second largest anthropogenic source of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere”⁵⁸ – REDD+ could also be used to channel large funds to developing countries to conserve rainforests, and at the same time enable the enhancement of ecosystem services and the promotion of rural development in some of the world’s poorest regions.⁵⁹ ⁶⁰ REDD+ was both expansive and flexible, giving developing countries the opportunity to re-define their strategies and approaches when it came to forest use management, in the context of support from external sources in terms of financing, technology, and capacity-building. And because the REDD+ mechanism developed as a national approach, it opened a window for reforms across sectors even outside forestry and could address the issues of leakage and non-permanence that were among the main obstacles to the adoption of avoided deforestation in Kyoto,⁶¹ discussed below.

REDD+ was also attractive to proponents because it was simple,⁶² ⁶³ at least in principle. Not only do tropical forests store about one-fourth of the Earth’s terrestrial carbon, thus possessing the potential for significant contribution to cutting overall greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, neither does forest conservation entail rocket science – it simply requires leaving

⁵⁵ Arild Angelsen and Desmond McNeill, “The evolution of REDD+,” in *Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices*, edited by Arild Angelsen et al. (Indonesia: Center for International Forestry Research, 2012), 31-50.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ IPCC 2007

⁵⁸ G.R. van der Werf, D.C. Morton, R.S. DeFries, J.G.J. Olivier, P.S. Kasibhatla, R.B. Jackson, G.J. Collatz and J.T. Randerson, “CO₂ emissions from forest loss,” *Nature Geoscience* 2 (2009): 738, doi: 10.1038/ngeo671 (accessed March 31, 2014). It is important to recognize, however, that this figure varies among different studies, and is particularly complex due to the double role of forests as both CO₂ emitters and sinks.

⁵⁹ López-Alonso, “The Global Political Economy of REDD+.”

⁶⁰ Butler, “REDD.”

⁶¹ Angelsen and McNeill, “The evolution of REDD+.”

⁶² Butler, “Are we on the brink.”

⁶³ López-Alonso, “The Global Political Economy of REDD+.”

trees standing. As former Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg expressed, “Everybody knows how not to cut down a tree.”⁶⁴ In the same vein, such an inexpensive activity provided cheap offsets⁶⁵ for industrialized countries complying with their emissions reduction targets.

Along with the perceived simplicity of avoiding deforestation was also the expected low cost of implementation: only US \$1-2 per tCO₂ on average,⁶⁶ “relatively cheap compared with other types of mitigation.”⁶⁷ Forestry as a whole can also make “a very significant contribution to a low-cost global mitigation portfolio that provides synergies with adaptation and sustainable development,” as per the IPCC.⁶⁸

Finally, after over a decade of discussions around the need for a mechanism by which tropical forest countries may be compensated or incentivized for their conservation, a performance-based system akin to payments for ecosystem services (PES) emerged as an attractive option for forest users and potential financiers alike.⁶⁹

The road to REDD+ as we know it today was not a smooth one, however. In this section, we trace the evolution of that system, reflecting the key players that shaped the process and the roles they played in achieving specific outcomes along the way.

Failure to include Avoided Deforestation in the Kyoto Protocol

Both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol acknowledged the importance of forests in GHG mitigation and adaptation.

Under the UNFCCC, all Parties are mandated to promote, along with sustainable management, conserving and enhancing greenhouse-gas sinks and reservoirs, including biomass and forests, and to cooperate on this endeavor.⁷⁰ Forests in developing countries are highlighted in several provisions, with a mandate to protect and rehabilitate areas

⁶⁴ Angelsen and McNeill, “The evolution of REDD+.”

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Stern, *Stern Review*, vi-xi.

⁶⁸ G.J. Nabuurs, O. Masera, K. Andrasko, P. Benitez-Ponce, R. Boer, M. Dutschke, E. Elsiddig, J. Ford-Robertson, P. Fromhoff, T. Karjalainen, O. Krankina, W.A. Kurz, M. Matsumoto, W. Oyhantcabal, N.H. Ravindranath, M.J. Sanz Sanchez and X. Zhang, “Forestry,” in *Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change—Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, eds. B. Metz et al. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 541-584.

⁶⁹ Angelsen and McNeill, “The evolution of REDD+.”

⁷⁰ UNFCCC, Article 4(1d).

affected by drought and desertification, particularly in Africa,⁷¹ and the need for Parties – presumably developed countries – to “give full consideration” to meeting the needs of developing countries related to climate change, especially those with “forested areas and areas liable to forest decay.”^{72 73}

The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, adopted in 1997, included provisions on land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities in developed countries (Annex 1 parties), allowing them to credit to their reduction or stabilization targets what they were/are doing in the LULUCF sector.⁷⁴ Tropical forests in developing countries were however excluded from the LULUCF sector because developing countries did not have economy-wide or any type of legally binding mitigation targets under the Kyoto Protocol.

Notwithstanding the exclusion of tropical forests from LULUCF, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), created as a flexibility mechanism under the Protocol, provided options for developed countries to meet their emission reduction targets by investing in “offset projects” in developing countries. Afforestation and reforestation, which both have to do with creating *new* forests – are the only types of forest carbon sequestration projects that Parties agreed could be eligible under the CDM. Those related to forest conservation, i.e. avoiding or reducing deforestation and forest degradation, are not currently eligible.^{75 76}

The proposed inclusion of avoided deforestation and forest degradation in the Kyoto Protocol, and specifically in the CDM, was a divisive issue both within and among governments and NGOs.⁷⁷ Philip Fearnside, in his commentary, “Saving tropical forests as a global warming countermeasure: an issue that divides the environmental movement,” mapped the positions of negotiating blocs and NGOs, detailing the arguments of the EU, Brazil, and the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS, represented by Tuvalu), which were opposed to the inclusion of forest conservation in the CDM, and of some Latin

⁷¹ Ibid, Article 4(1e).

⁷² Ibid. Article 4(8c)

⁷³ D. Schoen and M. Netto, “The Kyoto Protocol: what does it mean for forests and forestry?” *Unasylva* 222 (2005): 3-11.

⁷⁴ See Article 3.3 and Article 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol.

⁷⁵ Schoene and Netto, “The Kyoto Protocol.”

⁷⁶ P. Moutinho, M. Santilli, S. Schwartzman and L. Rodrigues, “Why ignore tropical deforestation? A proposal for including forest conservation in the Kyoto Protocol,” *Unasylva* 222 (2005): 27-30.

⁷⁷ Philip M. Fearnside, “Saving tropical forests as a global warming countermeasure: an issue that divides the environmental movement,” *Ecological Economics* 39 (2001), 167-184.

American countries and the Umbrella Group (US, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand), which were in favor of inclusion.⁷⁸

There were several bases for opposing inclusion, one of which was centered on the “uncertainty of permanence of carbon in forest ... and a high risk of leakage.” The “carbon benefit” of its inclusion was unclear,⁷⁹ and the absence of appropriate methodology to address these technical concerns bolstered opposition. Governments, NGOs, and scientists were concerned that “forest conservation could be an action without effect in terms of benefits to the atmosphere,”⁸⁰ mainly because of “serious methodological concerns pertaining to additionality, permanence and leakage.”⁸¹ ⁸² In other words, there was insufficient guidance and technology available to measure and validate emission reductions⁸³ and ensure environmental integrity.

However, Fearnside argued that the reasoning behind the rifts that resulted in an impasse on this issue in Kyoto was not so much scientific or methodological, as it was political.⁸⁴ For one, opposition also stemmed from the view that allowing offsets to be generated from avoided deforestation and forest degradation would weaken the emission reduction targets of developed countries. NGO positions were mixed and in some cases confusing, reportedly resulting in “shouting matches and bitter rifts”⁸⁵ among them. With the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) in the lead,⁸⁶ ⁸⁷ some NGOs believed that the proposal “was at best a distraction from the key issues of Kyoto,” and feared that an incentive mechanism around forest conservation would be used by industrialized countries, particularly the United States, to avoid cutting their own emissions by offsetting against forest carbon.⁸⁸ Opponents of offsetting through avoided deforestation and forest degradation activities also expressed the

⁷⁸ Fearnside, “Saving tropical forests.”

⁷⁹ Moutinho, et al, “Why ignore tropical deforestation?”

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Chukwumerije Okereke and Kate Dooley, “Principles of justice in proposals and policy approaches to avoided deforestation: towards a post-Kyoto climate agreement,” *Global Environmental Change* 20 (2010): 82-95.

⁸² Louise Aukland, Pedro Moura Costa and Sandra Brown, “A conceptual framework and its application for addressing leakage: the case of avoided deforestation,” *Climate Policy* 3 (2003), 123-136.

⁸³ Steve Zwick, “Carbon and Avoided Deforestation: The Road to Bali,” *Ecosystem Marketplace*. Forest Trends, November 30, 2007,

[http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=5436](http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=5436§ion=home)
§ion=home (accessed March 31, 2014)

⁸⁴ Fearnside, “Saving tropical forests.”

⁸⁵ Rhett A. Butler, “Are we on the brink of saving rainforests?” <http://news.mongabay.com/2009/0722-redd.html> (accessed March 31, 2014).

⁸⁶ López-Alonso, “The Global Political Economy of REDD+.”

⁸⁷ Butler, “REDD.”

