Representative Howard Berman released draft legislation, the Global Partnerships Act, that would rewrite the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. As noted here earlier, the FAA has not been re-authorized by Congress since 1985. Berman, previously as chairman and currently as ranking minority member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, directed his staff to craft a bill that updated U.S. foreign assistance laws to reflect a world with new threats and plenty of new actors. In doing so, his staff recognized the need to create opportunities for grand bargains.Grand bargains are hard to achieve, but they can, by definition, offer benefits for both sides. Yes, it involves compromise - something in short supply these days - but a grand bargain implies more than just compromise. It promises a tangible benefit in exchange for relinquishing an asset. You give me a good enough price, and I’ll give up some hard-earned cash. Of course, the price I want to pay may be too low, and that’s where the compromise comes in. You get a little less than you want, and I pay a little more than I had planned. To reach a grand bargain means that policymakers in the administration and Congress, as well as in the aid community, need to consider the costs and payoffs before agreeing to start the bargaining process.So here’s my tally sheet on the potential bargains offered either in the Global Partnerships Act, or via the process of a debate on a new foreign assistance act, and the possible consequences of not acting.Congress and the Administration. Congress complains that administrations act without consulting Congress. Administrations complain that Congress micro-manages everything they do via earmarks, reporting requirements, notifications, and holds (so better to keep the legislative branch as uninformed as feasibly possible).
- The potential bargain – Congress stops micro-managing in exchange for better consultation. The administration gets more flexibility in exchange for a little more legislative legwork.
- The consequences of no bargain – Congress passes more burdensome conditions that make it virtually impossible for aid to be managed effectively; funding gets gutted for lack of results.
- The potential bargain – Internationalists, some of whom have never met an international program they didn’t like, agree to a better prioritized set of U.S. objectives in exchange for buy-in on the value of U.S. non-military engagement among American First-ers, some of whom have never met an international program they could support.
- The consequence of no bargain – Foreign aid continues to be the punching bag of budget cutters even though it represents roughly 1% of the budget. Partisans continue to fight over funding levels rather than the more important issues of agreeing on objectives and strategies.
- The potential bargain – Aid groups stop lobbying based on sector, project, or country. In exchange, the greater flexibility given to government agencies allows for a better and more predictable allocation of resources.
- The consequences of no bargain – Authorizing and appropriations bills become so littered with directives that, in periods of budget austerity, groups resort to hand-to-hand combat over funds. Turning the Capitol into the Roman Coliseum is just not a good idea.
- The potential bargain – The government does better evaluations and evidenced-based programming around a set of agreed-upon objectives in exchange for recognition among the public that this component of U.S. global engagement is needed and works.
- The consequence of no bargain – Aid funding continues to be under attack until all that’s left is military assistance or the Department of Defense in charge of development.
Disclaimer
CGD blog posts reflect the views of the authors, drawing on prior research and experience in their areas of expertise. CGD is a nonpartisan, independent organization and does not take institutional positions.