Those who follow CGD will be familiar with our branded meme: “Cash on Delivery” aid, or COD. Many are enthusiastic about COD’s potential to revolutionize aid effectiveness. Yet within some global development organizations, leadership and staff alike express common concerns: is COD practical in the real world? Have you thought about this problem, or that constraint? How would this work in the context of our organization? And if we decided to move forward, how would we design a COD grant?
CGD Policy Blogs
I’m always a little anxious introducing a topic at a workshop without knowing if the presentations that follow will support or contradict my points. So it was with some trepidation that I spoke earlier this month at a SIDA workshop in Stockholm, associated with the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency’s launch of “Results Based Financing Approaches (RBFA) — What Are They?”.
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is the newest funding source to address climate change in developing countries. With $10 billion in pledges – and $5 billion committed to mitigation – the GCF is at a critical juncture because its Board is considering the rules and protocols it will follow when it pays for results. We believe the GCF can learn a lot from existing results-based aid agreements and the state of REDD+ finance (summarized in the forthcoming report of a CGD Working Group) which demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of pay for results approaches.
There’s a growing consensus that humanitarian cash transfers can help to bridge the widening gap between needs and resources, empowering people affected by disaster and using local markets to deliver the goods and services we previously thought only aid agencies could provide.
In the world of international aid, performance payments are a hot topic. But when it comes to signing performance payment agreements, most funders have been reticent. One of the reasons is a fear of “Double Counting” – paying once for investments to achieve outcomes and a second time when the outcomes are delivered. This concern ignores the complexity of achieving development goals and the intangible assets invested by recipient countries. When funders do agree to performance agreements, they end up ignoring the burden on recipients of “Double Demanding” – disbursing when outcomes are achieved and then setting restrictions on the use of those funds. All this confusion gets in the way of designing effective aid programs.
All the hype (and criticism) over foreign aid programs that pay for results got us wondering: how are these programs being implemented and are they effective?