⁸⁸ Butler, “Are we on the brink.”

view that factors driving deforestation are complex and are not so easily solved by “throwing more money at the problem.”⁸⁹

Questions around equity were also raised. While countries with large forest areas and high rates of deforestation stood to benefit from an avoided deforestation project scheme, smaller countries without “significant potential for forest sequestration” were not particularly supportive.⁹⁰

On the other hand, excluding avoided deforestation and forest degradation from the CDM was seen by others as a missed opportunity to provide incentives to and motivate countries with large forested areas, and high deforestation risk, to curb this trend.⁹¹ These countries, as typified by Brazil, may have narrow opportunities to engage in other CDM-eligible projects such as afforestation, reforestation and clean energy – and for that matter other mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol – and yet “access to resources is disallowed” for reducing and avoiding deforestation to reduce and avoid emissions.⁹² Also cited was the fact that these activities are cost-effective and foster materials that store carbon “as is.” As expressed by Bettelheim, “How can it be a drawback that forestry is cheaper than any technological solution? ... That just means it's available now, because as soon as a tree starts to grow, it is storing carbon dioxide, while it takes considerably longer for a power plant to be transformed for new renewable energy.”⁹³ The Nature Conservancy also called the exclusion “the worst possible outcome for those interested in biodiversity conservation.”^{94 95}

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Masahiro Amano and Roger A. Sedjo, “Forest Sequestration: Performance in Selected Countries in the Kyoto Period and the Potential Role of Sequestration in Post-Kyoto Agreements,” *Resources for the Future*, May 2006, www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-Rpt-ForestSequestrationKyoto.pdf (accessed March 31, 2014).

⁹¹ Márcio Santilli, Paulo Moutinho, Stephan Schwartzman, Daniel Nepstad, Lisa Curran and Carlos Nobre, “Tropical Deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol: An Editorial Essay,” *Climatic Change* 71 (2005): 267-276.

⁹² P. Moutinho, M. Santilli, S. Schwartzman and L. Rodrigues, “Why ignore tropical deforestation? A proposal for including forest conservation in the Kyoto Protocol,” *Unasylva* 222 (2005): 27-30.

⁹³ Zwick, “Carbon and Avoided Deforestation.”

⁹⁴ “A History of Climate Change and Tropical Forest Negotiations,” Tropical Forest Group, <http://www.tropicalforestgroup.org/a-history-of-climate-change-and-tropical-forest-negotiations/> (accessed March 31, 2014).

⁹⁵ Rocío Hiraldo López-Alonso, “The Global Political Economy of REDD+: Engaging Social Dimensions in the Emerging Green Economy” (paper presented at the Green Economy and Sustainable Development: Bringing Back the Social Dimension Conference of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, Switzerland, October 10, 2011).

Proposal by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica in Montreal

At a side event at the 8th UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) in 2002,⁹⁶ Marcio Santilli of the Amazon Institute of Environmental Research (IPAM) discussed deforestation and its consequences on climate change, stressing the “complex relationship between native forests and the climate system.”⁹⁷ Not only did he identify deforestation as an important source of carbon dioxide emissions – citing Brazil as an example of a country where a large amount of emissions result from deforestation – he stated that “current annual deforestation will offset a major portion of the Kyoto Protocol’s benefits and concluded that good governance is key for mitigating carbon dioxide emissions from deforestation in the Amazon.”⁹⁸

Taking up from these scientific findings by Santilli et. al,⁹⁹ the proposal to bring avoided deforestation under the ambit of the UNFCCC was formally revived in 2005. At the COP 11 in Montreal, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Costa Rica, leading the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN),^{100 101 102} – an alliance with over 50 members consisting of developing countries with tropical forests¹⁰³ – made a joint submission entitled “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action.” This submission was made under an item specifically requested by PNG to be added to the provisional agenda, and which request several other Latin American and African countries supported.¹⁰⁴ This is considered the introduction of “RED” into the UNFCCC process, which has evolved to what we know as REDD+ today.

⁹⁶ The side event was entitled “New look at ‘dangerous interference’: Perspectives for the future,” presented by the Nature Conservancy in collaboration with Environmental Defense, Conselho Nacional dos Seringueiros and IPAM.

⁹⁷ International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), “Special Report on Selected Side Events at UNFCCC COP-8 (23 October - 1 November 2002, New Delhi, India).” <http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop8/enbots/26oct.html> (accessed September 15, 2014)P. Moutinho and S.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Cf. Schwartzman (eds.), *Tropical deforestation and climate change*. Brazil: IPAM - Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental da Amazônia; USA : Environmental Defense, 2005.

¹⁰⁰ Okereke and Dooley, “Principles of justice.”

¹⁰¹ Holloway and Giandomenico, “Carbon Planet White Paper.”

¹⁰² Rhett Butler, “REDD,” <http://rainforests.mongabay.com/redd/> (accessed March 31, 2014)

¹⁰³ Federica Bietta, Paul Chung and Leonardo Massai, “Supporting international climate negotiators: lessons learned by the Coalition for Rainforest Nations,” *Climate and Development Knowledge Network*, November 2013, http://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/CDKN_CfRN_6pp_final_web-res-copy.pdf (accessed March 31, 2014).

¹⁰⁴ These include Bolivia, Central African Republic, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. UNFCCC FCCC/CP/2005/1, 2 September 2005.

In their submission, they made the case for why the UNFCCC is the appropriate forum to “develop scientific, technical, policy and capacity responses to address ... emissions resulting from tropical deforestation” at the necessary scale. They cite the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report on the dominant role played by tropical deforestation in generating land-use change emissions, and the absence of a “way [for developing countries] to engage with the Kyoto Protocol for emissions reductions generated through the reducing deforestation rates.”¹⁰⁵

They also called on the support of developed countries for their proposal, citing acknowledgment by the G8 in its *Gleneagles Communiqué: Climate Change, Energy and Sustainable Development* and the European Commission report on *Winning the Battle against Global Climate Change*, of the need for broader global participation in combatting tropical deforestation at the global level to address climate change. On behalf of “many supportive Nations,” the two countries called upon Parties to the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol “to take note of present rates of deforestation within developing nations, acknowledge the resulting carbon emissions, and consequently open dialogue to develop scientific, technical, policy and capacity responses to address such emissions resulting from tropical deforestation.”¹⁰⁶

The proposal met opposition from US NGOs, with objections to US investments in REDD+ revolving around four core themes, as follows:

First are questions of social risk – whether REDD+ would be good or bad for forest-dependent communities, indigenous people, and sometimes even economic growth and development more broadly. Second are questions of (non-climate) environmental risk – whether REDD+ incentives would truly protect natural ecosystems. Third are questions of effectiveness – whether and how much REDD+ in its various forms could truly contribute to climate mitigation.¹⁰⁷

Overall, however, the main components of CfRN’s proposal were accepted by parties to the Montreal COP, even receiving support from “ordinary people and conservationists” who approved of “[saving] tropical forests through carbon finance.”^{108 109} As a result, the COP

¹⁰⁵ Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, November 11, 2005, <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cop11/eng/misc01.pdf>

¹⁰⁶ Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, “Reducing Emissions.”

¹⁰⁷ Michael Wolosin and Donna Lee, *US Support for REDD+: Reflections on the Past and Future Outlook* (Draft). Post-CGD Review, May 30, 2014.

¹⁰⁸ “A History of Climate Change and Tropical Forest Negotiations.”

¹⁰⁹ López-Alonso, “The Global Political Economy of REDD+.”

invited Parties and observer organizations to make submissions on “issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries“ for consideration by the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA). SBSTA was also to report on its findings by December 2007 and organize a related workshop in the interim.¹¹⁰

This decision began a two-year process for exploring methodological and policy issues around RED, but which would continue well beyond the Bali COP. This involved a series of workshops and a significant number of submissions of views from parties and observer organizations. In 2007, the COP formally launched a focused work plan, with timelines for decisions, on REDD+ (then RED) in Bali with the aim of completing discussions by 2009 in Copenhagen. This did not mean that controversial issues around a mechanism compensating countries for avoided tropical deforestation were resolved, but now discussions were happening formally *within* the UNFCCC, which recognized the potential of such a mechanism to contribute to the ultimate goal of the Convention.

It is significant to note that developing countries were in the lead in moving this mitigation item forward – and individual countries and groups in particular, as opposed to the G77. While the main concern of Annex 1 countries about the proposal was its financial implication, there was sufficient push to overcome methodological concerns (discussed under the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice) that the issue of finance was put on a separate negotiating track (under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action) and both tracks proceeded parallel to each other.

Publication of the Stern Review and the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report

The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern Review) was commissioned and published by the UK government in 2006. It has been described as “the most comprehensive and powerful document to date on the portfolios of policies required to address the climate change problem,”¹¹¹ and “comes down very strongly on the side of undertaking decisive—and expensive— measures starting now to reduce CO₂ and other greenhouse gas emissions.”¹¹²

¹¹⁰ UNFCCC FCCC/CP/2005/L.2.

¹¹¹ Klaus Hasselman and Terry Barker, “The Stern Review and the IPCC fourth assessment report: implications for interaction between policy makers and climate experts. An editorial essay,” *Climatic Change* 89 (2008): 219-229.

¹¹² Martin L. Weitzman, “A Review of The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change,” *Journal of Economic Literature* 45 (2007): 703-724.

