Will the QDDR Recognize that Development and Diplomacy Are Distinct Disciplines?

A bright American University graduate student posed a question to me last night: do you believe the 3D framework--diplomacy, development, and defense as the pillars of U.S. national security—blurs the lines between them and is that a problem?President Bush first elevated development to accompany defense and diplomacy in his U.S. national security strategy.  This approach has been reiterated in President Obama’s national security strategy and further fleshed out in his Global Development Policy.  The “soon”-to-be-released Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) is expected to further refine how at least two of those Ds—the development and diplomacy parts--will work in tandem.Certainly there has been some mission creep from defense into areas of development and even diplomacy.  One can argue that in the complex security environments in which DoD operates (think: Afghanistan and Iraq),  the U.S. military needs to work with local populations in a variety of ways.  However, the distinction between what DoD does versus the State Department and USAID remains distinct. The Department of Defense has a clear line of authority (the well-known chain of command) that is not blurred by complementary diplomatic or development activities.Can we say the same for diplomacy and development?  Unfortunately not, and the trend seems to be worsening. The fuzziness between the two, or even the collapsing of space between them is good for neither.    Development is not a tool of diplomacy; diplomacy is not a tool of development.  Both are tools for achieving foreign policy objectives.  They are distinct disciplines that can be complementary, but they are separate endeavors.As Senator Lugar noted, “Although diplomacy and development often can be mutually reinforcing, at their core, they have different priorities, resource requirements, and time horizons… development must be an independent partner of diplomacy, not merely its servant.”So why do I fear that the QDDR will not appreciate this distinction?  Both rhetoric from the State Department and operational realities in Washington and the field support this view.  If that’s not where this is all going, then please help me with the following questions:

1. Why isn’t USAID in charge of Feed the Future?  Global food security is a core development challenge. And it just so happens that USAID Administrator Shah has enormous expertise on agriculture, having worked not only as under-secretary for research, education and economics and chief scientist at the U.S. Department of Agriculture, but also during his tenure at the Gates Foundation. Yet, FTF is being run out of the State Department.  The Global Health Initiative and nascent Global Climate Change Initiative are also at State, despite being major new development initiatives.
2. Why is whole-of-government (WoG) the perceived solution to a fractured aid system?  The WoG approach started percolating a few years ago as a way to better coordinate aid activities among 20-some separate federal government agencies.  Among many of us who used the term (yes, I am guilty), it was seen as a work-around until aid reform occurred -- reform that we hoped would reverse the diaspora trend.  But somewhere on the road to reform, WoG became transformed from the symptom to a cure for the disease.Equally disturbing, WoG seems to be the answer for development (Feed the Future and the Global Health Initiative) but not diplomacy.  It may be worth pausing to consider what a trade agreement would look like negotiated by the Secretary of Agriculture.  Perhaps the Environmental Protection Agency can lead the next U.S. delegation to international climate change talks? I hear there’s a good candidate at the Department of Commerce to be Special Envoy to Sudan.
3. Why so many State Department coordinators (read: diplomats) in charge of development? Under a WoG framework, coordinators are needed to manage the interagency process (see question 2 above).  There are coordinators for reconstruction and stabilization, global HIV/AIDS, counterterrorism, international energy, global women’s issues, and probably a soon-to-be announced global food coordinator.  Then there are foreign assistance coordinators in the field, notably in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Eight for eight of the preceding list are State Department diplomats.  If the QDDR did not look at this panoply of coordinators, it should.

I’ll be reading the QDDR carefully when it is released for answers to these questions. And I hope the answer is not  “referred for further study.”  The bottom line is that the rhetoric of elevating development rings hollow if it is not distinct from diplomacy and defense. U.S. development should be led by a premier development agency and its technical development experts.