Oeindrila Dube is a post-doctoral fellow at the Center for Global Development, and an assistant professor in politics and economics at New York University. She holds a Ph.D. in Public Policy from Harvard University, a M.Phil in Economics from the University of Oxford, and a B.A. in Public Policy from Stanford University. She also received the Rhodes Scholarship in 2002.
Dube’s research focuses on the political economy of conflict and development. One strand seeks to understand the economic causes and consequences of civil war. Focusing on Colombia, she has analyzed how international price shocks to agricultural and natural resource exports have affected civil war dynamics and assessed how U.S. military aid affects political violence and electoral outcomes. She has also investigated how armed conflict, in turn, affects economic activity such as firm investment. Her current work in this area also seeks to understand how changes in U.S. gun legislation have affected drug-war violence in Mexico, and how local-level reconciliation efforts affect poverty and violence in West Africa. A second strand of her research focuses on access to basic services in post-conflict nations. In this area, her current work uses randomized evaluation to examine how institutions and incentives, financial and non-financial, affect access to health services in Sierra Leone.
More information about Dube’s work can be found at: http://politics.as.nyu.edu/object/oeindriladube.html
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My guest this week is Oeindrila Dube, a postdoctoral fellow here at the Center for Global Development and an assistant professor of politics and economics at New York University. She is the author, along with Suresh Naidu, of a new paper that examines the relationships between U.S. military aid to Colombia and paramilitary violence and electoral participation in that country. Her paper reaches the unsettling conclusion that U.S. military assistance dollars may in fact be responsible for raising the levels of political violence.
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Does foreign military assistance strengthen or further weaken fragile states facing internal conflict? In a new working paper, CGD post-doctoral fellow Oeindrila Dube and co-author Suresh Naidu find that U.S. military assistance to Colombia may increase violence and decrease voter turnout, undermining the perceived value of foreign military assistance.
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Does foreign military assistance strengthen or further weaken fragile states facing internal conflict? In a new working paper, CGD post-doctoral fellow Oeindrila Dube and co-author Suresh Naidu find that U.S. military assistance to Colombia may increase violence and decrease voter turnout, undermining the perceived value of foreign military assistance.
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My guest this week is Oeindrila Dube, a postdoctoral fellow here at the Center for Global Development and an assistant professor of politics and economics at New York University. She is the author, along with Suresh Naidu, of a new paper that examines the relationships between U.S. military aid to Colombia and paramilitary violence and electoral participation in that country. Her paper reaches the unsettling conclusion that U.S. military assistance dollars may in fact be responsible for raising the levels of political violence.
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Do Bilateral Donors Give Aid to Influence Elections?
- Mar 25, 2010
Understanding the effectiveness of foreign aid is a top priority for development research. But effectiveness at what? Research has focused on how foreign aid affects poverty or growth, but anecdotal evidence suggests that donors often use aid for other ends. We test whether donors use bilateral foreign aid to influence elections in developing countries. We find that recipient country administrations closely aligned with a donor receive more aid during election years, while those less aligned receive less. Consistent with our interpretation, this effect holds only in competitive elections and U.S. aid to non-government entities follows an opposite pattern. (This work is joint with Michael Faye.)
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Does U.S. Military Aid Finance Illegal Armed Groups? Evidence from Colombia
- Jul 29, 2009
Abstract: This paper examines how US military aid affects political violence and democracy in Colombia. Since military aid is channeled to particular Colombian army brigades operating out of government military bases, we compare how changes in aid affect violence and elections outcomes in municipalities with and without bases. To address potential endogeneity in the timing of aid, we use an instrument based on U.S. military aid to the rest of the world (excluding Latin America). We find that increases in US military lead to differential increases in attacks by paramilitaries (who are aligned with the government), but have no significant effect on attacks by guerillas. The aid shock also results in more paramilitary political assassinations during election periods, but has no significant effect on guerilla assassinations. Finally, increases in aid reduce voter turnout in base municipalities, and these effects are larger in politically contested areas. The results suggest that foreign military aid may strengthen the capacity of armed non-state actors, undermining domestic political institutions.
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Listen to podcast interviews with Oeindrila Dube here.
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