Stern reported that more than 18% of global emissions are from land use change/deforestation, producing much greater emissions than the transport sector,¹¹³ and is the second largest contributor to global GHG emissions.¹¹⁴ He stressed “action to preserve the remaining areas of natural forest” as an urgent need, which must be undertaken at large scale “combining national action and international support.” He recommended that forested countries undertake country-led initiatives to address deforestation, while receiving support from the international community for the benefit it receives from the national efforts of those countries. He also identified as important considerations in this process: defining property rights to forestland, determining rights and responsibilities of stakeholders, involvement of local communities and respect for informal rights and structures, in the context of achieving development goals.¹¹⁵

Stern concluded that while international frameworks and structures already existed to respond to climate change at international level, among them the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, global action needed to become “more ambitious” based on long-term goals shared by members of the whole international community. Among the “key elements of future international frameworks” on climate change were actions to reduce deforestation.¹¹⁶

The Stern Review drew on the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC and includes a preview of the Fourth Assessment Report, which at the time of its publication in 2007 and until the recent release of the Fifth Assessment Report, was “the most complete and authoritative assessment of the status of scientific knowledge on all aspects of climate change.”¹¹⁷ The AR4 made the unprecedented declaration that

Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is *very likely* due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations. This is an advance since the TAR’s conclusion that “most of the observed warming over the last 50 years is *likely* to have been due to the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations”.

¹¹³ Nicholas Stern, *Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2007), vi-xi.

¹¹⁴ Okereke and Dooley, “Principles of justice.”

¹¹⁵ Stern, *Stern Review*, vi-xi.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ Hans-Martin Füssel, “An updated assessment of the risks from climate change based on research published since the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report,” *Climatic Change* 97 (2009): 469-482.

Discernible human influences now extend to other aspects of climate, including ocean warming, continental-average temperatures, temperature extremes and wind patterns.¹¹⁸

IPCC Working Group III reported that “reduced deforestation and degradation is the forest mitigation option with the largest and most immediate carbon stock impact in the short term per ha and per year globally ... because large carbon stocks (about 350-900 tCO₂/ha) are not emitted when deforestation is prevented.”¹¹⁹

The Stern Review and the AR4 thus reinforced each other, bolstering the scientific and economic bases for pursuing a global mechanism to encourage and incentivize forest conservation and enhancement.

Bali Road Map

In 2007, the 13th COP produced the Bali Road Map to guide negotiations towards reaching a new climate agreement by 2009 in Copenhagen, with the goal of ensuring that a new agreement would be in place by the time the Kyoto Protocol ended in 2012.¹²⁰ The road map was a set of decisions identifying negotiating “tracks” or key areas of work for the Parties. It includes the Bali Action Plan, which provides “a comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action,”¹²¹ prompting the establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) under the UNFCCC, working in parallel with the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP).

The Bali Action Plan provides five (5) “building blocks” around which the Parties’ future work would revolve (outside the Kyoto Protocol): shared vision, mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer, and finance. The mitigation track includes “policy approaches and

¹¹⁸ S. Solomon, D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor and H.L. Miller, eds., *Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis—Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 1-18.

¹¹⁹ B. Metz, O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, L.A. Meyers, eds., *Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change—Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 541-584.

¹²⁰ Raymond Cléménçon, “The Bali Road Map: A First Step on the Difficult Journey to a Post-Kyoto Protocol Agreement,” *The Journal of Environment Development* 70 (2008): 70-94.

¹²¹ “Now, up to and beyond 2012: The Bali Road Map,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations, https://unfccc.int/key_steps/bali_road_map/items/6072.php (accessed March 31, 2014).

positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries.”¹²² At this point, however, the last three items were not yet explicitly considered among the activities in tropical forests that could be compensated. It was only in Copenhagen that the semicolon separating REDD from the last three activities was dropped, thus expanding the scope of “eligible” forest conservation activities and adding the “plus” to make REDD+.¹²³

There was considerable anticipation for how the issue of incentives for reducing deforestation and forest degradation would be treated in Bali. This was in the context of the unprecedented attention to climate change brought about by the release of the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC in 2007 and the panel’s receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize together with Al Gore, whose *An Inconvenient Truth* had already won an Oscar Award.¹²⁴ Avoided deforestation in relation to carbon markets was also an ongoing debate, tracing back to its exclusion from the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol and the fact that these types of projects already existed in voluntary markets.¹²⁵

It was thus a promising step that among the agreements reached in Bali was Decision 2/CP.13 on “Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to stimulate action,” which established a work program on REDD and showed “Parties’ commitment to include REDD in a post-2012 climate agreement.”¹²⁶ Aside from encouraging support for activities, exploring actions and options, mobilization of resources and use of the most recent IPCC guidelines in undertaking REDD-related activities, Parties were asked to make submissions on methodological issues,¹²⁷ prompting the “proliferation” of views from Parties and observer organizations.¹²⁸

From Bali to Doha

After the inclusion of RED in the UNFCCC agenda in 2005, Parties and accredited observers made submissions to the UNFCCC Secretariat on relevant issues including scientific, technical and methodological issues, relevant information and experiences, and

¹²² UNFCCC, The Bali Action Plan, Paragraph 1(b3)

¹²³ Holloway and Giandomenico, “Carbon Planet White Paper.”

¹²⁴ Cléménçon, “The Bali Road Map.”

¹²⁵ Zwick, “Carbon and Avoided Deforestation.”

¹²⁶ Okereke and Dooley, “Principles of justice.”

¹²⁷ UNFCCC Decision 2/CP.13

¹²⁸ Okereke and Dooley, “Principles of justice.”

policy approaches and positive incentives. The first workshops around these issues were held in Rome in 2006 and in Cairns in 2007. The second workshop resulted in a recommendation to SBSTA to “substantially advance its work” in upcoming sessions.¹²⁹ These workshops were an important part of the progress of RED, as they provided an opportunity to sift through and analyze (and eventually overcome) the issues and concerns that prevented the inclusion of avoided deforestation under the CDM.

The first substantial COP decision on REDD came about in Bali in 2007, as discussed above in the context of the Bali Road Map. It was at this point that, “acknowledging that forest degradation also leads to emissions, and needs to be addressed when reducing emissions from deforestation,”¹³⁰ Decision 2/CP.13 expanded “RED” to “REDD” to include forest degradation in the scope of methodological issues to be explored by SBSTA. The Bali Road Map, as discussed above, already referred to conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks, which would come to be known as the “plus” in REDD+.

The Bali decision also recognized that REDD can provide co-benefits, that the needs of indigenous peoples and local communities should be addressed, and that complementarity with other international agreements – for example, the Convention on Biological Diversity and UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples – should be considered. Parties were invited to continue and strengthen their REDD-related activities, while noting that sustainability of emissions reduction “requires stable and predictable availability of resources.”

In 2008, SBSTA identified the main methodological issues on REDD that needed to be elaborated: estimation and monitoring, reference emissions levels, displacement of emissions, national and subnational approaches, capacity-building, effectiveness of actions, and cross-cutting issues. It also decided to take note of “methodologically relevant” outcomes on the discussions on policy approaches and positive incentives under AWG-LCA, which also held its first workshop on these issues that year.¹³¹

The 2009 COP in Copenhagen was disappointing for failing to complete a legally-binding instrument to take effect in 2013, at the end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, and to cover other areas of agreement set out in the Bali Road Map. The

¹²⁹ UNFCCC FCCC/SBSTA/2007/3, paragraph 87.

¹³⁰ UNFCCC Decision 2/CP.13

¹³¹ FCCC/SBSTA/2008/6

Copenhagen Accord, which the COP merely “took note” of, recognized the “crucial role” of REDD and of enhancing the function of forests in removing GHGs from the atmosphere, in the context of the provision of positive incentives through the establishment of a REDD+ mechanism, among others.¹³² The provision of “scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding” for REDD+, among other activities, from a “wide variety” of sources, along with improved access by developing countries, were also covered by the Accord.

The (Copenhagen) Green Climate Fund (GCF) was established and identified as a channel for this wide array of funding,¹³³ and “is intended to be the main fund for global climate change finance in the context of mobilizing USD 100 billion by 2020.”¹³⁴ While it is yet unclear how much and when this funding will become available, there are significant expectations that these resources will include resources for REDD+.¹³⁵ These expectations are reflected in the Warsaw (2013) decision on results-based finance, which explicitly mentions the “key role” of the GCF in channeling adequate and predictable finance to REDD+ activities.¹³⁶

While the COP failed to adopt the Copenhagen Accord, it reached agreement on a core set of methodological guidance for REDD+. The COP decision now referred to the five activities related to REDD+, and requested developing country Parties to identify drivers of deforestation and forest degradation and means to address them, and in-country activities that contribute to REDD+ results and to be guided by the most recent IPCC guidelines as the basis for estimating the impacts of REDD+ activities. They were also asked to establish national forest monitoring systems, and sub-national systems as a part of national systems as appropriate.¹³⁷

The establishment of the REDD+ Partnership in 2009 should also be acknowledged. While not directly related to the negotiations, the Partnership would serve as an interim platform for its partner countries to scale up actions and finance for REDD+ initiatives in developing countries. The Partnership aimed to take immediate action, including improving the

¹³² UNFCCC Decision 2/CP.15

¹³³ UNFCCC Decision 2/CP.15, paragraphs 6 and 8.

¹³⁴ UNFCCC, “What is the GCF?” http://unfccc.int/bodies/green_climate_fund_board/body/6974.php (accessed on September 14, 2014)

¹³⁵ FIELD, “The Green Climate Fund,” <http://www.field.org.uk/guides/guide-for-redd-plus-negotiators-august-2013/the-green-climate-fund> (accessed on September 14, 2014)

¹³⁶ UNFCCC Decision 9/CP.19

¹³⁷ UNFCCC Decision 4/CP.15.

effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and coordination of REDD+ initiatives and financial instruments, to facilitate among other things knowledge transfer, capacity enhancement, mitigation actions and technology development and transfer.¹³⁸ At the same time, the Partnership enabled more informal, flexible, and open discussions about difficult negotiating points that facilitated understanding and agreement in the negotiation process.

