In this blog, we draw on our newly published Finance for International Development (FID) measure, using the most up-to-date data now available (from 2018) to give an idea of the baseline efforts of the G20. We hope ministers and officials will use this information in considering the level of their and others’ financial commitments (given their income levels) and encourage a step up from the laggards—most obviously Argentina, Australia, Canada, Italy, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.
CGD Policy Blogs
There is a lot of money being spent on official development assistance (ODA). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) confirmed recently that countries provided over $160 billion in ODA in 2020. But ten years on from the global agreement reached in Busan, South Korea to improve the quality of how development cooperation is delivered, what do we know about how well provider countries and multilateral agencies spend that money?
In 2019-20, donors will commit roughly $170 billion of public funding to an alphabet soup of international aid organisations, many of which their citizens may never have heard of. Each replenishment will be considered as a separate exercise, ignoring the reality that they are competing for limited donor resources.
Last year the World Bank adopted a new “cascade” approach that intended to maximise finance for development by prioritising private solutions wherever possible. In what world would this “cascade” algorithm make sense? Without a good answer to that question, the cascade risks looking like ideology rather than sound development finance advice.
Demand for development finance as a key complement to traditional aid is growing, but despite the impressive strength of the US private sector, the US government’s ability to respond—to date— has fallen short. The good news: Congress got the memo.
In advance of adopting a new Policy on Public Information, the AIIB is inviting suggestions on how it could best align public disclosure with its guiding principles of “promoting transparency, enhancing accountability and protecting confidentiality.” The adoption of the new policy provides AIIB President Jin Liqun and the AIIB shareholders an opportunity to demonstrate that this newest of multilateral development banks (MDBs) is serious about its commitment to adopting international best practices. I identified a number of actions that the AIIB could take to improve its disclosure practices. Here are my top three recommendations:
In 1944, the United States created a blueprint for economic statecraft that relied heavily on a new class of multilateral institutions to pursue US interests in the world. The blueprint itself is now under serious duress in the “America First” strategy of international engagement of the Trump administration.
World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim on robots in the workplace, multilateral cooperation, and the development potential of blockchain.
Since the 2015 financing for development agreement, donor governments and their development finance institutions have all been singing from the same hymn sheet: we must do more to mobilize private investment. Here I will argue that setting leverage targets in isolation might not get us what we want: more investment in developing countries. Overall investment volumes in chosen markets may make a better target, but any incentives must be soft to minimize the temptation to put public money where it is not needed.
Today, the Center for Global Development, the Brookings Institution, and the Overseas Development Institute released The New Global Agenda and the Future of the MDB System, a report we jointly prepared as input to the deliberations of the G20-convened Eminent Persons Group on Global Financial Governance. We argue that current global economic challenges require a rethink of the role that multilateral development banks (MDBs) can play in developing countries. Here are the top five areas where MDB reform is needed to help meet the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals: