Afghanistan’s history is blighted by the actions of foreigners. The near-neighbours have plenty on their consciences; others further afield do too, including the British a century ago, the Russians in the 1980s, and the US-led NATO coalition over the last 20 years. So who wants what now?
CGD Policy Blogs
USAID Administrator Samantha Power appeared before House and Senate authorizing committees late last week to discuss the agency’s FY22 budget. It wasn’t surprising to hear Administrator Power make a case for strong US global engagement—including robust aid investments and continued commitment to humanitarian response. But she also demonstrated—in a number of important ways—a clear-eyed focus on development effectiveness. Below we highlight several issues we were glad to see receive attention.
The COVID-19 pandemic has pushed 120 million people across the globe into extreme poverty, and the limited data available thus far suggests that the wealth of extremely rich individuals has risen at the same time. In this blog post, we provide new evidence that in addition to its human cost, terrorism can have important consequences for public budgets. Most of the costs of terrorism—like loss of life and political upheaval—are well-known, but the macroeconomic and fiscal impacts are less well understood.
In this blog, we draw on our newly published Finance for International Development (FID) measure, using the most up-to-date data now available (from 2018) to give an idea of the baseline efforts of the G20. We hope ministers and officials will use this information in considering the level of their and others’ financial commitments (given their income levels) and encourage a step up from the laggards—most obviously Argentina, Australia, Canada, Italy, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.
Removing the Wedge between Process Actors and Knowledge Actors in Development Cooperation: A Step toward More Inclusive and Networked Global Governance
COVID-19 has exacerbated several pre-pandemic trends in international development cooperation—among the most obvious, the weakening of the multilateral system and its subdued response to crises. One manifestation of this trend is the noticeable wedge in the relationship between process actors and knowledge actors in development cooperation governance.
In the first two editions of the CGD/Gui2de Future of Development seminar series, our look at the big ideas that have the potential to reshape the face of development over the next decades, we examined how the adoption of digital technologies could change the way farmers receive and engage with information, and in turn their agricultural and marketing practices; and the
On January 1, 2021, the long-anticipated African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) became a reality. But AfCFTA’s potential might not be fully realized without stronger digital connectivity and effective policies that promote the free flow of data and information across member states to facilitate knowledge sharing and collaboration and reduce trade integration costs and address existing structural barriers to intra-regional trade in Africa.
There is a lot of money being spent on official development assistance (ODA). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) confirmed recently that countries provided over $160 billion in ODA in 2020. But ten years on from the global agreement reached in Busan, South Korea to improve the quality of how development cooperation is delivered, what do we know about how well provider countries and multilateral agencies spend that money?
In 2003, an estimated 3 million people died of HIV/AIDS globally. In May of that year, galvanized by the growing number of preventable deaths given the availability of an effective medicine, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief—PEPFAR—was signed into law.
Early on in the COVID-19 pandemic, researchers grappled with an ethical and methodological dilemma: should they integrate measures of violence against women and children into remote data collection efforts—and if so, what logistical protocols were required to safeguard participants against harm? Despite decades of good practice guidelines, institutional ethical boards are often ill-equipped to advise or make determinations on violence data collection, and this is especially true for less traditional remote surveys. Thus, researchers may end up making decisions on what to ask—and what ethical protocol to put in place—based on their experience, knowledge of the study population (setting), and their comfort level with including sensitive questions.