It was in Cancun in 2010 that the requirements for REDD+ as a mechanism, i.e. the elements and standards that need to be in place, were laid out, and the first “requirements” associated with REDD+ were agreed. The Cancun Agreements enumerate the five REDD+ activities and the elements that developing country parties who want to participate in REDD+ need to develop: a national strategy or action plan, national forest reference emission level and/or forest reference level (FREL/FRL), national forest monitoring system, and a safeguard information system (SIS). Related issues were identified - drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, land tenure, forest governance, gender considerations and the safeguards – which need to be addressed in the strategies and action plans to be developed.¹³⁹

Cancun was also an important turning point for the REDD+ discussions because it saw the establishment of the seven REDD+ safeguards, which aim to address risks associated with REDD+. Broad participation and respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and local communities had been recognized in previous decisions and SBSTA conclusions. However, it was in Cancun that the implementation of standards to ensure not only environmental integrity, but also transparent governance, respect for human rights and protections of social well-being were recognized as an integral part of any effort to achieve emissions reduction through REDD+.

The COP decided that setting up of a REDD+ system in each country should be undertaken in phases, while also recognizing that countries are in different stages of development and have varying capacities and capabilities and so may proceed through the phases in their own time and manner. Ultimately, countries would be able to produce emissions reduction results that are fully measured, reported and verified. In every phase, countries also need to ensure that the safeguards are promoted and supported, and developed countries in particular were urged to provide support to developing countries undertaking these activities. The COP also

¹³⁸ Website of the REDD+ Partnership, accessible at <http://reddpluspartnership.org/en/>

¹³⁹ UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.16

mandated the AWG-LCA in its subsequent session to “explore financing options for the full implementation of the results-based actions.”

From 2011 forward, parties made concerted efforts to negotiate the specifics of methodological guidance, policy approaches and positive incentives for REDD+. In Durban (2011), the COP agreed on methodological guidance on two elements defined in the Cancun work programme: safeguards information systems and modalities relating to FREL/FRL.¹⁴⁰ However, guidance on these two elements was not yet completed and more work was carried out in subsequent sessions. On the other hand, considerable progress was made in the REDD+ finance discussion in Durban – parties agreed that “results-based finance provided to developing country Parties that is new, additional and predictable may come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources,” and that both market-based and non-market-based approaches could be developed to generate finance.¹⁴¹ This was a significant development given the strong anti-market stance of a few countries, Bolivia being the most prominent, as well as concerns about the likelihood of access to the market, expressed by the African Group.

The Doha COP in 2012, in the context of the end of the Bali Action Plan, adopted a work program to focus on ways and means to transfer payments for results-based actions, ways to incentivize non-carbon benefits, and ways to improve the coordination of results-based finance. The COP also mandated SBSTA and SBI, jointly, to address the need to improve coordination of support and to consider existing institutional arrangements or “potential governance alternatives” such as a body, a board or a committee for REDD+. The COP also mandated the SBSTA to consider how non-market-based approaches such as joint mitigation and adaptation activities could be developed and explore methodological issues related to non-carbon benefits associated with REDD+ activities.

Warsaw agreements

After eight years of negotiations, from the time the Bali Action Plan established RED as an agenda item under the UNFCCC, international guidance on all the fundamental elements of REDD+ was considered complete. The COP in Poland produced the “Warsaw Framework for REDD+,” a total of seven decisions, completing the “package” of REDD+ rules and

¹⁴⁰ UNFCCC Decision 12/CP.17

¹⁴¹ UNFCCC Decision 2/CP.17, paragraphs 65-67.

procedures needed to get results-based actions and payments off the ground. Comprising seven out of the 15 COP decisions from Warsaw, the framework includes:

- Methodological guidance on:
 - Modalities for National Forest Monitoring Systems;
 - Timing and frequency of the provision of information on safeguards;
 - Addressing drivers of deforestation and forest degradation;
 - Measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of emission reductions;
 - Technical assessment of forest reference emission levels/forest reference levels;
- Coordination of support for REDD+ activities, including institutional arrangements; and
- Results-based finance for REDD+.

Together with previous agreements on methodological issues, policy approaches and positive incentives, these decisions provide a complete set of guidance for countries on the elements and standards that need to be developed for REDD+ – for developing countries aiming to produce and report on emissions reduction results on the one hand, and modes and mechanisms for how these efforts may be supported and their results financed or incentivized.

The “achievement” of the Warsaw Package sends a signal to governments and non-government actors about the continuing viability and potential for success of REDD+, which was said by some to have lost its momentum since the early years of its adoption by the UNFCCC. Part of the wane in enthusiasm has to do with “the absence of a binding climate agreement and the uncertainties this creates regarding the future of REDD+ as a global mechanism.”¹⁴² Others refer to the failure to establish a clear and predictable

¹⁴² L. Westholm, E. Mattsson and M. Ostwald, “REDD+ revisited – steady pace or passed momentum?” Forest, Climate and Livelihood Research Network, August 29, 2012, <http://www.focali.se/en/articles/artikelarkiv/redd-revisited-steady-pace-or-passed-momentum> (accessed March 31, 2014)

financing mechanism or channel for REDD+, particularly at a large scale.¹⁴³ The delays in reaching decisions on methodological issues, e.g. on MRV, also hampered interest and highlighted conflicting positions between developing and developed countries, as well as between positions on REDD+ and the treatment of other sectors.¹⁴⁴ The impasse on MRV negotiations in 2012, for example, centered on the impact of the type and level of verification of REDD+ results on national sovereignty, vis a vis the interest of donor countries and institutions in transparency and credibility of results.

The decision on National Forest Monitoring System is an important cornerstone in ensuring the integrity of REDD+ results, and also allows for the collection of related/relevant data in forest areas (avoiding duplication of efforts), such as on safeguards implementation.

Language on addressing drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (“drivers”) has been left general for several reasons: (1) Because of the overarching nature of the issue, i.e. one that has to be addressed at a broader level than REDD+, the expertise required to take detailed and complex action may not be possessed by REDD+ actors alone; (2) While there are global and regional trends regarding drivers, key drivers and how to address them are unique or specific to national circumstances; and (3) There was considerable sensitivity around guidance on how to address international drivers at the risk of creating trade barriers beyond the mandate of the UNFCCC. On the other hand, some have expressed the view that the decision on drivers could have taken a stronger stance to send a signal to actors outside the forest sector on the primary importance of the issue of drivers across all sectors.

The SBSTA conclusion on drivers coming out of the Bonn session “noted” the link between livelihoods and drivers¹⁴⁵, which gave rise to the issue that the language seems to consider indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ livelihoods as causes of deforestation and forest degradation. This prompted the Philippines, supported by Australia on behalf of the Umbrella Group, Bolivia, Brazil, the EU, and Mexico for the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG),¹⁴⁶ also in consideration of the call of indigenous and civil society groups to

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Catriona Moss and Michelle Kovacevic, “The honeymoon for REDD+ is over: consensus not yet reached in Doha on MRV, finance,” *Thomson Reuters Foundation*. Center for International Forestry Research, December 4, 2012, <http://www.trust.org/item/?map=the-honeymoon-for-redd-is-over-consensus-not-yet-reached-in-doha-on-mrv-finance> (accessed March 31, 2014)

¹⁴⁵ UNFCCC FCCC/SBSTA/2013/L.12/Add.3, paragraph 34.

¹⁴⁶ IISD Reporting Services, “Summary of the Warsaw Climate Change Conference: 11-23 November 2013,” *Earth Negotiations Bulletin*, November 26, 2013, <http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12594e.html> (accessed June 27, 2014).

address the dangerous implication of such unclear language, to emphasize during the COP plenary at the end of the conference that this was not their interpretation of the provision.

Deciding on the rules and procedures for MRV and FRELs/FRLs were priority agenda items at the Warsaw COP (2013), considering their highly technical nature and some controversial issues they entailed. In contrast to the discussions in Doha (2012), where there was frustration around the inability to reach consensus on key issues such as the debate between national and international standards and procedures for verification of actions and/or results, Warsaw saw Parties – particularly Norway and Brazil – display an encouraging level of willingness to accommodate one another’s concerns, although this required the direct engagement of negotiators and facilitators and the Parties to secure high-level approval from their delegations to reach a compromise. In the end, decisions on both MRV and the assessment of FRELs/FRLs were reached constructively.

The issue of coordination of support for REDD+ was among the more challenging discussions in Warsaw and focused on the question of whether or not a new/separate entity or body under the COP was needed to carry out such coordination. Many Parties, including the EU, Mexico, Colombia, Norway, the US, and Japan, expressed that a decision one way or the other was premature, without first exploring the potential functions of such an entity and examining if these may already be executed by other existing entities or mechanisms. There was also very little support for CfRN on the issue, which proposed and pushed for the establishment of a new entity, particularly because the proposed entity would have decision-making authority on the allocation of finance, contrary to agreements on the roles and responsibilities of the financial mechanism of the Convention. In the end, the decision invited Parties to nominate a “national entity or focal point” to participate in annual meetings, beginning in December 2014, with those from other countries and with the participation of observer organizations for purposes of addressing issues related to the coordination of support. The outcomes of these discussions will be reviewed by SBSTA in 2017.

