The COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the realpolitik of global health security. It has also illuminated some uncomfortable truths. In this blog, we explore China’s global health leadership, its international cooperation and lack thereof, and analyse what we see as the future of global health security. But perhaps the greatest difficulty in all of this will rest on how societies view their countries’ domestic responses, and how they see their duty to global health.
CGD Policy Blogs
The eighth Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) drew to a close last week in Dakar. The big takeaway this year is a noticeable shift in China’s approach to Africa—from hard cash for infrastructure, to soft cooperation on trade and human capital.
In this blog, we go beyond the headlines and unpack the Global Gateway’s strategy, narrative, finance, and governance. Now that the plan has been published, it’s clear that, while packaged and presented as a real competitor to China in infrastructure, the Global Gateway appears to be a paper tiger.
In a new report, we rely on public reporting from multilateral development institutions and funds to provide a clearer picture of China’s participation across the multilateral development system. We find that China has staked out a uniquely important position, one that relies on leading roles as a shareholder, donor, client, and commercial partner. No other country wears so many hats so effectively across these global institutions.
After a lengthy review of the Trump administration’s trade policy toward China, the Biden administration unveiled its approach on October 4th. It is the conclusion of the Biden administration that structural inequities in trade relations remain, and that China is not compliant with Phase I of the agreement it reached with the Trump administration. The American position, as outlined by US Trade Representative Katherine Tai, carries implications for African economies.
If the World Bank Wants to Move On from the Doing Business Scandal, It Should Take a Look at AidData
Today’s release of a new dataset of over 13,000 Chinese-financed projects in developing countries marks a major contribution to our understanding of China’s role as a lender to the developing world, as well as the ways in which these projects are increasingly structured to avoid accounting for direct liabilities on public balance sheets. At a moment of high debt vulnerability in the developing world, both contributions ought to prove valuable to policymakers in rich and poor countries alike as they seek to work through these problems.
Our series on the big challenges and opportunities for developing countries over the next couple of decades has so far largely focused on specific sectors: agriculture, health and finance. The fourth took a different tack, considering instead what we should—and should not—learn from the most dramatic development success of the past century: China.
The G7 countries pledged a massive scale-up in support of developing-country financing at their recent summit in the UK. How it will be financed remains an open question. But analyzing trends in recent debt flows by lenders to developing countries, and taking stock of the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), can provide some important lessons for the G7’s new ambitions.
If B3W is to be the better Belt and Road, it will have to embrace the role of government in infrastructure provision and ensure private sector infrastructure projects are designed and run in the public interest. Otherwise, and despite the denials-, low- and middle-income countries would be right to see it as not about them, but just about China.
In the Secretive World of Government-to-Government Lending, 100 Chinese Debt Contracts Offer a Trove of New Information
Is Chinese financing good for developing countries? Taking stock of China’s lending activities has long been hindered by the lack of publicly available data on dimensions like loan volumes and interest rates, let alone more esoteric features like loan collateral or default contingencies. A pathbreaking new study by researchers at AidData at William & Mary, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Georgetown Law School, and the Center for Global Development changes that.