The decision on results-based finance provides for an “information hub” (managed by the UNFCCC Secretariat) that will serve as a central platform to provide transparency or information on results-based actions, including both REDD+ actions and support. The decision strongly emphasizes the role of the GCF in scaling up long-term finance for REDD+, and requests the GCF to “apply the methodological guidance consistent with

[several REDD+] decisions” when providing results-based finance.¹⁴⁷ Agreement on this latter provision entailed engaging with Finance negotiators and overcoming their resistance to considering guidance from decisions reached outside the finance negotiations.

Agreements related to REDD+ safeguards and non-carbon benefits under the results-based finance decision were especially encouraging.

First, the decision established an explicit link between the provision of information on safeguards implementation on one hand, and access to results-based finance on the other, requiring countries to submit at least one summary of information before they may receive results-based payments.¹⁴⁸ This is an important clarification on the implication of safeguards implementation and reporting (or lack thereof) on a country’s ability to access results-based finance, especially because the decision on the timing and frequency of the provision of safeguards information – which leaves the “when” and “what channel” of reporting up to Parties – did not provide sufficient clarity that safeguards implementation and reporting are pre-requisite to results-based payments. The clarification was a major step in recognizing the central role of safeguards in ensuring the sustainability of REDD+ outcomes, in that countries may only benefit from their CO₂ emission reductions if they are able to demonstrate how they have sought to address the social, governance and environmental aspects of their REDD+ activities.¹⁴⁹

Second, the decision “recognizes the importance of incentivizing non-carbon benefits [NCBs] for the long-term sustainability of the implementation of [REDD+ activities], and [notes] the work on methodological issues” that has to be carried out regarding NCBs.¹⁵⁰ Incentives for NCBs (and NCBs themselves) are a recent introduction into the REDD+ discussions, and were met with resistance due to the current lack of clarity on what they are, what they entail and how they are measured, among other reasons. The EU and Norway, for example, while agreeing that NCBs are important, made it clear that they are not among the “results” for which REDD+ countries may obtain payments. Thus, the decision is quite progressive in that it ensures that attention to the NCBs, and their link to finance, are carried forward.

¹⁴⁷ UNFCCC Decision 9/CP.19

¹⁴⁸ UNFCCC FCCC/CP/2013/L.5, paragraph 24.

¹⁴⁰ UNFCCC FCCC/CP/2013/L.5, paragraph 24.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, paragraph 22.

Key REDD+ issues and how they were overcome

As simple as REDD+ was on paper, the complexity surrounding its realization slowly, but surely, appeared, as parties sought to agree on detailed methodological guidance, policy approaches, and positive incentives at the international level, and as they began to implement readiness activities in-country. There is an overwhelming abundance of views and studies on the key challenges facing REDD+ implementation, which cannot be covered in this paper in substantial detail, but an overview of the general roadblocks are identified and described below.

After the inclusion of RED in the Bali Action Plan and negotiations were launched, the following are the main issues that parties had to contend with and how they have been addressed,^{151 152 153} although some debates continued past Cancun up to the more recent COPs.

Scope or definition of REDD+

The Bali decisions expanded the scope of REDD from that proposed by CfRN in Montreal (RED) to include forest degradation (REDD). However, mention of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in the Bali Action Plan was in conjunction with policy approaches and positive incentives for REDD, but not part of a REDD mechanism¹⁵⁴ – the reason why REDD and the last three activities were separated by a semicolon in the decision text. By Copenhagen however, the semicolon was dropped, in response to India and others' demands that all five activities be given the same weight in the negotiations,¹⁵⁵ and in Cancun, all five activities were enumerated as possible activities under REDD+.

On the other hand, the question of whether or not REDD+ should include other land use and land use change¹⁵⁶ was now clear, differentiating it from the accounting and reporting rules for LULUCF under Kyoto. Whether emission reductions could be credited at project

¹⁵¹ "Recent REDD Developments," *Tropical Forest Group*, <http://www.tropicalforestgroup.org/the-solution-redd/> (accessed March 31, 2014).

¹⁵² "REDD forest agreement hits new low, missing basic elements," *Global Witness*, <http://www.globalwitness.org/library/redd-forest-agreement-hits-new-low-missing-basic-elements> (accessed March 31, 2014).

¹⁵³ Holloway and Giandomenico, "Carbon Planet White Paper."

¹⁵⁴ UNFCCC Bali Action Plan.

¹⁵⁵ Holloway and Giandomenico, "Carbon Planet White Paper."

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

level or only at national level¹⁵⁷ has since been resolved, with REDD+ considered a system that must be implemented and accounted for at national level, albeit applying a phased approach, and allowing for recognition of subnational REDD+ as an interim measure.¹⁵⁸

Unlocking safeguards leads to momentum

In the lead up to Copenhagen, key non-technical issues were the focus of negotiations as parties, NGOs and indigenous peoples' groups weighed in on the inclusion of standards or conditions to ensure that REDD+ activities did not perpetuate harmful results, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Among the most hotly-contested issues were:

- Indigenous peoples' rights
- Biodiversity conservation
- Non-conversion of natural forests
- Good environmental governance

In Copenhagen, the “need for full and effective engagement of indigenous peoples and local communities in, and the potential contribution of their knowledge to, monitoring and reporting of activities” and the “importance of promoting sustainable management of forests and co-benefits, including biodiversity,” were recognized.^{159 160}

The following year, the Cancun Agreements – considered to have moved REDD+ forward significantly “by describing its main elements and operationalizing its initial phase”¹⁶¹ and resolving some outstanding questions since Bali,¹⁶² – clearly laid down the seven safeguards that must be “promoted and supported” when carrying out REDD+ activities.¹⁶³ These safeguards specifically include transparent and effective national forest governance structures, respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local

¹⁵⁷ “Recent REDD Developments.”

¹⁵⁸ UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.16

¹⁵⁹ UNFCCC, Preamble.

¹⁶⁰ UNFCCC, Decision 4/CP.15.

¹⁶¹ The Center for People and Forests (RECOFTC), *Forests and climate change after Cancun: An Asia-Pacific perspective*. Bangkok, Thailand, March 2011.

¹⁶² Jennifer Morgan, Athena Ballesteros, Heather McGray, Kelly Levin, Florence Daviet, Fred Stolle and Hillary McMahon, “Reflections on the Cancun Agreements,” World Resources Institute, December 14, 2010, <http://www.wri.org/blog/reflections-cancun-agreements#redd> (accessed March 31, 2014)

¹⁶³ UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.16, paragraphs 69 and 2, Appendix I.

communities and their full and effective participation, as well as [consistency] with the conservation of natural forests and biological diversity,¹⁶⁴ in an effort to directly respond to the prominent social, governance and environmental risks around REDD+. The Cancun Agreements also required countries to set up a safeguard information system (SIS) through which they should report on how they have “addressed and respected” the safeguards in their implementation of REDD+ activities.

MRV and other technical issues

While politically progress had been made, and Cancun saw the adoption of a REDD+ decision, there were however important remaining technical issues. But by 2007, the technical and methodological issues that REDD+ opponents raised – primarily those to do with additionality, leakage and permanence, had begun to lose their strength as progress in science and research showed that “not only were verification and monitoring of forest carbon possible, but that emissions from deforestation and degradation were so significant that they couldn't be excluded“ from action if dangerous climate change were to be avoided.¹⁶⁵¹⁶⁶

Beginning from broad discussions on forest carbon accounting methodologies and whether to consider “reduced,” as opposed to “avoided,” deforestation and forest degradation,¹⁶⁷ it was not until COP 17 in Durban that modalities for Forest Reference Emission Levels (FRELs)/Forest Reference Levels (FRLs) were finally decided. While Cancun was successful in making very definite declarations on the safeguards, technical issues around national forest monitoring systems (NFMS), FRELs/FRLs and MRV would only find final resolution in Warsaw three years later.

Among the three, NFMS and FRELs/FRLs were the more technical issues, and debates around them centered on such questions as technology and capacity of countries to establish them. On the other hand, debates on MRV – and part of the reason deliberations on the item were pushed down the line after many of the other agenda items had been tackled – involved both technical and political concerns, particularly related to the verification standard to be applied to REDD+ results.

¹⁶⁴ UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.16. paragraph 2, Appendix I.

¹⁶⁵ López-Alonso, “The Global Political Economy of REDD+.”

¹⁶⁶ Butler, “Are we on the brink.”

¹⁶⁷ Holloway and Giandomenico, “Carbon Planet White Paper.”

The seven-year process from Bali to Warsaw to reach agreement on the technical aspects of REDD+ illustrated how controversial and complex these are – going beyond concerns purely for the integrity of REDD+ results but also extending to those for national sovereignty – and how far REDD+ has come.

Brazil played a particularly key role in how the debate on MRV unfolded, engaging with Norway on the standard for to be applied for verification of results-based actions. While Norway, one of the biggest developed country donors for REDD+, proposed a process for international verification based on principles of environmental integrity and ensuring that actions actually contribute to reducing emissions,¹⁶⁸ Brazil argued that this could encroach on national sovereignty and proposed national-level verification instead. The negotiations on MRV in COP 18 in Doha ended in an impasse, with Norway “pushing for an independent, international verification process undertaken by experts” and Brazil and other developing countries refusing to agree to such “strong verification requirements.”¹⁶⁹

After numerous bilateral and multilateral discussions among key players throughout the following year, a “creative” compromise was reached: data and information on REDD+ emission reduction results are to be provided in a technical annex in the biennial update reports (BURs) submitted by parties, to be analyzed by “two land-use [LULUCF] experts from the UNFCCC roster of experts, one each from a developing country and a developed country Party.”¹⁷⁰

Amid a strong push for REDD+ to be the “success story” in Warsaw, decisions on all three technical issues, along with four others, were finalized.

The issue of drivers of deforestation and forest degradation

The complexity of addressing drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (“drivers”) was recognized by the COP as early as Bali, when work on REDD+ was initially launched. In Copenhagen, Parties were asked to identify drivers “resulting in emissions and the means to address these”; and in Cancun to find ways to address them, along with “land tenure issues, forest governance issues, gender considerations and the safeguards.” The latter four areas may be said to be within the scope of the Cancun safeguards, while more concrete agreement on drivers was left out for years to come. And while many actions on drivers have

¹⁶⁸ Interview with Eirik Brun Sorlie, Norwegian REDD+ negotiator, June 12, 2014.

¹⁶⁹ Moss and Kovacevic, “The honeymoon for REDD+ is over.”

¹⁷⁰ UNFCCC Decision 4/CP.19, paragraphs 7-10.

been undertaken at local and national levels, means to address them at a global scale, including to look into international and transboundary drivers,¹⁷¹ has been a sensitive issue.

Parties such as PNG, Guyana, Indonesia and Malaysia have been hesitant to tackle drivers at length in the REDD+ discussion, being of the view that they are more appropriately addressed at national and local levels, and placing emphasis on the need to strengthen incentives for REDD+ as a way to encourage forest conservation. On the other hand, Tuvalu, Colombia, Tanzania, the EU and Switzerland are among those who did not consider international trade issues necessarily “off limits” to REDD+, and suggested stronger language on drivers to send a “clear signal” to various actors and sectors even outside forestry (e.g., private companies engaged in the global agricultural commodities sector).

By Warsaw, the resulting decision was mainly a re-statement of principles in previous decisions, with additional “action points” encouraging actors to (continue to) take action on drivers, share the results of their work, and take note of existing relevant work on the issue. A number of parties mentioned above, and many NGOs and indigenous groups, were of the view that the decision was disappointingly weak and did not provide meaningful guidance on how drivers may be *addressed*, even as such action is considered crucial to the success of REDD+.

Institutional arrangements

The debate around the appropriate global architecture or institutional arrangement for for financing or enabling REDD+ has also been around since before Bali, initially centered around whether such an arrangement should be part of a post-Kyoto regime under the UNFCCC, as proposed by CfrN and Mexico, or established through a separate agreement, as proposed by Brazil and the Center for Clean Air Policy (CCAP).¹⁷² This discussion was linked to finance and what parties would agree on as the appropriate approach to financing REDD+: it would make sense to have REDD+ under the Convention if financing were to take place under compliance markets, while the alternative would be better if it were fund-based. The question of “within or without” the Convention was also linked to the

¹⁷¹ Kate Horner, Niranjali Amerasinghe and Sebastian Bock, “REDD: Addressing the Drivers—A Case for the WTO?” Center for International Environmental Law, June 4, 2013, http://www.ciel.org/Publications/REDD_WTO_4Jun2013.pdf (accessed March 31, 2014).

¹⁷² Arild Angelsen and Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff, “What are the key design issues for REDD and the criteria for assessing options?” in *Moving Ahead with REDD: Issues, Options and Implications*, edited by Arild Angelsen (Indonesia: Center for International Forestry Research, 2008), 11-22.

additionality of emission reductions from REDD+ and “targets and commitments of developing countries.”¹⁷³

As per the Durban COP, financing for REDD+ has been made expansive to include “a wide variety of sources” and the possibility of applying market-based as well as alternative approaches. Still, how results-based finance (RBF) and support for REDD+ would be coordinated was unclear until the recent Warsaw decisions on these two issues. The decision on results-based finance established an online information hub, to be managed by the Secretariat, to enable parties and other actors to keep track of REDD+ actions and support. The proposal to establish such a platform was met with general agreement from parties and other stakeholders. The hub, which would house information on national action plans or strategies, NFMS, assessed FRELs/FRLs, verified emission reduction results, and safeguards implementation – and the amount of results for which payments have been received – provides a central component of the global architecture to enable RBF to flow to forest countries.

On the other hand, disagreement on the precise institutional arrangement for coordinating support for REDD+ came very close to holding back finalizing decisions on all the other issues on the table in Warsaw. The debate centered on the proposal to establish a new body or committee under the COP to coordinate not only support for REDD+ but its other aspects as well. Papua New Guinea (PNG), representing CfrN, was the main proponent of the establishment of a REDD+ Committee, or other body or institutional arrangement under the COP “to mainstream the implementation of REDD+ activities and ensure consistency of financial resources mobilization.”¹⁷⁴ Many Parties, including the EU, Mexico, Colombia, Norway, the US, and Japan, considered this premature, citing the challenges that setting up and running a new body would mean without having sufficient evidence to support its advantages.

To resolve this issue, high-level negotiations had to be conducted, resulting in a decision on coordination of support (10/CP.19). The establishment of a new body was not decided on, and instead the holding of regular meetings among national focal points and observer organizations, discussed above, was agreed. While PNG agreed to this process and dropped their proposal for a REDD+ Committee, it proposed the same language on the

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ IISD Reporting Services, “Summary of the Doha Climate Change Conference: 26 November – 8 December 2012,” *Earth Negotiations Bulletin*, December 13, 2011, <http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop17/> (accessed March 31, 2014).

establishment of a committee in another “room” – negotiating the results-based finance decision (9/CP.19) – which at that point was the last unresolved element in what was to become the Warsaw Framework for REDD+. Most other Parties did not appreciate this “surprise” from PNG, especially after the difficulty reaching consensus on other items in the finance decision, and PNG’s proposal was dramatically rejected.

Finance (offsets, carbon trading and markets)

When compensation for avoided deforestation was proposed as a climate mitigation mechanism in Kyoto, one of the foremost arguments against it was the risk that developed countries would use forest carbon credits to offset, in place of reducing, their own emissions after agreeing to emissions reductions targets in Kyoto. This objection continued to be raised well into Bali when work on REDD+ was eventually launched under the convention.^{175 176 177 178}

Parties, such as Bolivia and Brazil,¹⁷⁹ and organizations opposed to a REDD+ market mechanism also cited the creation of perverse incentives for countries with low deforestation rates to increase deforestation, so they could later claim compensation for “reducing” emissions later on. Risks related to environmental integrity (e.g., conversion of natural forests to plantations and displacement or “shifting” deforestation) and social and governance risks (e.g., depriving indigenous peoples and other forest dependent communities of their rights and access to their lands) were also presented to show the dangers of allowing avoided deforestation to be driven by market forces.

On the other hand, other parties, among them PNG and Costa Rica, argued that REDD+ cannot work without being part of the carbon market. More voices have spoken out on this

¹⁷⁵ Simon Bullock, Mike Childs and Tom Picken, “A Dangerous Distraction—Why Offsetting is Failing the Climate and People: The Evidence,” *Friends of the Earth*, June 2009, http://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/dangerous_distraction.pdf (accessed March 31, 2014).

¹⁷⁶ “Why REDD is Wrong,” *Global Justice Ecology Project*, <http://www.globaljusticeecology.org/publications.php?ID=472> (accessed March 31, 2014).

¹⁷⁷ “REDD: An Introduction,” *REDD-Monitor*, <http://www.redd-monitor.org/redd-an-introduction/> (accessed March 31, 2014).

¹⁷⁸ Larry Lohmann, “No REDD Papers,” *Global Justice Ecology Project*, November 2011, http://www.redd-monitor.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/noreddpapers_download.pdf (accessed March 31, 2014).

¹⁷⁹ See Simon West, “Command Without Control: Are Market Mechanisms Capable of Delivering Ecological Integrity to REDD?”, *6/3 Law, Environment and Development Journal* (2010), p. 298, available at <http://www.lead-journal.org/content/10298.pdf> (accessed 1 July 2014).

point in recent years,¹⁸⁰ as it has become apparent that public finance for REDD+ is not readily forthcoming or predictable, and may not be sufficient to absorb the carbon credits that will be generated. Although REDD+ has not yet been part of an emissions trading market under the UN, and REDD+ credits have not yet been used as offsets,¹⁸¹ ¹⁸² the COP could develop “appropriate market-based approaches,”¹⁸³ which is an option welcomed by those who see its necessity. The risks posed by an overly market-driven REDD+ mechanism are tempered by the requirement to comply with the Cancun safeguards in all phases of REDD+ implementation, and specifically in the development of market-based approaches, while ensuring environmental integrity. The COP could also develop, in addition to ones that already exist (e.g. bilateral arrangements and carbon/climate funds), non-market-based approaches for results-based financing of REDD+, methodological issues around which are currently being explored under SBSTA.

Country positions, coalitions of shared interests, and convergence of views

Country positions on REDD+ have evolved over time. Some parties, like the United States, started with modest support for the idea of REDD+ and eventually became strong supporters after seeing the value of the mechanism.

There are NGOs who staunchly opposed REDD+ because of technical issues and the potential for REDD+ credits to be used as offsets by developed countries, but have since supported REDD+ and shifted their focus to ensuring that safeguards are complied with. These and many other shifts are the result of factors ranging from scientific and technological progress, e.g., to address additionality, permanence and leakage, to changing global economic conditions and shifts in domestic policies.

The changes in positions and alignments among parties in recent years have been key to arriving at this point in the REDD+ negotiations, which can truly be considered a model for cooperation and consensus-building in international environmental negotiations. Although not without outstanding challenges, the past two or three years of REDD+ discussions at the UNFCCC have seen Parties’ willingness to speak to one another frankly and openly,

¹⁸⁰ See Covington & Burling LLP and Baker & McKenzie, *Background Analysis of REDD Regulatory Frameworks*, 17 May 2009.

¹⁸¹ Angelsen and McNeill, “The evolution of REDD+.”

¹⁸² Lohmann, “No REDD Papers.”

¹⁸³ UNFCCC Decision 2/CP.17, paragraph 66.

facilitating the process of resolving key issues that have been on the table since Bali, and some even since Montreal.

One interesting note in this overview is the absence of the Group of 77 (G77) and China, usually a very potent group in any UNFCCC negotiations. Although the G77 would sometimes speak as a group in the REDD+ negotiations, on procedural issues and sometimes on REDD+ finance issues, this was more the exception than the rule. More active than G77 and China in the REDD+ negotiations were Cfrn, the African Group, the LDCs, EIG, and the ASEAN group of countries.

Some country positions, while significant, have not been discussed in the chronological account above or as part of specific milestones or roadblocks. Still, these positions have had considerable influence in the UNFCCC negotiations, whether introducing innovative ideas into the process, or serving as turning points that could make or break discussions.

Indonesia and Brazil, which both possess high stakes in REDD+ by the sheer size of their forest areas, recent historic deforestation rates, and the need for incentives to help curb deforestation in their respective territories, have been at the forefront of discussions.¹⁸⁴ Both have exercised caution in agreeing to commitments that would place additional burdens on developing countries implementing REDD+, particularly when certain requirements could have unwanted or unforeseen implications for national sovereignty, and in the context of diversity in national circumstances. They have also consistently demanded more clarity on how finance for REDD+ would be scaled up and made more efficient. In fact, Brazil was among the proponents of a repository of information to track REDD+ actions and support, which evolved into the information hub included in the decision on RBF. Indonesia, coordinating with other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), maintained that further work on ways and means to transfer RBF was needed, leading to the request to the Standing Committee on Finance to include REDD+ in its immediate agenda.

The Philippines, consistent with its strong position on safeguards, co-benefits, and REDD+ in the broader context of sustainable development, worked to ensure that consideration of safeguards was not lost or neglected in the more technical discussions. It was one of the few active voices on these issues, especially among developing countries, and pushed for a link between safeguards compliance and reporting and RBF. It also played a key role in bringing

¹⁸⁴ Incidentally, Indonesia, Brazil and PNG have been serving as co-chairs of the G77 working group on REDD+ for the past years.

non-carbon benefits for REDD+ within the finance discussion, and their inclusion in SBSTA's current agenda. Other developing countries, some of which have historically been wary of the imposition of additional guidelines or processes related to safeguards, have become more receptive to these proposals in the last couple of years.

The Philippines and the EU often found common ground on the issue of safeguards, which the EU also strongly supports in the context of environmental integrity and sustainability of REDD+. On the issue of non-carbon benefits, however, the EU was not so quick to agree to its inclusion in the work program on finance launched in Doha, citing challenges in identifying and measuring NCBs and the risk of diverting from REDD+ as primarily a mitigation strategy, into one that provides compensation for "everything" instead of emission reduction results. With further elaboration on NCBs, including their close link to safeguards, in a workshop on RBF in the lead-up to Warsaw and other bilateral meetings, the EU acknowledged the role of NCBs in the long-term sustainability of REDD+ and agreed to continue these discussions under SBSTA.

Colombia is one of the most vocal proponents of a "stepped subnational approach" to REDD+, both in terms of reference levels and MRV, as well as eligibility for the results-based phase.¹⁸⁵ In a phased approach, subnational-level accounting, ranging from project to province and state level, is integrated into a national level system, to enable implementation and governance of subnational REDD+ activities at the appropriate scale and thus help address leakage, while engaging both national and sub-national stakeholders. Colombia's goal in applying this approach is "to achieve a subnational REDD approach where the Government will support the communities or organizations that want to implement REDD activities in their territories," enabling direct transactions between buyers and project proponents.^{186 187}

Australia has been a strong supporter of REDD+ and has pledged large amounts to support developing countries in their readiness activities in the past. In Warsaw, it announced a change in its position on REDD+, which was part of an overall shift in its commitments under the Convention prompted by a change in government. Australia will continue to

¹⁸⁵ <http://theredddesk.org/countries/colombia> (accessed 1 July 2014).

¹⁸⁶ Thiago Chagas, et al. *Nested Approaches to REDD+: An Overview of Issues and Options*. Climate Focus and Forest Trends, 2011.

¹⁸⁷ Rane Cortez, et al. *A Nested Approach to REDD+: Structuring effective and transparent incentive mechanisms for REDD+ implementation at multiple scale*, The Nature Conservancy and Baker & McKenzie, 2010.

engage in supporting REDD+ activities bilaterally through aid-based funds, but has not expressed commitment to help scale up finance for REDD+.

Canada has also been a strong supporter of and leader in the REDD+ negotiations. Its REDD+ negotiator has been a constant facilitator since 2009 and has had a successful record of helping the Parties active in the REDD+ negotiations reach agreement.

Consistent also in their constructive presence and contributions to the REDD+ process were the African Group and a group of Latin American countries. Developing countries from these two groups had strong views on many REDD+ subjects but were always willing to find compromises as the negotiations unfolded from Montreal to Warsaw.

Saudi Arabia, although not a forest country, actively participated in the REDD+ negotiations from 2008-2010 and was constructive most of the time. However in 2010, during the Cancun Conference of the Parties, it was one of the countries that blocked the negotiations by invoking procedural matters. Because of this, no substantive sessions by the REDD+ negotiating group were held in Cancun and instead agreement was reached bilaterally to enable the inclusion of REDD+ in the Cancun agreements.

Bolivia also posed difficult challenges in the negotiations with its rejection of a market approach and a forest mechanism that was focused mainly on mitigation. Instead, Bolivia proposed the established of a joint mitigation-adaptation mechanism that would enable countries to design, implement, and support activities that would have good forest and climate outcomes. In 2011, in Durban, South Africa, this idea was accepted and in turn Bolivia did not object to others making progress in the REDD+ issues.

Future prospects

The post-Warsaw agenda for REDD+ implementation and finance: opportunities and risks

The results-based finance (RBF) decision from Warsaw¹⁸⁸ not only reaffirms the decision from Durban that finance for REDD+ “may come from a variety of sources,” it also identifies the Green Climate Fund (GCF) as the foremost channel through which finance should flow, and asks the Fund to take into account methodological guidance already existing on REDD+ when providing RBF to countries. The Warsaw decision also seeks to

¹⁸⁸ UNFCCC Decision 9/CP.19.

keep the discussion on finance going, with the aim of helping “scale up and improve the effectiveness” of finance, by requesting the Standing Committee on Finance to include REDD+ in its immediate agenda. The Standing Committee on Finance will be finalizing its work in Paris 2015 and the outcome of its work is expected to be part of the overall package during that conference. Because it is considered low-hanging fruit, there is a reasonable chance that REDD+ will be part of that package.

For transparency and accountability, an information hub on the REDD+ web platform was set up to reflect both REDD+ actions and support and enable more efficient tracking of finance. These structures and forward-looking processes are very positive steps towards creating an enabling environment for REDD+ finance to flow, including for identifying where it is most needed. It is expected that this hub will build on the experience of the Voluntary REDD+ Database (VRD) of the REDD+ Partnership.

Despite these developments, there is still no assurance that funds will indeed flow into the GCF at the scale needed to compensate countries for their REDD+ results in the near future, or whether such funds will flow with any consistency. Although bilateral, multilateral and aid-based arrangements that have been in place in the earlier (readiness) phases of REDD+ continue to thrive, these are limited in scope – raising questions of equity in the distribution of incentives for REDD+ – and have a fixed lifespan. Truly making forest carbon a viable asset, the sequestration of which can result in tangible benefits for forested developing countries, will depend largely on more clarity around possible approaches to transfer and receive results-based payments, and successfully encouraging more investment, such as from the private sector.

Scenarios for Lima and Paris

The Warsaw Framework for REDD+ was is considered to have completed the set of basic guidance needed to implement and finance REDD+, specifically the issues outlined in the Cancun work plan. There are still remaining agenda items, however, under SBSTA’s mandate that will continue being discussed this year, including methodological issues on non-carbon benefits (NCBs) and non-market-based approaches (NMBA), and the need for further guidance on safeguard information systems (SIS). Countries have also been invited to designate national entities or focal points to participate in intergovernmental meetings focused on coordination of support for REDD+, the first one to be held in conjunction

with the Lima COP. Parties are also expected to continue engaging in the REDD+ Finance discussion as its exploration unfolds under the Standing Committee on Finance.

Parties and observer organizations have been invited to submit their views on NCBs, NMBA and SIS, the result of which will help determine the amount of remaining methodological work under SBSTA. While NCBs and NMBAs are more recent SBSTA agenda items and will likely be treated in general terms in any potential decision on them this year, further guidance on SIS has been on the table since Durban and thus may elicit more concrete guidance, if any, from the COP. Since REDD+ countries have begun to develop and test their respective SIS, there would be country experiences and lessons to draw from, which could form the basis for such guidance.

The intergovernmental meetings on coordination of support would presumably involve more actors involved in domestic REDD+ implementation, in contrast to negotiators, who may not always be part of day-to-day work back home. Participation from such “implementers” could infuse valuable new perspectives into the discussions on finance and enable parties to more directly tackle issues around, say, funding and finance gaps, on the one hand, and what donor countries need to see to encourage (further) investment, particularly in the GCF, on the other. These meetings could also influence how parties perceive REDD+ in relation to other land sector issues, in the context of the tendency towards increasing integration of land sector approaches in managing terrestrial carbon.

As early as Warsaw, many governments and non-government actors have expressed agreement that the land sector – including LULUCF, agriculture and REDD+ – should be included in the purview of the 2015 agreement to be completed in Paris.¹⁸⁹ Discussions on potential arrangements and approaches have begun, not only in bilateral and multilateral forums and among NGOs and indigenous peoples organizations, but also in the ADP. The future of REDD+ within this new regime is still very vague at this point. There have been reservations around “merging” too liberally with other land use and forestry issues, at the risk of losing significant gains made in developing methodology specific to REDD+, and in establishing the safeguards which do not exist in LULUCF and agriculture.

¹⁸⁹ At COP 19 in Warsaw, the COP Presidency organized a “High-level panel event on the land sector and forests” open to all Ministers or Heads of Delegation, and also for Observers. For an overview of the views expressed by Parties, see <http://vlscop.vermontlaw.edu/2013/11/19/more-on-the-high-level-panel-event-on-the-land-use-sector-and-forests/> (accessed June 30, 2014).

On the other hand, there is also broad acknowledgement both within and outside REDD+ that land-based sectors can no longer be treated separately from one another because their interrelationship is so clear that it makes no sense to carry on the making decisions on them as if they were in silos. This has encouraged actors to look more closely into integrated approaches, e.g. a “landscapes approach,” but at a global scale.¹⁹⁰

Lessons learned and recommendations

What lessons can be learned in looking back and analyzing how REDD+ has evolved throughout the years?

First, the progress of negotiations has to be able to adapt to the progress in science and technological advancements. While technical issues prevented avoided deforestation from inclusion in the CDM, subsequent developments in available technology and new methodological systems bolstered the appeal of a mitigation mechanism around forests when it was re-introduced as REDD+ later on.

By and large, progress in the methodological and technical discussions opened the way to agreement in the political issues. Thus agreements on methodological guidance in SBSTA in Copenhagen in 2009 led to the official establishment of the REDD+ mechanism in Cancun in 2010. Adoption of an agreement on forest reference levels and safeguards, also in SBSTA, in Durban paved the way for the initial agreement on REDD+ finance during the same COP. Finally, the Warsaw Framework would not have been completed if there was no agreement on MRV, and especially on verification.

Second, it is important to highlight gains and milestones as the negotiating process moves along, and to protect these gains as talks move on to unresolved topics – make progress where progress can be made. These have to do with prioritizing and managing the time dedicated to certain agenda items, and encouraging Parties to keep moving forward and take advantage of momentum around items on which agreement has been reached.

In the REDD+ context, the negotiations progressed by addressing methodological issues first and linking progress there to discussions on political issues such as safeguards and institutional mechanisms. The negotiation on results-based finance was purposely left for last

¹⁹⁰ The first Global Landscapes Forum, organized by CIFOR and UNEP, was also held in conjunction with COP 19 in Warsaw, a successor to past Forest Days and Agriculture and Rural Development Days. For an overview of the landscapes approach and more on the forum, see <http://www.landscapes.org> (accessed June 30, 2014).

because it is the most difficult discussion to have. Resolving issues like the role of markets and international verification are linked to other decisions on climate finance that have to be done.

Third, and finally, because it is not always possible to control the speed or pace of negotiations, Parties and other stakeholders must remain creative and proactive in establishing arrangements parallel to UN processes, to respond to the urgent need to undertake mitigation and adaptation actions. We have previously referred to this as a multi-track approach to climate multilateralism and action.

The establishment of the REDD+ Partnership is important in this respect as it was seen as a interim platform for cooperation among countries while the negotiations were going on. In addition, programs like the United Nations Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN-REDD Programme), Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), and Forest Investment Program (FIP) are important laboratories where REDD+ approaches, processes, and norms are being tested.

Forest Days,¹⁹¹ usually held in the middle of the Conference of the Parties, have also served the purpose of providing informal space for negotiators and stakeholders to meet and brainstorm on issues that impeded progress. Forest Day was first convened by CIFOR on behalf of the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) and host-country governments in 2007. It was last held in Doha in 2012 and has now been replaced by Landscape Day in anticipation of what will be the next stage of the climate and land use agenda of the climate change convention.

What donor countries need to do

Moving forward, donor countries need to continue with bilateral and multilateral efforts to support readiness activities, and particularly look into areas where sufficient support is not being channeled so that as many forest countries interested in engaging in REDD+ are able to do so. But because more countries are beginning to move from the readiness and scaling-up phases towards the results-based phase, donor countries need to put concerted effort into scaling up results-based payments for REDD+, and begin pledging funds to the Green

¹⁹¹ Forest Day was organized to bring to the fore “the importance of forests in mitigating carbon emissions.” There have been six Forest Days since the first one in 2007, each centering on a different overall theme. See <http://www.forestday.org/events/forest-day/forest-day-6/about-the-organisers.html> (accessed September 15, 2014)

Climate Fund. This is not only to ensure that there will be sufficient finance to compensate countries for their results, but also to motivate them to keep moving with their readiness and scaling-up activities, by sending a much-needed signal that finance is indeed forthcoming.

More active engagement with the private sector to stimulate investment in REDD+ is also an important step in scaling up finance. While this is obvious, its feasibility is uncertain given the state of the carbon markets and the uncertainty of demand for carbon credits. Whether the outcome of Paris can tilt the odds in favor of more demand remains to be seen.

Donor countries should consistently take into account whether safeguards are being addressed and respected in countries or projects that they support, and before providing RBF, look into the summary of information on safeguards that the REDD+ country has submitted. While monitoring safeguards implementation, it is also possible to gather information on non-carbon benefits resulting from REDD+ activities, even in earlier phases. Donor countries should find ways to incentivize and encourage the achievement and maintenance of these benefits through various means.

What REDD+ countries need to do

REDD+ countries should continue their efforts to develop and test systems required for REDD+ and steadily move to the results-based phase. In developing these systems, they should take safeguards implementation seriously because this is the only way to ensure the long-term sustainability of their REDD+ results. This means putting the necessary technical and regulatory infrastructure for REDD+ in place, which in turn will create a sound, stable, and enabling environment that would encourage the channeling of support to their activities and eventually of results-based finance.

These countries also need to actively share their experiences and lessons with others, and learn from them in turn. One way to directly highlight these experiences is through active engagement in the intergovernmental meetings on coordination of support for REDD+ that are set to begin this year, which opportunity forest countries should seize.

Conclusion

The story of international cooperation to reduce tropical deforestation is long and complex. There has always been a shared interest in managing tropical forests properly but because countries and constituencies have different motivations, it was difficult to find a common

approach to achieve the goal of reducing tropical deforestation. This challenge of finding a unified response to deforestation is described in the early sections of the paper when we discussed why the Tropical Forestry Action Plan was criticized, what prevented a forest treaty, the limitations of intergovernmental forest processes and forest law enforcement initiatives.

The same dynamics, which had developing country-developed country elements, originally characterized the forest and climate negotiations. But as the REDD+ negotiations evolved, countries and constituencies actually moved closer to each other with their views converging as several thorny issues (MRV, safeguards, finance, among others) were resolved. By Cancun in 2010, those views were close enough that a REDD+ mechanism was officially established. By Warsaw in 2013, most issues had been resolved and it is mainly implementation that is left to be done.

There are several reasons why this convergence happened.

First, the very nature of the climate change problem as a universal challenge to all countries and constituencies meant that there was a shared motivation to make mitigation through forest activities work properly. Nobody would gain if the mitigation potential of forests was not fully realized. As we showed in this paper, international cooperation on forests and climate, coming on the heels of the limited gains of the 1990s, started slowly but by Bali in 2007, there was already wide acceptance of the idea. The establishment of the REDD+ mechanism in Cancun cemented that. And today, there is very little debate on whether such cooperation is needed.

Second, related to the preceding point, many actors in the climate process needed a quick win to show that the climate change negotiations could come up with agreements that matter for climate. Many countries chose REDD+ to satisfy this demand because of the absence of a significant North-South dynamic in REDD+, the lack of it driven by the fact that developed and developing countries had diverse interests on this mitigation approach. For example, as pointed out in the paper, the Group of 77 and China did not figure prominently in the REDD+ negotiations. The same could be said of developed countries where UNFCCC parties like Norway, the United States, the European Union, Australia, and Canada have come to the negotiating table with different positions.

Third, the active role stakeholders (indigenous peoples, environmentalists, accountability advocates, etc.) played in the REDD+ negotiations helped in finding solutions when there

were impasses and provided a rich source of ideas on how to move forward. As discussed in the paper, the early resolution of the safeguards issue was critical in this respect as it made REDD+ more acceptable to stakeholders. Allowing those stakeholders to participate in the discussions, for example by the facilitators briefing them regularly or allowing stakeholders to make interventions, made the process inclusive and paved the way for greater acceptance and support of the agreements forged in the negotiations.

As the UNFCCC pivots to the final leg of negotiations for the 2015 Paris Agreement, the REDD+ story, a successful one by any negotiation standard, is instructive of what is possible for climate change cooperation: is not only possible but it can be done well, with all countries and stakeholders potentially achieving long sought for gains. In the REDD+ negotiations, the world has successfully achieved and strengthened international cooperation. Lessons learned from that experience might be useful as the world advances to a new agreement on climate change.